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SUMMARY OF THESIS
The concept of insight in mental illness is explored with the objective of 
developing a structural model of insight This model, in turn, aims to provide a 
framework allowing the different clinical phenomena subsumed under the term 
'insight' to be identified in a systematic manner. It is through the identification 
of, and differentiation between, such clinical phenomena that further progress 
can be made in the determination of the possible neurobiology underlying the 
different aspects of insight and insightlessness.
The thesis is divided into 2 sections. The first section (chapters 1-5) examines 
and analyses the notion of insight into mental illness from its historical 
development as an independent concept to the ways in which insight has been 
conceptualised and explored in clinical psychiatry and related disciplines. The 
second section (chapters 6-8) focuses on developing a model for the structure 
of insight. This section represents an integration of both conceptual and 
empirical work. Thus, the issues arising from the analysis in the first section are 
examined critically in order to determine possible theoretical components to the 
concept of insight as a whole. The empirical work draws on 2 studies 
undertaken to explore insight clinically and which help to support some of the 
theoretical distinctions made between the constituents of insight.
An overview of the chapters
Chapter 1 examines the concept of insight in mental illness from a historical 
perspective, concentrating predominantly on the views held by the late 19th 
century French alienists. This focus is the result of, firstly, the importance and 
influence of 19th century French psychopathology on Western psychiatry in 
general (Ackerknecht, 1967). Secondly, the French debates on this issue 
seemed to be particularly explicit in ways which not only bear resemblance to
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current problems in this area, but help also to show how ideas on 
consciousness and insight developed in the context of the changing 
philosophical and medico-pathological views at the time.
Chapter 2 examines insight from a variety of psychological approaches which 
have also contributed to the conceptualisation of insight in psychiatry and 
neurology. Of interest here has been the view of insight as a particular form of 
intelligent behaviour developed by the Gestalt and the Gestalt-influenced 
cognitive psychologists. The different meaning of insight with its inherent 
underlying mechanism is explored in the psychoanalytical literature with the 
particular emphasis being placed on the gaining of insight in the context of 
psychotherapy.
Chapter 3 reviews the current empirical work on insight within clinical 
psychiatry. Most researchers have focused on exploring insight in patients with 
psychoses. It Is apparent that there is considerable variability in both the way in 
which insight is defined, and the methods used to evaluate it clinically. 
Consequently, it is also not clear whether in fact studies are seeking to capture 
and assess the same clinical phenomenon. Results of research in this field are 
likewise variable and the relationship between patients' insight into their 
psychopathology and clinical variables such as severity of illness, type of illness 
or cognitive function remains unclear.
Chapter 4 examines work on insight and awareness in relation to neurological 
syndromes. Anosognosia, or unawareness of a specific and overt 
neuropsychological deficit, presents as a fairly dramatic clinical picture of 
insightlessness. It is important to question whether this constitutes the same 
clinical phenomenon as loss of insight in relation to mental illness. 
Neuropsychological theories attempting to explain such phenomena are
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examined. These theories are particularly important since they have 
increasingly also been applied to research on insight in general psychiatry.
Chapter 5 reviews the work on insight in chronic organic brain syndromes. This 
is considered as a separate chapter partly because of the recent increase in 
studies examining insight in patients with dementia, and also because 
approaches in this area have tended to be based on an admixture of methods 
used in both psychiatry and neurology.
Following these analyses, chapter 6 begins to develop a definition and structure 
for the concept of insight in psychiatry. On the basis of this, a simple instrument 
devised to assess levels of insight is constructed and a study is described in 
which this is tested in patients suffering from either schizophrenia or a 
depressive illness. The insight instrument identifies qualitative aspects to the 
insight held by the patients. In particular, items relating to awareness of change 
in patients are distinguished from items relating to awareness of illness and are 
differentially endorsed. The study also shows that the level of insight (as 
assessed by the insight instrument) held by the patients changes during the 
course of their illness episode. In addition, differences in the level and type of 
insight held are identified between patients with schizophrenia and those with 
depression. The small number of patients involved In this study preclude firm 
conclusions to be drawn, but nevertheless, point towards interesting issues 
relating to the components of insight and to the direction of future research.
Chapter 7 continues to develop the structural configuration of insight by 
focusing particularly on the differences apparent between the psychiatric and 
neurological/neuropsychological disciplines in their conceptualisation and 
approaches used in the study of insightlessness. A study is described in which 
this issue is highlighted by examining insight into memory function in a mixed 
group of patients suffering from either organic memory dysfunction or functional
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psychiatric disorders. Most significantly, the study identifies qualitative 
differences in the impaired insight shown between patients with an organic 
basis to their memory difficulties (n=56) and those without an organic deficit 
(n=44). It is argued, in the light of further analysis, that this result is best 
understood in terms of there being different phenomena elicited in the patient 
groups. The differentiation between such clinical phenomena falling within the 
concept of insightlessness carries important implications for the structure of 
insight. These implications are discussed with reference to possible different 
underlying explanatory mechanisms.
Chapter 8 brings together the analytical and empirical work to formulate a 
hierarchical model for the structure of insight. The model identifies different 
levels of insight structure and suggests that these may be differentially 
important when insight is assessed in relation to different 'objects' as well as for 
different purposes (i.e. clinical or research). The importance of maintaining 
distinctions between levels of insight structure is discussed in relation to 
implications for underlying mechanisms and hence for brain localisation.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of insight in relation to the 'healthy' mind has for a long time been 
a source of much interest to philosophers, psychologists, theologians, writers, 
and lay people. In Western cultures, for example, interest in self-examination is 
already evident in ancient Greek philosophy. 'Know Thyself is inscribed on the 
temple of Apollo at Delphi and self-knowledge was a dominant feature in 
Socrates' teaching (Plato, Charmides, 164e). According to Socrates, caring for 
one's soul was the individual's main duty. However, only when one had self- 
knowledge could one care for oneself (Plato, Alcibiades, 129b).
With the decline of the Greek culture, the interest in self-knowledge appeared 
to diminish. Morris (1972) argued that concern about human individuality 
reappeared in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, but primarily in relation to 
Christianity. The emphasis in the Middle Ages on self-examination seemed to 
lie in the pursuit of moral virtues and the self was viewed as under constant 
supervision and judgement by God. During the Renaissance, the conception of 
self changed. Accompanying the expansion in science, technology and the 
economy, interest became more focused on the self as an individual and on his 
or her relationship with the world. Amongst the Renaissance writers, Pico della 
Mirandola (1965) placed the self at the centre of the universe. He maintained 
that the individual was capable of judging himself and thus should be in control 
of his own life. In other words, the emphasis was on the self as someone who 
could exert effects on himself and on the world and society.
In the 17th century interest in individuality continued to develop. Descartes 
identified consciousness or awareness with thinking: 'It is correct that to be 
aware is both to think and to reflect on one's thought... [the soul] has the power 
to reflect on its thoughts as often as it likes, and to be aware of its thought in 
this way...' (Descartes, 1648/1991, p335). He assumed, as did Locke later, that
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every experience of the individual was accompanied by self-awareness 
(Perkins, 1969). In the 18th and 19th century, during the Enlightenment and the 
period known as Romanticism, the self became the true focus of thought. Self- 
awareness became self-reflection and self-consciousness. In contrast to 
Descartes who focused predominantly on the individual's self, the Romantics 
and some of the philosophers of that time argued that self-consciousness 
develops mutually with the consciousness of others. By being aware of others 
as reflexive beings, one is able to look at oneself through the eyes of others. 
One becomes the object of one's own observation (Mead, 1934, 1936). As a 
result, introspection became a prevailing theme of that time.
While interest in the self and self-awareness has grown and developed over a 
long time, there has been, in comparison, very little work carried out on the 
notions of awareness and insight into mental illness. Little is written on the 
history of these concepts, for example, when and why insight into illness was 
introduced into Western psychiatry. In the late 19th century, work on 
consciousness and awareness in relation to mental illness, as well as 
discussions on the value of subjective information, begins to appear (Dagonet, 
1881; Parant, 1888). Similarly, early neurologists and neuropsychologists were 
having to provide explanations for strange clinical findings such as the 
anosognosias or the occasional refusal of blind patients to accept their disability 
(Anton, 1899). Based on clinico-anatomical correlations the suggestion was 
soon made that such clinical syndromes resulted from specific brain lesions. 
Others, on the other hand, claimed that such major states of insightlessness 
resulted from diffuse pathological changes in cognition and mental functioning. 
Much the same debate continues to the present day.
In current clinical practice, the mental state examination demands an 
assessment of the patient's insight, but until relatively recently, questions 
concerning what this actually meant, how this should be done and even why
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this might be important, had not been addressed. In the last decade, however, 
insight into mental symptoms and illness has become an important subject of 
systematic research. Various instruments have been developed in attempts to 
assess patients' understanding of their experiences in a quantitative and 
qualitative way. Likewise, increasing interest in the subjective experiences of 
patients with neurological syndromes and dementias has resulted in a 
proliferation of studies focusing specifically on this aspect of patients' mental 
states. Curiously, research on insight from these various areas has tended to 
converge into two main domains of interest. First, studies have been aimed at 
exploring the specific features characterising those patients who seem to show 
some degree of insight, in comparison to those patients who appear insightless. 
In other words, questions are focused on the relationship between the 
presence/absence of insight and features such as the severity of the disorder 
affecting the patient, the effect of past experience of the illness, duration of 
hospital admission, and so on. Second, interest has been directed at correlating 
insightlessness with both neuroimaging and neuropsychological variables in an 
attempt to identify some form of brain localisation for insight.
It is interesting, however, and striking in the midst of this increased enthusiasm 
for the subject, that very little work has focused on examining the concept of 
insight itself, i.e. what insight means in the context of mental disorder and what 
its components might be. Is lack of insight simply unawareness of a particular 
phenomenon (akin to anosognosia in relation to neurological syndromes), or 
does insight involve additional judgements, i.e. attempts to make some sort of 
sense of the experienced phenomena? Is there a difference in the types of 
mental (and hence neurological) processes underlying awareness and 
judgement? Is this sort of distinction important clinically? Is it important from the 
research viewpoint, i.e. in exploring possible mechanisms and localisation of 
insight? Does the type of mental illness, mental symptom or neurological 
impairment, affect the way in which insight is conceptualised and assessed?
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The aim of this thesis is to explore the concept of insight in mental illness, in 
order to try to answer some of the above questions. Crucial to empirical work 
and further research is the development of a clear understanding of what is 
being assessed, not only from the perspective of trying to gain more knowledge 
about insight itself, but also thereby clarifying the value and limitations of 
methods used for its investigation, and consequently, the results and 
conclusions that can be drawn from these. For the purpose of conceptual 
analysis, the thesis is divided into two sections. The first section (chapters 1-5), 
is concerned with reviewing and analysing the ways in which the term 'insight' 
has been used and the concept studied in general psychiatry and related 
disciplines. The aim of the second section (chapters 6-8) is to build up a picture 
of the structure of insight. This is constructed on the basis of both theoretical 
and empirical work. Thus, some of the ideas emerging from the first section are 
developed alongside the analysis of individual terms and concepts important to 
the notion of insight, so that a model of the structure of insight is gradually built 
up. The results of empirical work reviewed in the first section together with 
additional results based on two empirical studies undertaken to specifically 
explore insight clinically, help to further develop and illustrate the model.
An overview of the chapters
Chapter 1 examines the concept of insight in mental illness from a historical 
perspective, concentrating predominantly on the views held by the late 19th 
century French alienists. This focus is the result of, firstly, the importance and 
influence of 19th century French psychopathology on Western psychiatry in 
general (Ackerknecht, 1967). Secondly, the French debates on this issue 
seemed to be particularly explicit in ways which not only bear resemblance to 
current problems in this area, but help also to show how ideas on 
consciousness and insight developed in the context of the changing
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philosophical and medico-pathological views at the time. Chapter 2 examines 
insight from a variety of psychological approaches which have also contributed 
to the conceptualisation of insight in psychiatry and neurology. Of interest here 
has been the view of insight as a particular form of intelligent behaviour 
developed by the Gestalt and the Gestalt-influenced cognitive psychologists. 
The different meaning of insight with its inherent underlying mechanism is 
explored in the psychoanalytical literature with the particular emphasis being 
placed on the gaining of insight in the context of psychotherapy. Chapter 3 
reviews the current empirical work on insight within clinical psychiatry. Here, it Is 
evident that interest has been directed primarily at exploring insight in patients 
with psychoses and the chapter focuses particularly on the variety of methods 
developed to assess insight in these patients. Chapter 4 examines work on 
insight and awareness in relation to neurological syndromes. Anosognosia, or 
unawareness of a specific and overt neuropsychological deficit, presents as a 
fairly dramatic clinical picture of insightlessness. It is important to question 
whether this constitutes the same clinical phenomenon as loss of insight in 
relation to mental illness. Neuropsychological theories attempting to explain 
such phenomena are examined. These theories are particularly important since 
they have increasingly also been applied to research on insight in general 
psychiatry. Chapter 5 reviews the work on insight in chronic organic brain 
syndromes. This is considered as a separate chapter partly because of the 
recent increase in studies examining insight in patients with dementia, and also 
because approaches in this area have tended to be based on an admixture of 
methods used in both psychiatry and neurology. Following these analyses, 
chapter 6 begins to develop a definition and structure for the concept of insight 
in psychiatry. On the basis of this, a simple instrument devised to assess levels 
of insight is constructed and a study is described in which this is tested in 
patients suffering from either schizophrenia or a depressive illness. Chapter 7 
continues to develop the structural configuration of insight by focusing 
particularly on the differences apparent between the psychiatric and
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neurological/neuropsychological disciplines in their conceptualisation and 
approaches used in the study of insightlessness. A study is described in which 
this issue is highlighted by examining insight into memory function in a mixed 
group of patients suffering from either organic memory dysfunction or functional 
psychiatric disorders. Chapter 8 brings together the analytical and empirical 
work to formulate a hierarchical model for the structure of insight. The model 
identifies different levels of insight structure and suggests that these may be 
differentially important when insight is assessed in relation to different 'objects' 
as well as for different purposes (i.e. clinical or research). The importance of 
maintaining distinctions between levels of insight structure is discussed in 
relation to implications for underlying mechanisms and hence for localisation.
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Section I: Insight in Clinical Psychiatry 
Chapter 1
Insight in mental illness (psychoses): a historical overview
Examining the concept of insight or insightlessness from a historical 
perspective presents numerous problems. There is the issue, for example, of 
deciding which definition of insight should be used as the object of inquiry. As 
will be seen in subsequent chapters, the definition of insight is variable not only 
between different clinical disciplines, but also within the same discipline. The 
question then is whether narrower definitions, such as the meaning of 
'awareness of illness' implicit in much of the current empirical research in 
psychiatry (McEvoy et al., 1989a,b,c; Amador et al., 1991; Young et al., 1993), 
should be explored and traced. Alternatively, the specific problem-solving 
notion in configurational learning as employed in Gestalt cognitive psychology 
(Sternberg & Davidson, 1995) could be examined, or perhaps it might make 
more sense to trace wider notions of insight such as self-knowledge (Markova 
& Berrios, 1992a, Gillett, 1994), self-appropriation of one's intellectual and 
rational self-consciousness (Lonergan, 1957), psychodynamic 'comprehension' 
(Richfield, 1954), or the cognitive view according to which insight is a function 
of a putative 'mind reading system' (Baron-Cohen, 1995). The problem here 
goes beyond that of tracing individual accounts or even attempting to capture 
the 'correct' invariant (assuming that there is such an object) that would enable 
one to devise a useful and valid reconstruction. More importantly, this problem 
concerns the consideration of the broader issue of chronicling a general history 
of insight, of determining whether the definitions grounded in the different 
traditions are based on a common ancestor or whether they are only related by 
a tenuous etymological link.
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Berrios (1994a, 1996) has suggested that one way of approaching the above 
problem, i.e. in the construction of a valid historical account of 
symptoms/illness, is to make an explicit distinction between the histories of the 
terms, the behaviours and the concepts relating to the object of inquiry. 
Differentiating between the histories of these aspects of insight helps to 
illustrate and clarify how the meanings of insight may change, not only in time 
but also in relation to different contexts, whether these are social, cultural, 
intellectual, etc. This approach shall thus be followed here. It should be 
emphasised, however, that such distinctions made in relation to the histories of 
insight, do not entail their independence. For example, when considering 
insight as a 'behaviour', then clearly this is not an atheoretical object, nor one 
that is given as an overt expression of an ontological entity. Indeed, behaviours 
corresponding to insight are likely to have less ontological mass than other 
medical objects such as tumours, heart murmurs or hallucinations. Instead, 
interpretation of such behaviour (as insightful or insightless) is the result of 
overt and covert conceptualisation which in turn is shaped by a background of 
related concepts (e.g., ideas about the 'self, about the workings of the mind, 
about illness and mental illness, etc.) themselves determined in part by the 
views and knowledge held during the particular historical period of the subject. 
This is not to say that insight has no neurobiological basis but only that the 
capture of its behavioural core (ontology) depends on concepts 
(epistemological devices). Hence, the history of insight must study the 
contextualised interaction of etymology, concepts and behaviours.
This chapter thus first examines some of the historical contexts forming the 
background to insight and related notions. Then a brief overview of the history 
of the term 'insight' will be given, followed by an account of the history of the 
concept and behaviour of 'insight'. The histories of the concept and behaviour 
of insight are discussed together because of their particular interdependence.
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The focus in this chapter will be, for reasons of space and in accordance with 
the general clinical interest, on insight in relation to psychoses.
1.1 Historical contexts
Until the early 19th century, the official view of insanity, as had been first 
offered by Hobbes and Locke during the 17th century (Berrios, 1994b), was 
based on the presence of delusions. Delusions, by definition, incorporated the 
notion of'insightlessness'. In other words, between the late 17th century and 
the early 19th century, it would have been a logical contradiction in terms to talk 
about 'awareness of delusions'. Insight, being inherent to the concept of 
delusion, was therefore a parameter in the definition of insanity, rather than a 
variable that could be examined separately. Consequently, this makes it difficult 
to find discussions from this period concerning the significance of 'varying 
insightlessness' in relation to insanity. In addition, at this time, ideas of 
subjectivity or introspection were not yet central to the meaning of madness 
and did not become important in this respect until the middle of the 19th 
century.
Only occasionally and in the legal sense 'awareness of (mental) illness' became 
an issue during the late 18th century. At this time debates were emerging 
surrounding the existence of partial insanity. In this context, lawyers, 
challenging the concept of total insanity (Goldstein, 1987), raised the question 
of the possibility of awareness in relation to insanity. At the beginning of the 
19th century partial insanity had two meanings. First, it referred to the concept 
of intermittent insanity, i.e. periods of madness interspersed with 'lucid'
Intervals, lucidity relating to either reversion (temporarily) to normality by the 
mental faculties, or the sparing of the intellectual faculties in the face of disease 
involving rest of the mental faculties (Despine, 1875; Legrand du Saulle, 1864). 
Second, partial insanity meant incomplete insanity or monomania, i.e. the
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madness was viewed as affecting only one or some regions of the psyche 
(Kageyama, 1984). Thus, awareness of illness could in such contexts be 
conceived as occurring in relation to either the unaffected faculties of the mind, 
or in relation to the unaffected periods in the course of the illness.
Another development important to the history of insight at the beginning of the 
19th century and relating also to the conceptualisation of partial insanity, was 
the gradual emergence of different forms of faculty psychology. This in broad 
terms referred to the view that the mind operates on the basis of individual, 
independent units or functions, and contrasted with the prevailing 
associationism which, following the empirical philosophy of Locke and 
Condillac, viewed the mind as indivisible. The challenge to the associationistic 
view of the 'workings of the mind' and hence also to the notion of total insanity 
came from a variety of both theoretical and empirical sources. Prominent 
amongst these was the rise of the phrenology movement through the work of 
Gall and Spurzheim which was important in influencing the views of alienists in 
early 19th century France (Goldstein, 1987) and Britain (Cooter, 1979). 
Specifically, Gall proposed that innate, independent faculties were localisable to 
particular organs/regions in the brain and that these were responsible for 
individual mental qualities, constitutive of both mind and character (Spoerl, 
1936). A different form of faculty psychology, viewing faculties more in 
functional terms (or powers) and consisting of different 'content' (e.g. 
understanding, will, judgement etc.), came from the 18th century Scottish 
philosophers, particularly Thomas Reid (1785/1863). This also permeated into 
the thinking of French philosophers and alienists during the early and middle of 
the 19th century (Boutroux, 1908). From an empirical perspective, the clinical 
observations of the alienists of the early 19th century likewise contributed to the 
development of views about the mind as consisting of separate mental 
functions and hence, vulnerable to independent dysfunction. Pinel, Prichard 
and Esquirol, amongst others, proposed a definition of insanity in terms of
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faculty psychology which in due course made possible the creation of new 
clinical categories such as the 'emotional' and 'volitional' insanities (Berrios & 
Gill, 1995). Pinel, in particular, was explicit in the conclusions he drew on the 
basis of his observations of insane patients: '...the examples of manic patients 
with fury but without délire and without any incoherence in their ideas, are far 
from being rare in both women and men, and they go to show how much 
lesions of the will can be distinct from those of the understanding, even though 
they frequently occur together' (Pinel, 1809, p i 02, my emphases). Pinel then 
went on to question how such examples could be explained if the views held by 
Locke and Condillac were to be followed. Similarly, he noted that patients could 
appear to have lesions of the affective faculties only, or even isolated lesions 
involving attention, memory, thoughts or judgement. Again, Pinel could not 
reconcile his observations with the doctrine of indivisibility of human 
understanding (Pinel, 1801). The new clinical categories formed as a result of 
such observations, e.g. volitional insanities, were thus subsequently found not 
to be necessarily linked to 'insightlessness', even if in practice, patients with 
severe depression or mania or abulia might refuse to accept that they were 'ill'. 
In other words, the concept of 'partial' insanity and of monomania allowed for 
the existence of an insanity which could have awareness of itself. This is thus 
the historical moment in which 'insightlessness' ceased to be a parameter in the 
definition of insanity. It became meaningful, for the first time, to treat it as a 
variable.
Faculty psychology raised important debates in relation to mental illness. Falret 
(1866), for example, believed that faculties represented useful psychological 
divisions but did not necessarily represent pathological divisions of the brain. 
He, like Maudsiey some years later, believed that madness, even if affecting 
predominantly one or some faculties, had its effects on all. Others, like 
Delasiauve (1866) in the same debate, disagreed and held that insanity could 
be specific to different faculties.
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The conceptualisation of insight or awareness into mental illness was made 
further possible by the changing views on the causes of insanity, these in turn 
relating to shifts in the notion of disease itself. An anonymous historian stated in 
1840: 'all explanations of mental illness boil down to three options: they are 
localised in the brain ... or in the sou l... or in both.' (Fabre, 1840, p i 18). 
Supporters of the anatomo-clinical view of disease, including madness 
(Ackerknecht, 1967), were thus more able to accept the notion of partial 
insanity and monomania and hence also the possibility of insight into the 
diseased mental faculties. In contrast, those who believed that insanity was 
exclusively sited in the mind or soul (l'âme) had difficulty in conceiving partial 
insanity and insight into illness since the soul was, in terms of the philosophy of 
the period, indivisible and could not become partially diseased.
Besides the changing views developing in relation to the nature of mental 
processes and mental illness, the growth and enrichment of insight as a 
concept, was, in the late 19th century, further enabled by the increased interest 
taken in related concepts such as consciousness, introspection (Boring, 1953), 
the self (Berrios, 1993) and in the importance of the subjectivity of inner 
experiences. In addition, there was the arrival in psychology and psychiatry, of 
the concept of comprehension (Verstehen), as developed in different ways by 
Brentano (1973), Dilthey (1976) and eventually, Freud, Husserl and Jaspers, 
amongst others (Berrios, 1992). This concept encompassed more than 
'understanding' and more than 'looking into one's mind' (as suggested by 
introspection). It attempted rather to capture the totality of one's mental and 
existential state (which included also regions of information which are not 
conscious or volition-driven). Within this new frame, 'full insight' demanded 
more than a definition of'intellectual' knowledge of'being ill'. Instead, deeper 
processes involving emotions and volitions also needed to be invoked. The 
mechanisms that made such holistic insight possible varied according to the
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school of thought. In Brentano, for example, this concerned intentionaiity and 
particularly his mechanism of a 'third consciousness': 'Experience shows that 
there exist in us not only a presentation and a judgement, but frequently a third 
kind of consciousness of the mental act, namely a feeling which refers to this 
act, pleasure or displeasure which we feel towards this act' (Brentano, 
1973/1874, p143). For Dilthey, on the other hand, 'Verstehen' attempted to 
grasp the totality of individual's experience ('Erlebnis',- not just inner experience 
but including the relationship between inner and outer), in its historical context 
as well as the cognitive, affective and volitional aspects of consciousness 
(Dilthey, 1976; Makkreel, 1992; Apel, 1987).
1.2 History of the word
The history of the word 'insight' and equivalents is potentially informative. The 
main issue arising here is that the term only exists in the North and West 
Germanic families of languages. The Italic family (French, Spanish, Italian, 
Portuguese, etc.) does not have a corresponding unitary term and the 
translation of insight into any of these languages Is made according to verbal 
function. For example, a well known 19th century German-French dictionary 
translates the German word for 'insight', 'Einsicht', as: 'inspection, examen, 
connaissance de cause, bon sens, jugement' (Rose, 1878). This linguistic fact 
is interesting as it also corresponds with a more marked interest shown in 
'insight' in the countries of the Germanic families. It is not however clear 
whether, or to what extent, having a unitary term (insight or Einsicht) might 
carry implications for the conceptualisation of insight (particularly with respect to 
a putative ontological entity).
For the German term 'Einsicht', Grimm and Grimm propose as equivalents the 
Latin terms 'intelligentia' and 'judicium', and suggest that the term gained wider 
usage in the work of Goethe and Kant (Grimm and Grimm, 1862). Adelung, at
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the very beginning of the 19th century, defines it as 'Das sinneinsehen In eine 
Sache' (understanding the sense of something) (Vol. 1, Adelung, 1811). Ritter 
adds that the Middle German term 'însehen' is present in Medieval mystical 
writings meaning 'hineinsehen' (looking into); and that J.C. Gunther at the 
beginning of the 18th century discarded the religious denotation to use 
'Einsicht' as equivalent to personal evidence (Vol. 2, Ritter, 1972). This writer 
also suggests that the 'psychological' meaning introduced by Kohler (see 
chapter 2) was a departure in that it simply meant 'intelligence' and hence 
approached the old Aristotelian meaning of (jipovrjçiç (thought or 
understanding).
As far as the English is concerned, the second edition of the Oxford English 
Dictionary provides a set of definitions governed by the same metaphor:
'internal sight, with the eyes of the mind, mental vision, perception discernment' 
or 'the fact of penetrating with the eyes of the understanding into the inner 
character or hidden nature of things; a glimpse or view beneath the surface; the 
faculty or power of thus seeing'.
On the other hand, one of the earliest clinical usages of the term 
'insightlessness' can be seen in Krafft-Ebing (1893): 'in the later stages of 
insanity, where delusions have become organised or mental disintegration has 
ensued, the patient is completely insightless [einsichtslos] about his disease 
state' (pi 02).
1.3 History of the concept
The history of the concept of insight is illuminating, particularly in relation to the 
evolution of the notions of reason, consciousness and self-knowledge. In this 
section, only the psychiatric aspects will be examined. As mentioned earlier, 
because of the special nature of the behaviours corresponding to insight (i.e.,
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they have to be accessed via the concepts), their history and that of the 
concepts, will be dealt with together.
French Views
A major debate specifically concerned with awareness of mental illness ('la 
discussion sur les aliénés avec conscience de leur état', SMP, 1870) was held 
by the Société Médico-Psychologique in 1869/1870, and again to a lesser 
extent, in 1875. These discussions were held in the context of medico-legal 
concerns in relation to determining responsibility for criminal and civil acts. 
There had been recognition many years earlier that some insane patients 
retained awareness of their pathological state. The Belgian alienist Guislain 
(1852), for example, observed how some patients, particularly at the beginning 
of their illness, would tell others that they felt unwell, ill or that their illness was 
at the point of exacerbation. In his clinical descriptions of mental illnesses 
Guislain further pointed out that 'awareness could remain intact and the patient 
is able to say to himself; I am mad' (Guislain, 1852, p62). Similarly, Delasiauve 
(1866) had commented on the presence of awareness in some insane patients 
and had specifically designated the term 'pseudo-monomanie' for patients with 
monomania who had awareness of their morbid condition. Falret (1866) in his 
study on 'folie raisonnante' likewise pointed out that some patients with 
delusions and hallucinations knew that they were ill. Many insane patients, he 
observed, 'have perfect awareness of their states, which is in great conflict with 
their ill behaviours, ... with the delusional ideas imposed on them' (Falret, 1866, 
p387). On the basis of this observation, Falret argued against allowing loss of 
awareness to be a criterion distinguishing between reason and insanity. It was 
thus accepted in the debates that followed, that some patients with mental 
illness had awareness of their conditions. Discussion therefore focused firstly, 
on the significance of such awareness, particularly in the area of legal
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responsibility, and secondly, on attempts at defining the criteria and limits of 
insanity itself.
Concerning the question of legal responsibility, most alienists (Delasiauve,
1866, 1870; Falret, 1866, 1870; Morel, 1870) argued that patients could have 
awareness of their mental illness and nevertheless be powerless to prevent the 
behaviours that arose as the result of their madness, and thus, could not be 
held legally responsible for their acts. Morel (1870), emphasising the 
importance of distinguishing between reason and awareness of illness, 
observed that some patients could continue to reason even when deluded but 
still remained unaware of their illness. Other patients, in contrast, might have 
poor ability to reason, but were nevertheless aware of their mental illness 
('aliénés irréponsables mais non des aliénés inconscients' [sic], p i 16). On the 
other hand, Fournet (1870) argued strongly that awareness of illness on the 
part of the patient implied some degree of reason. This in turn implied partial 
responsibility for acts, the degree of responsibility being proportionate to the 
amount of reason held. Fournet's arguments, however, based on the ability of 
the soul to resist 'insane' impulses, were not generally upheld.
In regard to the other domain in which awareness of illness was discussed, 
namely, the nature of mental illness itself, the debate focused on a variety of 
issues. For example, it became clear that terms such as 'intelligence', 'reason', 
'judgement', 'understanding', etc. first needed to be clarified in the context of 
both brain physiology and mental or psychological processes (SMP, 1870). The 
question of whether patients with awareness into their illness could rightly be 
called insane, was also raised. Billed (1870) made some interesting 
observations. First, he reported that awareness was more common in patients 
whose madness followed alcohol excesses and that if these were excluded, 
women showed more awareness into their insanity than men. He also 
presented data showing that of 378 men admitted to the asylum in that year, 61
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showed awareness of their mental illness and in 53 of these patients, their 
mental illness followed alcohol excesses. Of the 61 patients with awareness of 
their mental illness, 49 had complete awareness and 12 showed incomplete 
awareness. Similarly, of 350 women patients admitted in the same year, 19 
showed awareness of their condition and in 5 of these patients, their mental 
illness followed alcohol excesses. Twelve of the 19 patients with awareness of 
their mental illness, showed complete awareness and 7 had incomplete 
awareness. Thus, if patients with mental illness subsequent to alcohol abuse 
were excluded, a greater proportion of female patients compared to male 
patients showed awareness of their mental illness (14 females from 350 
admissions: 6 males from 378 admissions). Second, Billod distinguished 
between two types of awareness shown by insane patients. The first group, he 
noted, were those who were aware of being insane but who nevertheless 
believed in the reality of their delusions. Billod held that this contradiction 
evident between their awareness and their delusional beliefs, signified a lesion 
of judgement. Consequently, this group of patients were to be considered as 
truly insane. The second group, Billod labelled as 'pseudo-insane' (pseudo­
aliénés). Again, patients in this group showed awareness of being insane, but 
in contrast to the first group, they also recognised the falseness or unreality of 
their morbid experiences (this antedates David's (1990) notion of 'relabelling' 
psychotic symptoms as pathological - see chapter 3), even though they 
remained tormented/distressed by them. Because their judgement was thus 
relatively preserved. Billed argued that these patients were not truly insane.
One of the problems in examining the concept of awareness or insight in 19th 
century French psychiatry is that the term 'conscience' refers to two rather 
different concepts. Prosper Despine (1875) pointed out that this was a source 
of confusion since psychologists and philosophers tended to use the concepts 
interchangeably. He suggested that the term 'conscience morale' should be 
used to refer to the English equivalent of 'conscience' (i.e. knowledge of right
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and wrong, good and bad), whilst the term 'conscience personelle' should refer 
to the English term 'consciousness' (he further translated this as 
'conscienciosité [p14]). For Despine, 'conscience personelle' meant knowledge 
of one's mental faculties, i.e. knowledge of what is perceived, remembered, 
reflected, felt, feared etc. and he did not separate this from such activities 
themselves. Thus, he stated that conscience personelle 'is not a special faculty 
... doing and knowing that one is doing, is the same thing' (Despine, 1875, 
p14). This knowledge however does not include further knowledge and 
judgements concerning the nature and cause of mental pathology. In fact, the 
concept of insight in this wider sense is not really possible for Despine because 
of his conception of the psychology of madness (folie). Firstly, he links this 
awareness of thoughts/feelings intrinsically to the intellectual faculties 
themselves. Secondly, he views madness as a disturbance of the moral 
faculties resulting specifically in (moral) blindness to overwhelming passions. 
The intellectual faculties on the other hand may be weakened, but continue to 
work, albeit under the influence of the abnormal passions. He explicitly 
disagrees with Victor Cousin whom he cites as stating '...frequently the 
passions, removing our liberty, remove at the same time the consciousness of 
our actions and ourselves. Thus to use common parlance, one doesn't know 
what one does' (Despine, 1875, p266). Instead, Despine argues that 'man 
always has conscience personelle of acts that he carries out, even when 
blinded by passion, he always knows what he is doing and can, subsequently 
recall it' (Despine, 1875, p266-267). On the other hand, knowledge of the 
mental pathology itself is not possible, 'the one afflicted by madness cannot 
judge it as madness because it is his own blindness that constitutes it' 
(Despine, 1875, p271).
It seems clear therefore that, in contrast to the earlier debates, insight as a 
composite concept of self-awareness and judgements concerning mental 
illness did not exist for Despine. He viewed knowledge of self and the
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knowledge of the nature and effects of madness as separate and distinct 
processes subserved by different types of mental faculties. Whilst the former 
was preserved during madness as a function of the (relatively) intact intellectual 
faculties, the latter was impossible on account of the impaired moral faculties.
In a classical paper on 'Conscience et Aliénation mentale', Henri Dagonet 
(1881) directly addressed the concept of consciousness or awareness 
(conscience) in relation to mental illness. He believed that in order to better 
comprehend mental illness and thus any relationship to anatomical change, it 
was essential to examine the mental symptoms in themselves. Foremost 
among these, he argued, should be the study of anomalies of consciousness. 
Dagonet's concept of 'conscience' was broad, and more akin to the notion of 
insight as used in current studies in clinical psychiatry (at least as theoretically 
defined) than to the notion of awareness as used in the earlier studies or in the 
studies of insight in neurological states (see chapters 3 & 4). He based his 
concept of consciousness on the ideas of Littré and Despine. The former had 
defined 'consciousness' as 'the immediate, constant, intimate (intime) feeling of 
the activity of the self, that is within each phenomenon of moral and intellectual 
life' (Dagonet, 1881, p369, my emphasis). Despine, as described above, had 
defined consciousness as 'the knowledge held by the psyche of its operations, 
its thoughts...(Dagonet, 1881, p369, my emphasis). Dagonet himself defined 
consciousness as 'the intimate (intime) knowledge of ourselves, or the moral 
and intellectual processes going on within us' (Dagonet, 1881, p370). 
Elaborating on this further, he conceived of consciousness as 'capturing all the 
phenomena of our internal life and committing them to memory'. This 
knowledge included the 'feeling of totality of the person (le sentiment de la 
personnalité) which was subject to the transformations experienced by the latter 
under the influence of illness' (Dagonet, 1881, p370). In other words, the 
concept he described was not simply an awareness of a particular function or 
activity (nor was it equivalent to the current meaning of consciousness), but
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suggested also a deeper notion of self-understanding and knowledge. 'In the 
(healthy) physiological state, man has consciousness of himself. He knows and 
understands what is going on in him' (Dagonet, 1881, p374). At the same time, 
this consciousness was as vulnerable to pathology or disease as the rest of the 
psyche.
Dividing up pathological states into those where consciousness was 
lost/disturbed and those where it was preserved, Dagonet observed that in 
relation to mental disorders, there existed a wide range of anomalies of 
consciousness. In most cases of the various mental illnesses the disorders of 
consciousness were related to the disorders affecting other faculties. Thus, the 
manic patient, for example, though generally able to subsequently recall his 
acts within an illness episode, would lose consciousness (i.e. insight) during the 
episode itself. This was evident on account of his inability to fix his attention, of 
his incoherent speech and of the lack of connections between his ideas. 
Similarly, in most cases of hallucinated patients, the hallucination 'removes the 
consciousness of self from the individual and renders him passive to its 
force...such that he will commit all sorts of unreasonable actions under its 
influence' (Dagonet, 1881, p392). Nevertheless, Dagonet pointed out, there are 
other cases where patients appear to retain awareness of the hallucination as 
an abnormal phenomenon and search for explanations. Likewise, with other 
mental illnesses, awareness of these can be absent, modified or retained, in 
the latter case, patients may have full knowledge of themselves, may be able to 
analyse all their (new) experiences and at the same time be unable to 
understand their passivity in the face of the illness.
Interestingly, Dagonet also identified patients who appeared to show what he 
termed 'double awareness' (double conscience). Such patients might exhibit 
impulsive and violent behaviour and/or be dominated by fears, hallucinations 
and delusions and yet, they have 'intimate knowledge of what is happening to
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them. They judge correctly, and feel that their will is insufficient to resist against 
the terrible acts into which they are pushed' (Dagonet, 1881, p21). These 
patients would thus ask for help or admission to the mental hospital. Dagonet 
viewed such double awareness as a state of splitting of the psyche, whereby 
one state of awareness was experiencing the bizarre phenomena and the other 
state of awareness was judging this in a correct manner. The resultant 
combination of experiences gave rise to perplexity and confusion. He gave an 
example of a patient suffering from persecutory delusions, believing that the 
whole world was concerned with him, that people were repeating what he was 
saying and thinking and making obscene gestures at him. At the same time the 
patient could analyse and study his abnormal experiences and make a correct 
judgement; 'he knows that the impressions he is experiencing are false 
interpretations' (Dagonet, 1881, p21).
Dagonet believed that the awareness of illness shown by some patients could 
be explained on the basis of Luy's hypothesis of pathological asymmetry of the 
cerebral hemispheres. Thus he cited, 'the coexistence of lucidity and delusional 
illness [délire] can be rationally explained by the integrity of one cerebral 
hemisphere and pathological hypertrophy of the other' (Dagonet, 1881, p20).
He claimed further support for this hypothesis by the autopsy result on one of 
his mentally ill patients who had manifested clinically 2 distinct states of 
awareness. At post mortem, there was apparently considerable difference 
between the 2 hemispheres suggesting that each corresponded to the different 
mental states.
Finally, Dagonet devoted a small section to the medico-legal implications of his 
observations. He stated that from the point of view of allocating responsibility 
(for criminal acts), it was not sufficient for patients to have perfect knowledge of 
their selves as was the case in some disorders, but that one had to take into 
account all the symptoms characterising the patient's illness. In other words, he
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emphasised, as had the alienists in the debates 10 years earlier that patients 
could retain self-awareness, but nevertheless be 'forced' into unreasonable acts 
through the influence of delusional ideas. Specifically therefore, Dagonet 
dissociated the notion of awareness of illness from that of legal responsibility: 
'awareness should not be considered as a thermometer measuring degree of 
responsibility...more important are the pathological phenomena characterising 
the mental illness. The severity of these should be determined in order to 
ascertain the degree of resistance necessary for the patient to overcome the 
dominating impulses' (Dagonet, 1881, p32).
Seven years later, in a book examining the nature of reason in insanity and the 
implications for legal responsibility, Victor Parant (1888) analysed the concept 
of awareness of self in mental illness (conscience de soi). Following Falret and 
Morel, he made it clear that awareness should not be confused with reason and 
defined the former as a 'state [in mental illness] in which the patient can take 
account of his impressions, his actions, his internal experiences and their 
resultant effects.' In other words, awareness, 'implies not just knowledge of the 
mental state, but also the capacity, in varying degrees, to judge this' (Parant, 
1888, p i74). In contrast to Despine, he disagreed with Spurzheim's view, 
translated by Baillarger as 'madness is a misfortune which is unaware of itself 
(Parant, 1888, p i75) and concurred with Dagonet that patients could show a 
range of awareness and judgements with respect to the mental illness. Pointing 
out also that this varied according to the stage of the illness (i.e. whether early 
on in the illness, during the episode, or after recovery). Parant (1888, p188- 
218) classified mentally ill patients (during an episode of illness) into 5 groups 
on the basis of different types of awareness:
1) those who were aware of their acts and who could judge if these were good 
or bad, but who were unaware of their morbid state (this is similar to Despine's 
notion of awareness);
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2) those who were aware that they were in an abnormal state but who did not 
understand or would not admit that this state was insanity (e.g. patients 
recognising the abnormality of their experienced phenomena but making 
delusional interpretations):
3) those who were aware that their experiences/behaviours/perceptions were 
the result of insanity but who nevertheless behaved as if they did not realise 
this, i.e. not fully accepting that they had a mental illness (e.g. patients with 
hallucinations and persecutory delusions, convinced by the reality of their 
delusional illness and yet, at the same time, believing that they were ill);
4) those who were aware of their morbid states and understood that these were 
due to insanity, but who were powerless to do anything about it;
5) those who were aware of their morbid states and understood that these were 
due to insanity, but who committed or were pushed into doing serious, 
dangerous acts.
The concept of awareness or insight that Parant held thus incorporated both 
the awareness of thoughts, perceptions and actions together with the 
judgement of these as being morbid or the result of mental illness. He 
emphasised that whatever form the awareness took during the mental illness, 
i.e. whichever category patients fell into, the presence of awareness implied a 
persistence of the faculty of judgement. He further emphasised the dissociation 
between such judgement and the manifest behaviours (particularly with respect 
to categories 3), 4), and 5)). Patients 'are like helpless spectators of the 
breaking down of what is most precious in themselves, that is their freedom as 
well as their intellectual faculties' (Parant, 1888, p223). Like Dagonet, he thus
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stated that preservation of awareness did not entail the preservation of free will 
and hence did not entail legal responsibility for criminal acts.
British Views
In 19th century England, the concept of consciousness in mental illness was 
likewise a subject of debate. Interest, however, focused predominantly on this 
as the notion of awareness of mental operations and in this context, 
discussions were concerned with examining the nature of conscious and 
unconscious mental processes from the physiological and philosophical 
perspectives (Davies, 1873; Ireland, 1875). The wider concept of awareness of 
or insight into the mental illness and the effects of this on mental faculties was 
not in itself an important issue for discussion. Instead, occasional reference to 
this notion can be found in the observations put forward by the alienists in 
relation to their descriptions of the various forms of insanities. Prichard (1835), 
for example, concurring with Georget whom he cited, commented that insane 
persons were fully convinced of their perfect sanity, ' yet, as the same author 
observes [Georget (1795-1828)], there are some patients who are well aware of 
the disorder of their thoughts or of their affections, and who are deeply affected 
at not having sufficient strength of will to repress it' (Prichard, 1835, p i 21).
Some years later, Maudsley (1895) expressed considerable scepticism towards 
the importance and role placed on consciousness in relation to mental function. 
He stated: 'it has been very difficult to persuade speculative psychologists who 
elaborate webs of philosophy out of their own consciousnesses that 
consciousness has nothing to do with the actual work of mental function; that it 
is the adjunct not the energy at work; not the agent in the process, but the light 
which lightens a small part of i t ... we may put consciousness aside then when 
we are considering the nature of the mechanism and the manner of its work...'
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(Maudsley, 1895, p8). He reiterated this several years later: 'consciousness is 
the dependent phenomenon or so-called epiphenomenon...' (Maudsley, 1916, 
p7). Maudsiey's conception of insanity precluded the possibility of insight or 
proper judgement concerning the nature of the mental derangement on the part 
of the patient. The insane patient, whose mental functions were deranged, 
became alienated from himself, and, 'he is now so self-regarding a self as to be 
incapable of right regard to the notself...' (Maudsley, 1895, p1). Whilst clinically 
the line between sanity and insanity could not be well demarcated (Maudsley, 
1885), in functional terms, Maudsley drew a strict line between the sane and 
the insane aspects of the mind, with no real communication or exchange 
between them. Thus, in the same way that the sane man was incapable of 
Judging precisely the behaviours and experiences of an insane man (and hence 
carrying implications for determining legal responsibility) (Maudsley, 1885), then 
similarly, patients with partial insanity could not judge with their sane mental 
functions the phenomena produced by their insane mental functions: '...each 
self thinks its own thinks or things - that is, thinks its own world; the true self, or 
what remains of it, perceives the world as it looks to sane persons, and the 
morbid self or double perceives it as a strange and hostile world' (Maudsley, 
1895, p304). In other words, antedating Lewis (1934), Maudsley did not believe 
it was possible for an insane mind to make a rational judgement concerning its 
derangement.
The question of the role and state of consciousness in insanity continued 
troubling writers well into the 20th century. For example, Claye Shaw (1909), 
echoing many of Maudsiey's views on consciousness, nevertheless placed 
greater importance on the notion in relation to mental illness, particularly again 
with respect to determining legal responsibility. He suggested that the poor 
recall of events shown by patients with acute mental illness was due to altered 
consciousness at the time. Such changes in consciousness often may be 
subtle and difficult to discern because 'there are in reality as many forms of
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consciousness as there are different mental states' (Shaw, 1909, p408). Linking 
consciousness to emotional tone, however, he went on to postulate that one 
way of recognising altered consciousness in mental illness was by the 
dissonance or incongruence between patients' thoughts and their apparent 
emotional state: 'there is evidence that both in dream states and in insanity the 
emotional side of the idea may be wanting, and this must have great effect on 
both memory and consciousness ... I have over and over again noticed that 
people with delusions of a very depressed type do not show the emotional tone 
which should co-exist with the delusions' (Shaw, 1909, p406-407). Once again, 
the implication behind Shaw's views is that the disordered or deranged mind, 
unable to attend to either internal or external events, and hence unable to 
subsequently recall them, is unlikely to be capable of forming 'correct' or sane 
judgements concerning the nature of morbid pathology.
German Views
The concept of insight in terms of its nature, its diagnostic and predictive 
significance, did not seem to interest Kraepelin or Bleuler a great deal.
Kraepelin referred to the notion under 'judgement': 'What always surprises the 
observer anew is the quiet complacency with which the most nonsensical ideas 
can be uttered by them and the most incomprehensive actions carried out' 
(Kraepelin, 1919, p25). He observed that some patients showed awareness of 
the morbidity of their state early in the disease, but that this left them as the 
disease progressed: 'patients often have a distinct feeling of the profound 
change which has taken place in them. They complain that they are "dark in the 
head", not free, often in confusion, no longer clear, and that they have "cloud 
thoughts"... understanding of the disease disappears fairly rapidly as the 
malady progresses' (Kraepelin, 1919, p25-26). Beyond subsequently 
commenting that 'a certain insight into their diseased state is frequently present' 
in patients with the catatonic form of dementia praecox (Kraepelin, 1919, p i 50),
Chapter 1 / 3 5
and that patients with manic-depressive psychosis had 'more tendency to, and 
ability for, the observation of self, to painful dissection of their psychic state' in 
contrast to patients with dementia praecox, (Kraepelin, 1919, p264), Kraepelin 
did not further elaborate on the concept.
It was Karl Jaspers who, using his 'phenomenological' approach to 
psychopathology, focused more specifically on the concept of insight in relation 
to mental illness. He wrote: 'Patients' self-observation is one of the most 
important sources of knowledge in regard to morbid psychic life; so is their 
attentiveness to their abnormal experience and the elaboration of their 
observations in the form of a psychological judgement so that they can 
communicate to us something of their inner life' (Jaspers, 1948, p350). Jaspers 
observed that in the early stages of their illness patients became perplexed, this 
being an understandable reaction to the new experiences they were 
undergoing. As the illness progressed, the patients tried to make sense of their 
experiences, for example by elaborating delusional systems. Thereafter, 
Jaspers described how, when the illness produced changes in personality, a 
patient's attitude to the illness became less understandable to others as he/she 
could appear indifferent or passive to the most frightening delusions.
Jaspers also observed that while transient insight may occur during acute 
psychoses, there was no lasting or complete insight. In fact, he stated that 
where insight ('Elnsicht') persisted, the patient was more likely to be suffering 
from a personality disorder than a psychosis. In patients who recovered from 
the psychotic state, Jaspers made a distinction between psychoses such as 
mania and alcoholic hallucinosis where the patients were able to look back on 
their experiences with 'complete' insight, and a psychosis such as 
schizophrenia where they did not show full insight. He reported the latter 
patients as being unable to talk freely about the contents of their experiences, 
becoming overtly affected when pressed to do so, and occasionally maintaining
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some features of their illnesses. He further described patients with chronic 
psychotic states who, from their verbal contents, often appeared to have full 
insight, yet in fact such verbal contents would turn out to be learnt phrases and 
meaningless to the patients themselves.
Jaspers' concept of insight, partly based on clinical observation, referred to the 
patients' ability to judge what was happening to them during the development of 
psychosis, and to the reasons why it was happening. Thus, he made a 
distinction between awareness of illness ('KrankheitsbewuStsein'), that is 
experiences of feeling ill or changed, and insight proper ('Krankheitseinsicht'), 
where a correct estimate could be made of the type and severity of the illness. 
These judgements, however, depended on the intelligence and education of the 
individual; indeed, because judgements of this nature are inherently a part of 
the personality make-up, in the case of patients with intelligence below a 
certain level (e.g. idiocy), it would be more appropriate to think of loss of 
personality rather than loss of awareness as the feature in their lack of 
knowledge of themselves.
Jaspers was aware of the difficulty involved in theorising about patients' insight, 
and of the extent to which an outsider can hope to understand patients' 
attitudes to their illness. He formulated this by stating that it was easier to 
assess patients' objective knowledge, that is their ability to understand and 
apply medical knowledge to themselves, than their comprehending 
appropriation ('verstehendes Anelgnen') of it. This latter function, Jaspers 
claimed, is intrinsically linked with the patients' selves, and hence cannot be 
divorced from knowledge of self-existence itself.
The aftermath
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During the inter bellum period the currency of insight as a concept was 
established. Insight was the subject of debate, primarily in the area of Gestalt 
psychology (chapter 2), where questions being asked concerned both its 
meaning and empirical application in terms of experimental elicitation 
(Bulbrook, 1932). George Hartmann (1931), the German psychologist, 
expressed this as follows: 'terminological difficulties are a notorious source of 
confused thinking ... the notion of insight as elaborated by the Gestalt 
psychologists during the last decade is a special case in point... both precision 
and uniformity of meaning are absent' (Hartmann, 1931, p242). He went on to 
identify 3 main meanings of insight: '(1) insight as general comprehension ... 
(equivalent to an intuitive form of knowledge)... (2) insight as a personality trait 
... and (3) insight as configurational learning' (Hartmann, 1931, p243). Of 
particular relevance here was his second meaning which he held to refer to 
awareness of one's state: 'Psychiatrists have long sought to discriminate 
between the functional disorders in psychotic and neurotic cases on the basis 
of awareness of one's condition. The sufferer from a neurosis is maladjusted 
and knows it; the frankly insane person is said to be relatively oblivious to his 
abnormality. The Allports have modified this view in their treatment of the social 
phases of character to designate the ability of a person to appraise his 
individual resources in accordance with the judgements of his fellows. Insight in 
this case has fundamentally an egocentric reference' (Hartmann, 1931, p243).
In 1932, R. M. Ogden replied to Hartmann and criticised his introspective 
leanings. He also called into question the plausibility of trying to use insight as 
'a clear and simple idea', for questions about insight could not be answered in 
general. In a claim, that must still apply to current empirical work on insight (see 
chapter 3), Ogden wrote: 'the point is that such questions [about insight and its 
experimental applications] cannot properly be asked outside the framework of a 
definite set of postulates; and when they are asked the framework will suggest 
most of the answers as a necessary consequence of the postulates' (Ogden,
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1932, p356). The same year, Hartmann (1932) responded and defended his 
introspective and experiential views on insight. These exchanges were 
important to the views expressed 2 years later by Lewis (1934). His classic 
paper on insight in relation to mental illness has in turn been important to the 
development of current models and empirical studies on insight and as such, 
will be examined in chapter 3.
Lastly, in the exploration of the concept of insight, it is of interest to mention 
Conrad's work in this area. Conrad (1958) carried out long-term observations 
on schizophrenic patients and described the development and progression of 
the psychotic state. Although he did not use the term, his conceptualisation of 
the awareness of change in the self and the environment due to mental illness 
is related to what Jaspers called 'Insight'.
Conrad named the early stage of the schizophrenic illness the 'trema'; during 
this stage patients found it difficult to express their feelings and experiences; 
some would talk about fear, tension, anxiety and anticipation, while others 
would describe feelings of guilt and helplessness. Conrad believed that the 
common theme was a feeling of oppression, an awareness that something was 
not right, and a sense of restriction of one's freedom. During the next stage of 
the illness, the 'apophany', patients attributed meaning to feelings and 
experiences; for example, when in the state of 'anastrophe' patients believed 
themselves to be the centre of the world.
Conrad described further stages during which destructive processes were 
followed by partial resolution as residual schizophrenic effects persisted, and 
postulated that schizophrenia was an illness affecting the higher mental 
functions which differentiate humans from animals. Thus, it affected the whole 
self-concept and, in particular, the ability of the individual to effect the normal
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transition from looking at oneself from within to looking at oneself from the 
outside, by the eyes of the world.
1.4 Summary
The conceptualisation of insight into mental illness and hence its observation as 
a behaviour or manifestation of a patient's mental state appears to emerge in 
the middle of the 19th century. Before that, there is very little on insightlessness 
in the clinical literature. This is likely to have been due to the fact that questions 
concerning insight and awareness of mental illness were meaningless during a 
period in which insanity was specifically defined in terms of the presence of 
delusions. Subsequently, in the contexts of an emerging faculty psychology and 
the changing views on the causes of insanity, there developed concepts such 
as partial, emotional, and volitional insanities. These led during the second half 
of the 19th century to the possibility of evaluating patients' awareness and 
attitudes vis-à-vis their insanity.
Important also to the development of the concept of insight has been the 
formation and elaboration of concepts such as consciousness, introspection, 
the self and the notion of 'Verstehen'.
The French and German psychiatric traditions have handled the problem of 
insight differently. The absence of a single French word to refer to the mental 
states and behaviours captured by the German term 'Einsicht' has meant that 
the phenomenon has been referred to by paraphrase which has included 
reference to the wider notion of conscience. This has, in general, kept French 
ideas broader. The availability of a specific term in English and German, on the 
other hand, is likely to promote a view of insight as a circumscribed 
phenomenon with implications for an independent ontology. Such differences in 
perspective are in turn likely to influence the direction of future research.
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Chapter 2
Insight in Psychology: Gestalt and Psychodynamic theory
Within psychological literature, the concept of insight has been a source of 
interest from a number of perspectives. As in other disciplines, the meaning of 
the term 'insight', and approaches taken to study this, have been variable, 
serving to emphasise perhaps the complexity of this concept. Some of the 
neuro-cognitive psychological approaches to the study of insight or awareness 
are examined in chapters 4 and 5 (in relation to neurological states and 
dementia). This chapter deals with a brief review of the concept of insight as 
understood in Gestalt psychology and the subsequent Gestalt-influenced 
cognitive psychology, before concentrating in more detail on insight in relation 
to psychodynamic theory.
2.1 Gestalt Psychology
Gestalt psychology was one of the branches of psychology that developed at 
the beginning of the 20th century, predominantly through the work of the 
German psychologists, Wertheimer, Kohler, Koffka and Duncker. The notion of 
'insight' in this area has had a very specific meaning which is quite different to 
the usage of the term 'insight' in general psychiatry (chapter 3), neurological 
states (chapter 4) and the dementias (chapter 5). In some ways, however, the 
meaning of insight in Gestalt psychology is perhaps closer to the sense in 
which 'insight' is used in lay terminology,
Kohler (1931/1927) originally used the term 'insight' to refer to intelligent 
behaviour as manifested in his experiments with chimpanzees. Specifically, this 
related to "the sudden occurrence of a perfectly clear and definite solution" 
(Kohler, 1931, p241) when the apes were faced with particular tasks. On the
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basis of his experiments, Kohler distinguished between behaviours which led to 
solutions of the tasks by chance or trial and error learning, and those where 
genuine solutions occurred, i.e. were solved by 'insight'. In line with Gestalt 
theory, Kohler went on to say that in the former behaviour, "the structure of the 
situation in itself has no power whatever directly to determine conduct 
appropriate to it", whereas in the latter behaviour, the "process as a whole 
corresponds to the structure of the situation, to the relation of its parts to one 
another" (Kohler, 1931, p i 89). In other words, 'insight', as determined by the 
particular behaviour in the chimpanzees, characterised by a sudden, rapid, 
smooth and directed process through which the objective is attained, is viewed 
as intelligent thought or solution-solving process. This, according to Gestalt 
theory, results from the structural reorganisation of the particular situation 
through the 'understanding' of the functional relationships between its relevant 
and constituent parts. Thus, a criterion of insight is "the appearance of a 
complete solution with reference to the whole lay-out of the field" (Kohler, 1931, 
p i 90). Furthermore, again in line with Gestalt theory, this reorganisation is a 
perceptual process and hence, "insight of the chimpanzee shows itself to be 
principally determined by his optical apprehension of the situation; at times he 
even starts solving problems from a too visual point of view, and in many cases 
in which the chimpanzee stops acting with insight, it may have been simply that 
the structure of the situation was too much for his visual grasp" (Kohler, 1931, 
p267). According to Koffka (1963/1935), insight here is offered as a description, 
or "a fact containing a new problem" and not as an explanation in itself. 
However, Kohler does attempt to provide some explanation based on 
association theory, proposing that it is the understanding of the relationship 
between things (and hence the structure of the whole) that is the crucial 
element, this being the "interconnexion based on the properties of these things 
themselves".
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Whilst others have criticised this interpretation of the animals' behaviour as 
'insight' (see Koffka, 1952/1928 for review), this concept of insight, as 
developed by Gestalt psychology, has been influential in this area until the 
present time. Thus, although Gestalt psychology itself, in relation to this topic 
has largely been superseded by more 'cognitive' approaches, the original 
notion of insight has persisted and has been applied to human behaviour. 
Current work in this area has tended to focus more on the possible cognitive 
processes preceding and possibly underlying 'insight' as a phenomenon 
observed in humans (Sternberg & Davidson, 1995). A review of the recent 
research raises a number of issues.
First, it appears that within the constraints of a fairly narrow and specific 
concept of insight there are nevertheless (as is the case in other disciplines) 
numerous differences concerning the actual definition of insight and its 
underlying mechanisms. Most commonly, the currently held meaning of insight 
involves the "sudden, unexpected solution to a problem" (Schooler et al., 1995), 
reflecting very much the view held by the early Gestalt psychologists (Kohler, 
1931; Hartmann, 1931; Hutchinson, 1941). Other definitions however abound. 
Some writers, for example, stress that insight is a particular state of mind such 
as a "knowledge state" (Dominowski & Dallob, 1995), or "subjective experience 
of correctness" (Gruber, 1995), or "integral part of human intellect" (Seifert et 
al., 1995). Others however emphasise that insight is not a state, but a process 
(Davidson, 1995; Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer, 1995; Ippolito & Tweney, 1995). 
As a 'process', insight has also been viewed in different ways, e.g. a fairly 
narrow meaning of insight as a "process by which a problem solver suddenly 
moves from a state of not knowing how to solve a problem to a state of knowing 
how to solve it" has been put forward by Mayer (1995, p3). A broader definition 
has been offered by Finke (1995, p255) as an "essential process by which we 
come to make surprising discoveries and realisations, both about real-world 
issues and problems and about ourselves". Smith (1995, p232) in fact.
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distinguishes between (1) insight, as an understanding (of a mechanism, an 
analogy or a reconceptualization) and (2) an insight experience, as a "sudden 
emergence of an idea into conscious awareness, the 'Aha' experience". Some 
further confusion results from the fact that definitions often incorporate (to 
different extents) both 'phenomenological' features and possible underlying 
mechanisms. Thus, Gick & Lockhart (1995) stress the affective component of 
insight, i.e. they distinguish the feeling of surprise and suddenness (ranging 
from delight to chagrin) from the cognitive components of insight. Others, e.g. 
Dominowski & Dallob (1995), focus on 'restructuring' and changing perception 
as the main definitional criteria. This type of problem is common also to the 
definitions of insight/awareness in relation to neurological states (see chapter
4). It would however be useful, as Schooler et al. (1995) point out, to distinguish 
between the event of insight and the explanation of insight.
Debate also continues on whether 'insight' represents a special state or process 
(Dominowski & Dallob, 1995; Metcalfe, 1986) or whether in fact it is 
unnecessary to consider it as a special construct (Gick & Lockhart, 1995; 
Perkins, 1995; Weisberg, 1995). Weisberg (1992, 1995), in particular, has 
argued against insight as a special psychological process, focusing instead on 
classifying the types of problems that may or may not require 'insight' in order to 
be solved.
Second, research on insight in cognitive psychology has concentrated 
predominantly on experiments where individuals are given different types of 
problems or tasks to solve. (Some 'naturalistic' studies have also been 
undertaken in terms of observing how scientists work, e.g. Dunbar (1995).) 
Thus, as in Kohler's experiments, insight is assessed as a behaviour occurring 
in 'normal' individuals in relation to particular tasks (though in these situations, 
subjective evaluations are also assessed). This approach to studying insight 
clearly contrasts very greatly to the approaches taken in psychiatry, where
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insight has to be explored in relation to subjective experiences which are 
generally not ascertainable in an objective sense. On the other hand, insight as 
a task-dependent behaviour, has also been one of the approaches taken in the 
study of insight in relation to various neuropsychological syndromes, such as 
the amnesic syndrome (see chapter 4). This particular issue (to be discussed in 
section II), illustrates the singular interdependency between conceptualisations 
of insight and the specific environments (i.e. 'normal' situations v 
mental/physical symptoms v specific deficits etc.) in which insight is elicited. In 
other words, the concept of insight appears to be as much determined, in terms 
of meaning, definitional criteria, refinement and specification, by the 
assessment itself (and the object of assessment) as is the assessment on an a 
priori notion of insight.
Third, a variety of different stages have been described in the process of 
attaining insight, and likewise, a range of different underlying mechanisms have 
been proposed. In general, such stages and mechanisms have been couched 
in information processing terms and, most commonly, in variations on the 
phases suggested by Wallas (1926) (cited in Seifert et al., 1995) and 
Hutchinson (1941). Such stages can be summarised as follows:
(1) a mental preparation stage (Simonton, 1995, distinguishes between short 
and long term), where the problem or situation is first confronted and where 
perhaps unsuccessful attempts at solving take place;
(2) most researchers also propose a second stage of incubation 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer, 1995; Seifert et al, 1995), where the particular 
problem is put aside temporarily. A number of mechanisms have been 
postulated as underlying this stage, including, (a) unconscious processing (e.g. 
Seifert et al., 1995; Smith, 1995), and, (b) random or fortuitous interaction with 
external/social events serving to trigger or precipitate further processing, which
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eventually leads to restructuring of the problem (Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer, 
1995; Seifert et al., 1995; Simonton, 1995). interestingly, Perkins (1995) argues 
against the need for an 'incubation' phase and unconscious mechanisms in 
particular, proposing instead mechanisms involving searching through potential 
"possibility" and "klondike" spaces.
(3) the third stage put forward is the illumination or flash of insight itself, when 
unexpectedly/suddenly, the solution is solved, not preceded by the 'feeling of 
knowing' characteristic of non-insight solution solving (see Metcalfe, 1986 for 
review of experimental evidence). It is of interest to note that this is in direct 
contrast to experimental methods used in neuropsychological studies of insight 
in amnesic syndromes. In the latter studies, the notion of 'feeling of knowing' 
(also termed as 'metacognition') has been used as an indication of insight or 
awareness (Shimamura & Squire, 1986; Shimamura, 1994).
(4) lastly, a fourth stage of verification, completes the process, and is the stage 
where details of the problem-solution are worked out (Seifert et al., 1995).
The actual solution or 'insight' is viewed generally as representing a 
restructuring of the particular problem, and again, a range of possible 
psychological processes have been suggested, whereby such restructuring 
might take place. For example, Duncker (1945) describes this as a 
reformulation of the initial problem. A similar conceptualisation of "discovering 
effective problem representation" has recently been proposed by Kaplan & 
Simon (1990). In a similar vein to Duncker, the Russian psychologist Rubinstejn 
(1960/1958) argued that in order for reformulation of the problem to take place, 
there has to be a preceding analysis of the problem-solving situation. Davidson 
& Sternberg (1986) suggest a 3-stage process consisting of: (i) selective 
encoding, (ii) selective combination and (iii) selective comparison. They 
describe a set of experiments with problems designed to test such processing.
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Other suggestions involving methods of restructuring have included: removing 
mental blocks (Duncker, 1945), restructuring by analogue (Gick & Holyoak, 
1980, 1983; Mayer, 1995), reorganisation of the elements of past experience 
(Ellen & Pate, 1986), and by the filling in of a particular schema/gap (Mayer, 
1995). An interesting, more integrative and less mechanistic model is proposed 
by Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer (1995). They emphasise that although 'moments' 
of insight involve intrapsychic processes, they fundamentally occur in the 
context of a social/environmental milieu and hence the attainment of insight is a 
social process. They formulate a 3-level model involving a combination of serial 
psychological processing occurring at a conscious level, and parallel distributed 
processing at a subconscious level. Information from the different domains is 
viewed simultaneously and thus, connections between disparate bits of 
information can be made. In this way the authors stress that all stages in the 
model are heavily dependent on social interaction.
In summary, the concept of insight in Gestalt psychology is viewed in a very 
specific sense. Bound up in the theory of perception that is central to Gestalt 
theory, insight results from the reorganisation or restructuring of a particular 
situation/problem, based on some form of perceptual shift ('things failing into 
place'). With the development of cognitive approaches, the perceptual analogy 
has largely been replaced with information-processing-like models, though the 
'behavioural' aspect of the Gestalt notion remains. Insight has been studied 
both as an 'intelligent behaviour', by the solving of specific tasks or problems 
and as a 'creative process' through retrospective and prospective research into 
scientific methods (Dunbar, 1995).
In contrast to the broader and often vague meanings of insight held in relation 
to mental illness (see next chapter), the specificity of the concept of insight in 
Gestalt/cognitive psychology is striking and manifest in several ways. Thus, 
firstly, the experience of insight (whether conceptualised as a state or process)
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is characterised by certain features, namely, suddenness, spontaneity, 
unexpectedness and satisfaction (Seifert et al., 1995). In other words, there is 
the sense of 'enlightenment' or 'revelation' that can be observed both in 
behavioural (the rapid solving of a task) and in subjective (the 'Aha' experience) 
terms. Secondly, the 'object' of insight is likewise considered in specific terms, 
namely, as a particular problem or task. Hence, insight has to do with problem- 
solving. Furthermore, the particular problem concerned is also specified and 
generally, such problems are divided into insight-problems and non-insight 
problems (Weisberg & Alba, 1982; Metcalfe, 1986; Weisberg, 1992, 1995; 
Mayer, 1995). The fact that some insight-problems can be solved by non-insight 
means, and vice versa (Davidson, 1995), together with the fact that the 
decision as to whether problems are insight-problems or not is dependent on 
the way in which they are solved, makes this particular issue somewhat 
tautological. Thirdly, some specificity is also implied in relation to the individual 
with insight. Thus, linked more directly with intelligence (e.g. Davidson, 1995), 
insight is typically viewed as the 'property' or feature of highly intelligent or 
creative beings, borne out by the extensive research into scientists and their 
methods (Dunbar, 1995). Some writers (Isaak & Just, 1995) do make a point of 
stating that "insight can be experienced by lay and professional people" but 
nevertheless, the general point is that insight belongs to the domain of 
intelligence.
2.2 Psychodynamic theory
In contrast to the situation in general psychiatry, the concept of insight has 
been very much central to psychoanalytic theory, both as an integral 
element/component of psychoanalytic psychotherapy and subsequently as a 
focus of attention in its own right. Thus, in the former case, without being 
invoked as such, insight, in the sense of attaining a 'deeper' self-knowledge, 
has formed the basis to psychoanalytic theory. 'Deeper' here refers to the
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tapping of unconscious knowledge, this being thought to underlie the patient's 
psychopathology. As Freud (1973a, p321) stated, "our therapy works by 
transforming what Is unconscious into what is conscious". Freud used the term 
'insight', or 'Einsicht/Einblick' predominantly to denote knowledge or awareness 
of being ill (A. Freud, 1981). According to A. Freud, there were only two 
instances where Freud used the term 'insight' in the deeper sense of revelation, 
as in the much quoted line from the 1931 preface to the 3rd English edition of 
The Interpretation of Dreams: "Insight such as this comes to one's lot but once 
in a lifetime" (S. Freud, 1900, p xxxii). Nevertheless, the concept of insight as a 
deep self-understanding is implied in both the aim ("where id was there ego 
shall be" (Freud, 1973b, p i 12)) and in the treatment ("understanding and cure 
almost coincide, that a traversible road leads from one to the other" (Freud, 
1973b, p i 80)) through the psychoanalytic approach. It was in fact in the early 
1950s that the term 'insight' really started being applied specifically to this 
concept and since then, it has continued to be the source of much debate, in 
this regard, two main areas will be examined in this section. Firstly, the concept 
of insight itself will be reviewed, as again, numerous definitions and underlying 
processes have been suggested within the psychodynamic literature resulting 
in conflicting views concerning its nature. Secondly, the role of insight in 
psychoanalytic therapy will be discussed as this likewise has been a source of 
mixed views.
2.2.1 Concept of insight
In psychodynamic approaches, it was recognised early on that the term 'insight' 
was confusing and that there were inconsistencies in the way it was used 
(Strachey, 1934; Zilboorg, 1952; Roback, 1974; Scharfman, 1981). As in other 
disciplines, numerous definitions of insight have been offered, e.g. more than 
self-awareness or introspection but requires tolerance of anxiety and delay of 
impulse (Sargent, 1953), as a first awareness of oneself or of the world as it
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.affects oneself (Myerson, 1960), as an ability to see and move freely through 
the inner world that contains both changing and stable representations of the 
self and of other environmental objects (Shengold, 1981), as knowledge 
helping the patient explain his symptoms or problems (Glucksman, 1993) etc. 
Similarly, a number of analyses of the concept of insight have been proposed, 
both from a descriptive perspective and from the point of delineating possible 
constituent processes. Such work has yielded a range of different distinctions 
with consequent variable definitional criteria which remain confusing to the 
present day (Elliott et al., 1994). For example, Reid & Finesinger (1952) define 
insight as "a cognitive act by which we grasp the significance of some pattern of
relations a problem-solving, knowledge-yielding process" (in this sense, their
definition is close to the Gestalt notion). They analysed the concept of insight 
on the basis of the type of relations that are understood and went on to 
distinguish the following types:
(1) neutral insight, where the patient grasped the relationship between events 
on the basis of "plausible sounding patterns of words" (i.e. some sort of logical 
sense between meanings);
(2) emotional insight, which was further divided into two forms. In the first form, 
the patient grasped the relation between terms, one of which was an emotion.
In the second form, whilst understanding might involve an emotion as part of 
the relevant relationship, there was in addition a cognitively mediated emotional 
response (i.e. an emotion was released through the cognitive act);
(3) dynamic insight, where the knowledge related to unconscious processes as 
representing one or more terms in the significant relationship. The authors used 
this term 'dynamic' in the "systematic Freudian sense of penetrating the 
repressive barrier and making the ego aware of certain hypercathected wishes 
that were previously unconscious" (Reid & Finesinger, 1952, p731). The
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authors also suggested that of the types of insight described, it was the 
attainment of 'dynamic insight' that produced the most lasting and therapeutic 
benefit.
Whilst agreeing that 'insight' had to involve the patient's understanding of his 
unconscious mental processes in order to achieve therapeutic benefit, Richfield 
(1954), pointed out that recognition of such unconscious processes on the part 
of the patient did not necessarily lead to a change in the 'neurotic' behaviour.
He proposed that it was not the content of the knowledge that was essential to 
the therapeutic effect of insight, but the form in which this knowledge was 
experienced. Thus, on the basis of Bertrand Russell's classification of 
knowledge, Richfield distinguished between insight gained by description and 
insight gained by acquaintance. When patients attained descriptive insight, they 
became aware of the 'truths' about themselves by acknowledging the words of 
the analyst. When, however, they attained ostensive insight, they became 
'personally acquainted' with the 'truths', for example, through transference when 
the particular emotions were brought directly in their awareness. In a similar 
vein, Bibring (1954) distinguished between insight through clarification and 
insight through interpretation, and likewise, Kris (1956) conceptualised insight in 
terms of both experiential and reflective forms.
In general agreement that becoming 'aware' ('intellectually/expehentially') of 
unconscious mental processes was a prerequisite of psychodynamic insight, 
subsequent writers elaborated on this idea, attempting to describe and 
delineate further the possible mechanisms and effects which could help to 
define insight more clearly. Blum (1979, p51), for example, states specifically 
that insight ('analytic') "does more than make conscious; it establishes causes, 
meanings, and connections". He goes on to suggest that this is achieved by the 
process of 'working through' with the analyst, overcoming the patient's 
resistances (primarily through transference and interpretation) and leading to
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"structural change" in the patient. (A few authors dispute this particular view, 
e.g. Cautela (1965), holding instead that it is the structural change which 
promotes insight rather than vice versa. However, most writers seem to hold 
the latter view.) The use of the terms 'structural change' and in a similar 
manner, 'restructuring' and 'reconstruction', suggests again a similarity to the 
Gestalt notion of insight as involving a restructuring of a particular problem. 
However, restructuring and reconstructing in the psychoanalytic literature have 
a much broader and deeper connotation in terms of both referents and 
consequences. Firstly, in psychoanalytic theory the structural change in relation 
to insight refers to personality change, and this is how Blum (1979) uses the 
concept, i.e. insight results in "adaptive and intrapsychic change". Secondly, 
'reconstruction' or 'restructuring' also refers to the putative process of insight 
development (Sternbach, 1989; Blum, 1992). This particular use emphasises 
the active nature of insight attainment (Sternbach, 1989), with 
events/experiences in the past and in the present being perceived differently 
and 're-structured' according to the 'working through' process (via interpretation, 
transference, clarification etc.). In this sense, the reconstruction or insight 
development is viewed very much as a creative process. In fact, as pointed out 
by A. Freud (1981), there are contrasting opinions concerning this actual 
process of insight development. On the one hand, this is considered by some 
as a 'restoration' or 'rediscovery' of insight, i.e. by the overcoming of defence 
mechanisms, the knowledge that is already there, albeit repressed, will be 
restored (e.g. H. Hartmann, 1939, cited in Abrams, 1981). On the other hand, 
most authors (Abrams, 1981; Sternbach, 1989; Blum, 1992), including A. Freud 
(1981), view the insight process as an act of creation, i.e. as restructuring inner 
experiences in a completely 'new' way. Abrams (1981, p261) states this very 
clearly; "Insight-producing activity entails taking things apart and putting them 
together differently. It is the highly specialized expression of fundamental 
differentiating and integrating capacities, the operation of a relatively intact 
higher level of mental organization. The new assemblage of drive and defence.
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desexualized and/or restructured, is an entirely different product from what has 
preceded it".
The essential point however is that structural change, as both a process and 
consequence of insight, in contrast to the Gestalt notion, is very much 
interactive and bi-directional. Thus, not only are the inner experiences viewed 
as being reconceptualized or restructured by the patient (together with the 
analyst), but such restructuring, becoming assimilated/integrated within the 
intrapsychic processes, in turn, affects the way the patient perceives and 
structures future experiences.
So far therefore, psychodynamic insight is in the main viewed as an active, 
creative process of self-knowledge, mediated by reconstruction or by 
uncovering of inner experiences, generally through the awareness and 
understanding of unconscious mental processes. Most writers in this field seem 
to agree that it is an on-going or long term process (Kennedy, 1979; A. Freud, 
1981; Abrams, 1981, Shengold, 1981, Blum, 1992). Some, such as Blum 
(1979) suggest even that it applies to the entire life of the patient, and only a 
few (Olmos-de Paz, 1990; Elliott et al., 1994) talk about insight as an 
'immediate' or sudden event as used in the Gestalt sense. Part of the problem 
here, is that the distinction between insight as a process and 'working-through' 
is not clear. Olmos-de Paz (1990) does specifically distinguish between the two, 
describing insight as a creative process occurring at a 'given moment' but 
achieved by the slow process of working through. She argues, however, that 
the two processes are inseparable. Rhee (1990) on the other hand makes a 
distinction between insight as a 'sudden enlightenment' and working through as 
'gradual enlightenment'. Pollock (1981) in a like vein also distinguishes between 
two 'types' of insight, namely:
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(1) inductive insight, corresponding to the more 'sudden' phenomenon, defined 
as "discovery of meaning" and derived from "transference repetition in 
psychoanalysis";
(2) reconstructive insight, which seems to correspond more to 'working through' 
and is defined as "deductive understanding arrived at by reconstruction" and 
involving the "determination of cause and effect or antecedent-consequent 
linkages".
The nature of the psychoanalytic process itself has precluded the use of large 
scale empirical studies. Conceptualisations of insight have tended to be 
couched in terms which are consequently subjective, involving individualised 
assessments of the patient-analyst interaction that generalise from the single, 
'in-depth' case studies. Hence, insight is frequently discussed in metaphorical 
and personally interpretative terms, such as, a journey (Shengold, 1981), a 
bridging of different levels of the mind (Scharfman, 1981), a capacity to be 
familiar with different mental states (Segal, 1991), ideational representation of 
the change in ego formation (Wallerstein, 1983), a sense of congruence, 
mutuality and unity recollected from early mother-child experiences (Mangham, 
1981), and so on. There have also been some attempts at suggesting both 
empirical/objective elements to insight and comprehensive theoretical models. 
For example, Abrams (1981) proposed a number of empirical components to 
'insight-producing activity' which he identified on the basis of two case reports 
(one adult and one child) and which were common to varying extents to both. 
These components he listed as: (1) attention, initially diffuse but becoming 
more focused, (2) distinct emotional tone, appropriate to the ideas, (3) 
recognition of link between different components, e.g., dreams or memories, (4) 
free movements within time periods, due to awareness of the meaningful 
relationship between past and present, (5) a sense of inner unity within the
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patient, and (6) at moment of 'discovery', a recognition that something new has 
happened.
More recently Elliott et al. (1994), examining insight empirically, described a 5- 
stage model of insight based on identification of some common factors around 
the experiencing of an 'insight-event'. To do this, they compared 2 groups of 
patients undergoing psychotherapies, 3 patients receiving cognitive-behavioural 
therapy and 3 patients having psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy. 
Taping and transcribing the relevant sessions, they used 'Comprehensive 
Process Analysis' ("a systematic, interpretative, qualitative research procedure 
for analyzing significant events") to demarcate characteristic features and 
contexts surrounding identified 'insight-events'. Such insight-events were 
defined as the patients' realising something new about themselves. This is an 
interesting study and one of the few empirical attempts made in this difficult 
area. The authors' conceptualisation of insight in this case was somewhat 
different from the approaches used by the foregoing authors, and bore more 
similarity with the Gestalt notion of insight. They suggested that 4 elements 
constituting insight were: (1) metaphysical vision (seeing something with 
'figurative eyes'), (2) identification of connections, (3) suddenness ('click') and,
(4) newness (sense of discovery). Their operationalised definition of an 'insight- 
event' was therefore based on this 'sudden understanding' concept. This makes 
sense from a practical viewpoint, though clearly, insight here Is considered in a 
relatively narrow way. It would be difficult to argue that the same type and 
'quality' of'insight' was captured in each case. Based on their discourse 
analysis of such events, they went on to propose a model of insight involving 5 
stages, namely: (1) contextual priming, (2) novel information, (3) initial 
distantiated processing, (4) 'insight', and (5) elaboration. This again resembles 
the Gestalt-based cognitive work discussed earlier.
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A different theoretical model of insight is offered by Linden (1984,1985) who, in 
line with Reid & Finesinger (1952) views insight as a cognitive act, but stresses 
the need for an adequate theory of cognition as a necessary basis for her 
model. For this purpose, she uses the framework of Nilson's genetic- 
hierarchical system which itself is based on an integration of Freud's and 
Piaget's developmental theories. Hence, using a developmental approach (see 
also Kennedy, 1979), she classifies insight by means of levels of capacities in 
different 'cognitive' domains, these being, sensori-motor, perceptual and 
conceptual levels. This results in an interesting and broad framework, which 
helps to describe different levels or types of insight in relation to patients' 
development, though again, insight is conceptualised in a highly individual 
interpretative style. Interestingly, in relation to the particular stimuli that 'trigger' 
the cognitive activities, Linden makes a distinction between 'insight', where the 
stimuli are internal, and 'outsight', where the cognitive activities relate to 
external object stimuli.
Using another theoretical approach. Watt (1990) tries to link the process of 
psychoanalytic insight with neurological and neuropsychological models of 
brain functioning in order to provide an integrative and explanatory framework 
for the concept of insight. Specifically, he suggests that insight in patients 
occurs as a result of increased and changed "dialogue" between the left and 
right hemispheres, this being promoted by the psychoanalytic process itself. By 
this "dialogue". Watt means increased communication between each 
hemisphere so that there is a mutual integration of each other's specialised 
function. Thus, the right hemisphere (viewed as the affective-configurational 
representational system), loses some of its "highly polarized character, 
activating power and distorting impact" through increased 'dialogue' with the left 
hemisphere (viewed as the lexical-semantic representational system). This in 
turn "expands its constricted and narrowly rigid base to include much more 
sensitivity to needs, aggression and their vital relationship". Such increased
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communication is seen as being promoted by the therapist's input in terms of 
his/her clarification and interpretation. This hypothesis is interesting and novel, 
but does lack justification on both theoretical and empirical grounds, as well as 
needing essential clarification of terms such as 'dialogue'.
2.2.2 Role of insight in therapy
Closely linked to the conceptual debate of insight is the other main area giving 
rise to mixed views, namely, the role or significance of insight within 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy. How important is the attainment of'insight' in 
the treatment/cure of the patient? Fisher & Greenberg (1977) pointed out how 
Freud's own concept of insight in relation to therapy and cure changed. While 
initially Freud maintained the existence of a direct relationship between the 
attainment of insight (albeit not in these terms) and behavioural change/cure, 
he later acknowledged the equal importance of time, 'working through' and 
'inner resistances':
"The pathological factor is not his [the patient's] ignorance in itself, but the 
root of his ignorance in his inner resistances....Informing the patient of 
what he does not know because he has repressed it is only one of the 
necessary preliminaries to the treatment...(Freud, 1910, p225-226)".
Since then, there have been disparate views on the relationship between 
insight and cure. Blum (1979) maintained that the goal of analysis was the 
attainment of insight, achieved mainly through interpretation: "analytic 'cure' is 
primarily effected through insight and not through empathy, acceptance, 
tolerance etc." (p47). He further stated strongly, "Insight is a sine qua non of the 
psychoanalytic process and is a condition, catalyst, and consequence of the 
psychoanalytic process" (p66). More recently, Blum (1992) reiterated these 
views, stating that in spite of the ambiguities of definition of the concept, insight 
remains the "unique critical agent of psychic change in clinical psychoanalysis" 
(p257). There have been a few who have shared such views, e.g. Loewenstein,
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(1956), Segal (1991) and Etchegoyen (1993). The latter author, though 
stressing that a good relationship between the patient and analyst was a 
necessary condition of cure, stated that "Insight is the sufficient condition". Most 
writers in this area however, whilst acknowledging the importance of gaining 
insight, believe that other factors are also, equally if not more, important in 
achieving 'cure' or therapeutic change (Roback, 1974). As many have pointed 
out, patients can gain insight with no therapeutic improvement and, likewise, 
patients can improve without gaining insight (Wallerstein, 1983). Alexander & 
French (1946) stated that insight was not central to change but that the crucial 
factor was a "corrective emotional experience". Valenstein (1981) suggested 
that rather than having a direct curative effect, insight was important in cure 
through its indirect effect, i.e. gaining insight would lead to "restoration of ego 
function" which in turn would lead to cure. Fischer (1983) pointed out that there 
were some patients who did not have the capacity to understand symbolic 
representation via interpretation/transference etc., and hence were unable to 
make use of an insight-oriented approach. He suggested that in these patients, 
cure could be achieved by means of 'paradoxical intervention', which 
specifically avoided the promotion of insight through confrontation and 
subsequent clarification and interpretation of behaviour. Some authors have 
stressed the importance of direct experience as a means of achieving cure or 
structural change; rather than insight (Lehmkuhl, 1989; Sampson, 1991; De 
Jonghe et al. 1992). Still others emphasise the importance of a combination of 
insight and other factors in the curative process, such as experience and 
supportive environment (De Jonghe et al, 1992), the relationship with the 
analyst, both as a real relationship and through transference, empathy and self- 
analytic capacity (Glucksman, 1993), and interaction of insight with 'working 
through', active action (behavioural) techniques (Frank, 1993).
There have been a few empirical studies examining the relationship between 
insight and therapeutic outcome in the psychodynamic literature. Most of these
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have involved the comparison of outcomes between insight-oriented 
psychotherapies and various forms of non-insight-oriented psychotherapies.
For example, Coons (1957) examined differences in 3 groups of'mostly 
schizophrenic' hospital in-patients. One group, the 'interaction group', was given 
treatment along 'interaction' lines, i.e. focus was on inter-patient verbal 
communication with no reference to psychological problems or personal 
difficulties. Another group, the 'insight group', was given treatment using 
directed discussion of psychological disturbance (including looking at 
aetiological factors, manifestation of illness and personal difficulties). This group 
was discouraged from inter-patient communication and the focus was on 
therapist-patient interaction. The last group was a 'control group' who received 
no formally specified treatment. The results of this study indicated that the 
'interaction' group showed the greatest improvement, and Coons concluded 
that inter-personal interaction could cause therapeutic change and that insight 
was not necessary for such change. However, there are a number of problems 
with this study. For example, it is not clear whether the patients receiving 
'insight treatment' actually attained insight, and if they did, how this was 
assessed or measured. Nor is it clear what sort of insight was being promoted.
It is also questionable whether the Rorschach, used as an indicator of 
therapeutic change, was a valid measure of improvement. Similar problems 
occur in other studies. Paul (1967) compared outcomes between patients 
(selected from volunteer undergraduates wanting help with interpersonal 
performance anxiety) receiving insight-oriented psychotherapy and those 
receiving individual systematic desensitisation (and control groups). He found 
that in comparison with the other treatments, systematic desensitisation led to a 
more significant and lasting reduction in maladaptive anxiety. Again however, 
whether and how insight was attained and measured was not specified, and 
some might argue that psychoanalytic insight is unlikely to be achieved in the 5- 
session treatment. Hartlage (1970), comparing outcomes between chronic 
schizophrenic patients receiving 7 sessions of 'reinforcement therapy' (i.e.
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adaptive behaviour reinforced by coffee, smiles, various rewards) with those 
receiving 7 sessions of 'traditional therapy' (i.e. therapy promoting insight - 
interpretative statements, fostering of transference), found that significant 
improvement (assessed using the hospital adjustment scale) occurred in the 
patients receiving reinforcement therapy. Once again however, similar 
problems arise with respect to the following issues: whether 'insight' was 
attained in the relevant group; what sort of insight this was; how was this 
measured etc. In addition, the 'therapists' in this study were student nurses who 
received brief training (5 hours) in both therapies, and hence, it is questionable 
whether 'insight' in the sense of deep understanding could be promoted under 
these conditions. Roback (1971, 1974), reviewing these and other studies, also 
reiterates their methodological limitations and makes a number of conclusions. 
These are still valid today, namely: (1) the need to define the concept of insight 
in empirical studies, (2) the need to employ measures of the degree of insight 
produced, (3) the need to report on the specific operations of the therapists 
involved in bringing about the development of insight, and (4) the need for there 
to be validating material showing that 'insight' has been developed. That these 
issues remain valid even now, is borne out by some of the more recent 
empirical studies. Thus, Gedo & Schaffer (1989), examining the relationship 
between a specified form of insight, namely, 'transference insight', found a very 
poor inter-rater agreement on the insight ratings, suggesting that in spite of 
selection of a particular type of insight, the concept still needed further 
clarification. In a different type of study Bogetto & Ladu (1989), comparing 
outcomes between a group of patients receiving psychoanalytic psychotherapy 
(insight-oriented) and a group of patients receiving psychopharmacological 
therapy, found that both groups improved symptomatically. The first group, in 
addition, exhibited greater insight into their problems. However, the concept of 
insight was left unclear and likewise, how this was evaluated was not specified. 
Similar difficulties have beset other studies examining, for example, 
psychological-minded ness and benefit from insight-oriented group therapy
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(Abramowitz & Abramowitz, 1974), or assessment of suitability for insight- 
oriented psychotherapy (Persson & Alstrom, 1983, 1984). In the former study, 
however (Abramowitz & Abramowitz, 1974), the authors focused on validating, 
in several ways (including external judgements of taped sections), the 
operations used by the therapists, i.e. whether they fulfilled the aim of each 
therapy.
There have been few actual measures of insight produced in this field (c.f. other 
disciplines, see next chapters), presumably because of the specific difficulties in 
attempting to 'measure* the concept of a 'deep' understanding and the 
complicated levels of conceptualisations. One specific measure, the 'Insight 
Test', was developed as a projective test by Sargent (1953). This consisted of a 
series of items describing a number of different problem situations. The subject 
had to respond by saying what the leading character in each situation did and 
why and how he/she felt about it. The subject’s responses were viewed as an 
'ability to "see into" the motives, actions and feelings of others' (Sargent, 1953, 
p i 7). In spite of its title, the author explicitly stated that the test was not 
designed to assess self-understanding, but was intended to delineate 'the self- 
concept, the individual defense structure, and the preferred modes of emotional 
problem solving' (p ix). In other words, it was a test developed to explore the 
personality of the subject, including in this context, the individual's 'potential for 
insight', interestingly, a test developed along similar lines but purporting to 
measure 'insight' was constructed by Tolor & Reznikoff (1960). Their test 
consisted of 27 hypothetical situations, depicting the use of common defence 
mechanisms, and they applied this to college students and psychiatric patients, 
where they found it correlated with intelligence. However, whether this was a 
valid measure of insight is debatable, as they assumed that the ability to 
appreciate motivation in other subjects was equivalent to self-understanding. 
This test was also used in a study by Roback & Abramowitz (1979), who found 
that the schizophrenic patients scoring higher on it, were rated by hospital staff
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as better adjusted behaviourally though more distressed subjectively. 
Interestingly, the use of'vignettes', involving patients making judgements on the 
hypothetical behaviour of others, has recently also been taken as a measure of 
insight in general psychiatry (McEvoy et al., 1993a).
The role of insight in psychoanalytic psychotherapy thus remains blurred and 
clearly this must in part be related to the difficulties and variability in the 
conceptualisation of insight itself. Some have argued that the role of insight in 
therapeutic cure is dependent on the 'correctness' and depth to which it is 
attained. For example, Segal (1991) says that "In order to have therapeutic 
value, insight has to be correct and sufficiently deep. It has to reach the deep
levels of unconsciousness the more one reaches the deep layers of
unconsciousness, the greater and more stable will be the therapeutic effect..." 
(p366, my translation). This raises interesting and important issues. For 
example, what does 'correctness' mean? Can one have false insight? In a 
slightly different vein, Blum (1979, 1992) stresses the importance of correct 
interpretations for the attainment of insight, whereas Reid & Finesinger (1952) 
speculate that perhaps the 'truth' is not so essential for the interpretations. They 
suggest that it may be the relevance of the truth, i.e. the belief which can be 
stimulated through dynamic insight in order for a particular conflict to be 
resolved. Clearly it would be very difficult to verify the truth-value of a 
psychoanalytic interpretation. This presents different types of problems for the 
notion of insight in psychoanalysis compared, for example, with insight as 
conceived in relation to neurological states (chapter 4) or even in relation to 
general psychiatry (chapter 3). Such concerns, however, belong more in the 
realm of philosophical debate and are beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Nonetheless it is of interest to raise and consider these issues.
Another interesting and final point to be mentioned here is that within the 
psychoanalytic literature, there seems to be almost exclusive focus on insight in
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the patient. This is particularly surprising in view of the emphasis in 
psychoanalysis on the interactive process between patient and analyst, 
specifically with reference to transference and countertransference. In this 
situation, comments such as the analyst giving insight (Sternbach, 1989) or 
offering insight (Steiner, 1994) would seem to make little sense in the 
psychoanalytic concept of the term. Whilst work has been carried out in 
exploring the qualities that may be important in the analyst (and in the analytic 
interaction) in promoting the development of insight in the patient (Segal, 1991; 
Levine, 1994), the term 'insight' as applied to the analyst has rarely been 
addressed In a like manner. Nor has there been much interest shown in any 
possible interactive effects between the types of 'knowledge' gained by the 
patients and their analysts in relation to themselves and to each other. Yet this 
might be of relevance, particularly when exploring the issue of 'true' 
interpretations. Pollock (1981) does in fact discuss insight in the analyst (as 
opposed to the patient) in regard to patients with senile dementia. He suggests 
that there may be psychic meaning in the content of their repetitive 
reminiscences and that some of the 'gaps' in their memory may be analogous 
to Freudian slips of memory. Pollock (1981) points out that without necessarily 
intervening in a psychodynamic sense, the analyst can gain insight into the 
psychological organisation of the patient's mind. But in this case the concept of 
insight in the analyst must be different from the concept of insight in the patient. 
Insight here refers to the analyst's understanding or knowledge of experiences, 
motivations and connections that might be going on in somebody else. This has 
to be a different type of knowledge or judgement from the sort of knowledge or 
judgement that is made or 'experienced' in relation to oneself.
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Chapter 3
insight in clinical psychiatry
Until relatively recently, there has been little interest shown into research on 
insight in general psychiatry. Aubrey Lewis (1934) was one of the first to offer 
some exploration of the concept of insight in relation to clinical psychiatry. 
Pointing out that confusion existed because of the different meanings given to 
'insight' within and outwith psychiatry, he offered his own definition of insight as 
"a correct attitude to a morbid change in oneself. He then proceeded to 
examine in turn the meaning of the individual terms within this definition. Lewis 
raised some interesting points. First of all, like Jaspers (though not referring to 
him), he distinguished between awareness of change and judgement of 
change, both being necessary components of insight. Thus, in order to have an 
'attitude' to the change in oneself, the patient must first become aware of the 
change, before secondarily, forming a judgement of this. Lewis went on to 
suggest that the awareness itself could be further subdivided into awareness 
based on primary or immediate perceptions (e.g. becoming aware of feeling 
different and unpleasant in depersonalisation, i.e. the feeling that there is a 
change), and awareness based on secondary data (e.g. becoming aware of a 
change in capacity to function or on the effect on others, i.e. the feeling that 
there must be a change). In other words, without stating this explicitly, Lewis 
was implying that the core structure of insight was constituted from different 
levels or types of awareness. The final judgement referred to the patient's 
attribution of the particular change i.e. whether the patient believed that this 
was due to illness or to some other factor e.g. satanic possession etc. 
Secondly, Lewis emphasised that the patient's data were different from those 
judged by the outsider and that it was always with a 'disordered mind' that the 
patient contemplated him/herself. Therefore, it would be impossible for him/her 
to attain complete insight, insofar as the definition of insight related to the
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attitude of a non-affected individual. Consequently, rather than relating the 
concept of insight to the personality of the individual as Jaspers did, Lewis 
made a direct and inherent connection with the psychopathology of the disorder 
itself.
Whilst Lewis discusses in some detail issues around and relating to his 
definition of insight, such as attitude, health and normality, he leaves unclear 
the concept of insight as a whole. In other words, despite his reference to 
degrees of awareness, he does not explore the possible structure of insight, its 
relationship to different disorders or possible means of clinical assessment. 
Furthermore, although Lewis defines the various individual terms within his 
definition of insight, he provides no theoretical basis to the concept itself or to 
the distinctions made in its constituents. It is curious, for example, why he uses 
the term 'attitude' by which he seems to mean judgement. Yet, 'attitude' implies 
a personal opinion or feeling about what is happening, irrespective of what the 
patient 'knows' or 'judges' to be the case. Thus, theoretically at least, an 
argument could be made for the distinction not only between awareness and 
judgement, but also between the judgement of something and the feelings or 
attitudes held about this. Neither is discussed the issue of possible empirical 
application of his definition of insight.
Similarly, until fairly recently, there has been little interest shown in the 
exploration of insight empirically in clinical psychiatry. In the last decade, 
however, there has been a progressive increase in the work carried out in this 
area. The focus of studies is aimed predominantly at examining correlations 
between 'levels' of insight and variables such as prognosis (McEvoy et al, 
1989a; Amador et al, 1993), treatment compliance (Lin et al, 1979; Bartkô et ai, 
1988), and severity of psychopathology (McEvoy et al, 1989b; David et al,
1992; Amador et al, 1993; Amador et al, 1994; Michalakeas et al, 1994; Vaz et 
al, 1994). More recently a number of studies have examined the relationship
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between insight and neuropsychoiogical impairment (McEvoy et al, 1993b; 
Young et al, 1993; Cuesta & Peralta, 1994; Lysaker et al, 1994; Ghaemi et al, 
1996) and Magnetic Resonance Imaging (Takai et al, 1992). Such studies have 
yielded, as will be shown below, somewhat mixed and inconsistent results. 
Consequently, the relationship between insight and these variables remains 
unclear. In addition, a number of interesting and different 'insight' instruments 
have been developed (e.g., David et al, 1992; Amador et al, 1993; Birchwood et 
al, 1994), suggesting that perhaps different aspects of insight are being 
captured or that different concepts of insight are held. These all serve to 
emphasise the complexity of the notion of insight, the difficulty in translating a 
theoretical concept to an empirical approach and the need for further theoretical 
exploration. The next section examines the different definitions of insight 
employed in empirical work and some of the approaches taken to assess 
insight. The results of the studies are then summarised and lastly, some of the 
issues that are raised here will be discussed.
3.1 Definitions of insight and methods of assessment
Probably the most striking issue emerging from the empirical work on insight is 
the lack of a consistent definition of insight and means by which it is assessed. 
This makes it difficult to draw valid conclusions and meaningful comparisons 
between the studies. In general, methods in this area can be divided into those 
involving, a) categorical and b) continuous approaches.
a) categorical approaches to studying insight
Most of the earlier studies carried out in relation to insight employ rather vague, 
non-specific albeit narrow definitions of 'insight' which are then 'converted' into 
categorical descriptions of insight. Eskey (1958) defined insight as "verbalized 
awareness on the part of the patient that impairment of intellectual functioning
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existed". Subsequently, he categorised patients into those with insight, those 
with partial insight and those with no insight. However, the basis on which these 
distinctions were made was not specified. A simpler categorisation was used by 
Van Putten et al. (1976), who divided patients into those with and those without 
insight. These authors used another definition of insight according to which the 
patient "acknowledges some awareness of emotional illness". In neither of 
these studies, however, was the conceptualisation of insight made clear in the 
sense that there was little explanation of what awareness meant or how it was 
determined. Likewise, the reasons for focusing on intellectual or emotional 
functioning were not discussed. In a study reported by Lin et al. (1979), insight 
was defined as "recognition of existence of problems and the need for medical 
intervention". This time a structured approach was used to assess insight. 
Insight was scored as present if the patients answered in the affirmative to the 
questions whether they thought they had to be in hospital or had to see a 
doctor or see a psychiatrist. As was the case in the previous studies, insight 
here was regarded as an all-or-none concept, being either present or absent. 
The reasons underlying patient responses, however, were not examined, so 
that positive answers to the questions were assumed to reflect the patients' 
recognition of their problems. It goes without saying that patients might respond 
positively to such questions on the basis of, say, delusional ideas or 
motivational factors and not because they 'recognised' the existence of 
problems. Thus, although this form of assessment is structured and reliable, its 
validity might be questionable. A similar concept of insight as an all-or-none 
phenomenon was used by Heinrichs et al. (1985), who defined insight as "a 
patient's ability, during the early phase of a decompensation, to recognize that 
he or she is beginning to suffer a relapse of his or her psychotic illness". 
Patients were categorised as insightful or non-insightful on the basis of 
descriptions in case notes. Although some of the judgements were then 
validated by discussion with the responsible clinicians, the criteria for the 
categorisations were not defined. The subjective nature of such judgements (in
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addition to the variable accuracy of case note descriptions) calls into question 
the validity and reliability of such a method. Bartkô et al. (1988), on the other 
hand, defined lack of insight as "the patient fails to acknowledge his/her 
emotional state and behaviour assessed as pathological by the physician and 
does not perceive the necessity of treatment". This is a more composite 
definition that incorporates some of the elements from previous definitions. It 
includes a recognition and need for treatment, but it implies, in addition, a 
relative judgement, i.e. a comparison of attitude between patient and clinician. 
However, the authors do not elaborate on this and categorise patients into four 
degrees of severity of lack of insight without defining the boundaries between 
these distinctions.
Recent studies, involving categorical approaches to insight assessment, have 
tended to use structured schedules such as item 104 in the Present State 
Examination (PSE) (Takai et al, 1992) or a similar item on the Manual for the 
Assessment and Documentation of Psychopathology (1982) (AMDP). For 
example, Cuesta & Peralta (1994) rely on a combination of 3 AMDP items, 
namely, lack of feeling ill, lack of insight and uncooperativeness, these three 
being considered as a global index of insight. However, the authors do not 
actually explain or discuss what they mean by insight itself. Because scores are 
involved in the rating of both PSE (Wing et al., 1974) and AMDP items, the 
impression is given that insight is scored along a continuum. In fact, however, 
the scores represent categorical descriptions of 'insight' as present, partially 
present or absent, and little clarification or specification is provided concerning 
these divisions.
in addition to studies referring specifically to insight, there have been other 
studies exploring conceptually similar issues in which categorical approaches 
have been involved. Thus, on the basis of direct questions examining the views 
patients held about their illness, hospitalisation and treatment, but without
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specifically using the term 'insight', Whitman & Duffy (1961) categorised 
patients into two groups. These consisted of, a) patients expressing a functional 
reason and b) patients expressing a non-functional reason underlying their 
condition. This categorisation in turn was determined by whether the patients 
viewed their illness as caused by psychological factors or organic factors, 
respectively. Small et al. (1964, 1965), using direct questions, examined 
attitudes of patients towards their hospitalisation and treatment. The patients 
were subsequently categorised according to more positive or negative 
responses to the questions in relation to predetermined objectives. These 
attitudes covered four main areas, namely, (1) comprehension of being in 
hospital, (2) acceptance of being in hospital, (3) motivation and (4) 
apperception. Patients were then further categorised with respect to each of 
these areas, i.e. whether they were accurate or not accurate in their 
comprehension, whether they accepted or did not accept hospital admission, 
whether they believed or not that there was a goal in their treatment, and 
whether they believed that they had or that they did not have a problem. 
Similarly, examining attitudes rather than insight, Soskis & Bowers (1969) 
devised a set of statements based on Mayer-Gross' classification of patients' 
reactions to psychoses, and designed to categorise patients into those with 
positive and those with negative attitudes to their illness. Interestingly, Soskis & 
Bowers included statements concerning attitudes towards insight, where 
insight, though not defined specifically, referred to some understanding of 
illness. In other words, in contrast to the previous authors, they distinguished 
here between attitudes to what is happening to the patients and insight or 
understanding of this.
This point further illustrates the often unacknowledged differences in the 
meanings of terms used to refer to similar notions. For example, the notion of 
insight held by these authors contrasts with the meaning of insight held by, e.g. 
Lewis (1934), who defined insight as an attitude. Another related notion is the
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term 'disease consciousness' which was used by Dittman & Schüttier (1990) to 
refer to awareness of the existence of psychotic behaviour. Whilst 
acknowledging degrees of awareness, these authors nevertheless categorised 
patients into those with disease-consciousness and those without disease- 
consciousness, consequently implying an all-or-none concept. In addition, the 
determining criteria for this division were not specified.
b) continuous approaches to studying insight
More recently, the other main approach to studying insight empirically has 
involved the conceptualisation of insight as a continuous process rather than 
the all-or-none concept described above. In other words, attempts have been 
made to assess insight in a graded manner with structured schedules based on 
either a unitary concept (e.g. McEvoy et al., 1989a,b,c) or on multidimensional 
models (e.g. David 1990; Amador et al., 1993). Again, researchers using this 
approach have employed a range of different definitions and methods of 
assessing 'insight'. McEvoy et al. (1989a,b), who were probably the first to 
develop a standardised questionnaire to assess insight as a continuous 
process, defined it in terms of a correlation between the judgements made by 
patients and by clinicians. They state, "patients with insight judge some of their 
perceptual experiences, cognitive processes, emotions, or behaviors to be 
pathological in a manner that is congruent with the judgement of involved 
mental health professionals, and that these patients believe that they need 
mental health treatment, at times including hospitalization and 
pharmacotherapy" (McEvoy et al., 1989b, p43). Their 'Insight and Treatment 
Attitude Questionnaire' (ITAQ), validated against taped open interviews, was 
based on questions relating to patients' attitudes towards admission, 
medication and the need for follow-up. Thus, it reflected well the authors' 
definition of insight in the sense that insight was scored on the basis of a 
relative judgement rather than an absolute or individual judgement in terms of
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the patients' awareness of what was happening. However, the items on the 
questionnaire did not specifically address the individual components of the 
patients' disorder, i.e. the 'perceptual experiences, cognitive processes, 
emotions or behaviors', focusing instead on judgement of the experience as a 
whole.
In a different vein, Greenfeld et al. (1989) carried out an exploratory study of 
patients' views concerning their experiences. On the basis of patients' 
descriptions they proposed a multidimensional model of insight with dimensions 
relating to: (1) views about symptoms, (2) views about existence of an illness,
(3) speculations about aetiology, (4) views about vulnerability to recurrence and
(5) opinions about the value of treatment. In other words, they offered a broader 
concept of insight aimed at a more qualitative assessment. With the aim of 
operationalizing and standardising the assessment of insight in psychotic 
patients, both David (1990) and Amador et al. (1991, 1993) have also proposed 
multidimensional models for 'insight'. David (1990) suggested that insight is 
composed of three distinct, overlapping dimensions, namely: (1) recognition 
that one has a mental illness, (2) compliance with treatment and (3) the ability 
to relabel psychotic events (delusions and hallucinations) as pathological. Thus 
the structure of insight is seen as consisting of interacting components, though 
the theoretical derivation of the dimensions and their relationship to one 
another, are not discussed, and would have been interesting to explore. It 
would appear for example, that dimensions (1) and (3) are equivalent to the 
secondary components of both Jaspers' (1948) and Lewis' (1934) definitions of 
insight, namely the attribution of the pathological process to a mental illness, in 
David's definition, this pathological process is subdivided into a) the process as 
a whole (involving all symptoms) and b) particular symptoms (delusions and 
hallucinations) only. This subdivision is important and implies the possibility of 
there being differential insight or awareness in relation to different symptoms. 
Once again it would have been useful to examine this further as well as to
Chapter 3 / 7 1
discuss the selection of the particular symptoms (delusions and hallucinations). 
The dimension relating to treatment compliance (2) seems to be derived from 
evidence based on previous empirical studies indicating that (psychotic) 
patients with 'insight' are more likely to accept treatment than those without 
'insight'. However, as indicated already, such studies use variable definitions of 
insight and it is questionable whether in fact the same notion of 'insight' is being 
accessed in all cases. Moreover, at a theoretical level, it may not follow that 
compliance with treatment has a necessary relationship with the dimensions of 
awareness and judgements and hence form an integral structural constituent of 
insight. For example, patients might be aware of having a mental illness, they 
might be able to judge their symptoms as pathological, but nevertheless, show 
non-compliance with treatment on grounds of reasons unrelated to the self- 
assessment of their experiences. They might believe, for example, that 
treatments are ineffective or perhaps too distressing. Similarly, patients 
showing little apparent awareness of having a mental illness or judgement 
concerning the nature of their symptoms, may yet be compliant with treatment, 
on the basis of unrelated reasons. For example, they might accept treatment as 
a means of achieving quicker hospital discharge or even because of delusional 
reasons. In other words, it might be argued that compliance with treatment is a 
dimension whose link with insight may be tenuous and perhaps associative 
rather than constitutive. This is an area which merits further exploration.
Amador et al. (1991) also propose a dimensional approach to insight, their 
dimensions being based on observations of the variety of ways in which 'insight' 
and related terms are used within the psychiatric literature. One problem arising 
here is that Amador et al. present slightly different multidimensional models in 
relation to their theoretical and empirical work and this results in some 
confusion. It seems that in the foremost (Amador et al. 1991), insight is 
presented as a multidimensional construct comprising of (1) awareness of the 
signs, symptoms and consequence of illness, (2) general attribution about
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illness and specific attribution about symptoms and their consequences, (3) 
self-concept formation, and (4) psychological defensiveness. Clearly, this is a 
very broad and comprehensive conceptualisation of insight and suggestive of 
interesting approaches to assessing the different components of insight. In their 
review, however, Amador & Strauss (1993) distinguish only 2 main component 
dimensions to insight, namely, "awareness of illness" and "attribution regarding 
the illness". Their scale to assess insight (Scale to Assess Unawareness of 
Mental Disorder [SUMD]) (Amador et al. 1993) on the other hand, appears to 
be based on somewhat different dimensions, i.e. awareness of illness (general 
and particular symptoms), attribution regarding illness and symptoms, achieved 
effects of medication and awareness of the social consequences of having a 
mental disorder. Both current and retrospective views are assessed in relation 
to these dimensions. And, in their impressive study examining insight in 412 
patients (mainly schizophrenic and schizoaffective, see below), Amador et al. 
(1994) use an abridged version of their scale. This scale appears to be based 
on yet different dimensions, since the dimensions related to retrospective 
awareness and attribution regarding illness/symptoms as well as those relating 
to some of the individual symptom items have been specifically removed. Thus, 
for unclear reasons, it seems that different dimensions of insight are being 
selected and emphasised in these papers, which again suggests that different 
aspects of insight are being assessed, but which results in some ambiguity 
concerning the concept of insight as a whole.
3.2 Results of correlational studies
Not surprisingly, in view of the different definitions of insight used and the 
different methods of evaluating insight, empirical studies have yielded very 
mixed and variable results (e.g. Amador et al, 1991; Amador & Strauss, 1993). 
The relationship between insight and other variables studied (e.g. prognosis, 
severity of psychopathology, treatment compliance etc.) therefore remains
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unclear. Thus, to summarise briefly, some studies have suggested that insight 
is not related to prognosis (e.g. Eskey, 1958; Van Putten et al., 1976) while 
others suggest that increased insight relates to better outcome (e.g. Small et 
al., 1965; McGlashan & Carpenter, 1981; Heinrichs et al., 1985). Still others 
indicate a more complicated relationship between insight and outcome. For 
example, Roback & Abramowitz (1979) showed in their study that whilst 
increased insight was related to improved behavioural adjustment, it was at the 
same time related to increased subjective distress.
The relationship between levels of insight and severity of psychopathology 
likewise is not resolved. Studies examining this relationship show a wide range 
of conflicting results, summarised in Table 1 below.
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T a b le  1 (3  p a g e s )
S u m m a ry  o f  s tu d ie s  e x a m in in g  th e  re la t io n s h ip  b e tw e e n  le v e l o f  in s ig h t  
a n d  s e v e r ity  o f  p s y c h o p a th o lo g y
Study Patient
Sample
Insight
Assessment
Psycho­
pathology
Assessment
Outcome
McGlashan &
Carpenter
(1981)
schizophrenia
(DSM-II)
n=30
Attitudes 
questionnaire 
(Soskis & 
Bowers)
Global psycho­
pathology 
(assessment 
not specified)
No correlation 
between 
attitudes and 
global psycho­
pathology
Heinrichs et al. 
(1985)
schizophrenia
or
schizoaffective
(RDC)
n=38
2 categories:
1. insight 
present
2. insight 
absent
BFRS No correlation 
between insight 
and total 
severity; 
significant 
correlation with 
grandiosity 
item
Bartkô et al. 
(1988)
schizophrenia
(RDC)
n=58
2 categories:
- lack of feeling
ill
- lack of insight 
into illness
BFRS No correlation 
between insight 
and severity; 
indirect 
relationship 
with grandiosity 
item
McEvoy et ai. 
(1989b)
acute
schizophrenia
(D8M-III)
n=52
ITAQ BFRS, CGI No consistent 
relationship 
between insight 
and severity
David et al. 
(1992)
schizophrenia:
(n=57)
P. psychosis 
(n=2) 
manie 
psychosis (n=4) 
depressive 
psychosis (n=7) 
(FSE)
David’s Insight 
Assessment 
Schedule
FSE item 104
FSE total 
scores
Moderate 
correlation 
between total 
insight and 
severity of 
psycho­
pathology
Takai et al. 
(1992)
chronic
schizophrenia
(DSM-III-R)
n=57
- FSE item 104,
- subjective 
ratings (FBS),
- ratios of FBS 
and BFRS
BFRS
- 4 positive 
symptoms
(SADS);
- 5 negative 
symptoms
(SANS)
Significant 
correlations 
between insight 
and total 
severity of 
specific items 
(anergia, 
thought 
disturbance, 
activation, 
hostile 
suspicious­
ness)
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Markové & 
Berrios (1992b 
- see chapter 6)
schizophrenia
(n=19)
major
depression
(n=13)
dysthymia
(n=7)
bipolar
depression
(n=4)
(DSM-lll-R)
Preliminary 
Insight Scale
BPRS; HRSD Significant 
correlation 
between insight 
and BPRS 
scores (on 
admission) and 
HRSD scores 
(on discharge)
Amador et al. 
(1993)
schizophrenia
or
schizoaffective
(DSM-lll-R)
n=43
SUMD SAPS: SANS: 
HRSD
No correlation 
between insight 
and total 
severity: 
moderate 
correlation 
between item 1 
on SUMD and 
total score on 
SAPS, 
moderate 
correlation 
between past 
form of item 1 
and HRSD
McEvoy et al. 
(1993b)
schizophrenia
or
schizoaffective 
(DSM-lll-R) 
long-term follow 
up 
n=25
ITAQ + 2 extra 
questions
BPRS: CGI No relationship 
between insight 
and severity of 
psycho­
pathology
Amador et al. 
(1994)
schizophrenia 
(n=212) 
schizoaffective 
(n=49) 
bipolar disorder 
(n=40) 
psychotic 
depression 
(n=24) 
major 
depression 
non-psychotic, 
(n=14)
Abridged 
version of 
SUMD
(without 
retrospective 
scale, 
attribution 
scale, some 
symptom Items)
SAPS: SANS No relationship
between insight
and total
severity:
significant
relationship
with severity of
some
symptoms
(delusions,
thought
disorder,
disorganised
behaviour)
no relationship
with grandiosity
Michalakeas et 
al. (1994)
schizophrenia 
(n=42) 
mania (n=13) 
depressive 
psychosis 
(n=22) 
(DSM-lll-R. 
female)
ITAQ BPRS Significant 
relationship 
between insight 
and severity in 
manic patients, 
no relationship 
with severity in 
schizophrenia
Cuesta & 
Peralta (1994)
schizophrenia
(dsm-lll-R)
n=40
AMDP-3 items: 
-lack of feeling 
ill
-lack of insight 
-uncooperative­
ness
SAPS: SANS No significant 
relationship 
between insight 
and severity of 
psycho­
pathology
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Vaz et al. 
(1994)
acute
schizophrenia
(DSM-lll-R,
male)
n=64
ITAQ (Spanish 
version) 
factorised into 2 
factors:
FI = 
awareness of 
illness
F2 = 
awareness of 
need for 
treatment
PANSS No relationship 
between insight 
and global 
scores, no 
relationship 
between FI 
and total 
scores on 
positive and 
negative 
scales, 
significant 
relationship 
between F2 
and total 
scores on 
positive and 
negative scales 
and some 
items (hostility, 
poor rapport, 
etc.),
significant 
relationship 
between FI 
and some 
items (somatic 
preoccupation, 
poor rapport, 
etc.)
A b b re v ia t io n s :
P psychosis = Paranoid psychosis 
HRSD = Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression
RDC = Research Diagnostic Criteria
BPRS = Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale
CGI = Clinical Global Impression
SADS = Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia
SANS = Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms
SAPS -  Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms
PANSS = Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale
PSE = Present State Examination
AMDP = Manual for the Assessment and Documentation of Psychopathology
FBS = Frankfurter Befindlichkeitsskala
ITAQ “  Insight and Treatment Attitude Questionnaire
SUMD = Scale to Assess Unawareness of Mental Disorder.
It seems therefore that whilst some studies show a direct relationship between 
insight and severity of illness, others show no such link, and still others point to 
a relationship between insight and the severity of only particular symptoms or 
symptom clusters.
Other variables studied in relation to insight have also yielded conflicting and 
Inconclusive results. Treatment compliance, for example, has been considered
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in most studies to be strongly correlated to insight (Lin et al., 1979; Marder et 
al., 1983; Bartkô et al., 1988, McEvoy et al., 1989a) though some have 
suggested only a weak relationship (Van Putten et al., 1976) and others have 
indicated a negative effect on insight (Whitman & Duffey, 1961). One problem, 
as others have pointed out (David et al., 1992), concerns the issue of 
correlating treatment compliance with insight, when the notion of treatment 
compliance is already inherent in the definition of insight (as in McEvoy et al., 
1989a,b; David 1990, Amador et al., 1993, etc.). Correlations drawn in such 
cases must be tautological. Studies correlating insight with yet other variables 
such as age and IQ have similarly given rise to mixed results. Thus whilst some 
researchers have found no correlation between insight and age (David et al., 
1992; Amador et al., 1993; Peralta & Cuesta, 1994), others have suggested a 
positive correlation between age and insight (Vaz et al., 1994). Age of onset of 
psychiatric disorder was reported by Amador et al. (1993) as being moderately 
correlated with the retrospective component of insight in their scale, but found 
not to be correlated with insight in the study by Peralta & Cuesta (1994). 
Likewise, whilst David et al. (1992) found that insight correlated positively with 
IQ (as assessed by the National Adult Reading Test), Takai et al. (1992) found 
no correlations between insight and IQ (as assessed by the WAIS). With regard 
to more sophisticated neuropsychological tests, the results are also conflicting. 
Thus, McEvoy et al. (1993b) and Cuesta & Peralta (1994) found no relationship 
between insight (as assessed by the ITAQ and items on the AMDP 
respectively) and neuropsychological impairment. Indeed Cuesta & Peralta 
(1994) reported an association between poor insight and better performance on 
some of the subtests. On the other hand. Young et al. (1993), using the SUMD 
(Amador et al., 1993) found a significant correlation between lack of insight and 
neuropsychological performance. Similarly, Lysaker et al. (1994) found a 
positive correlation between lack of insight (evaluated as a global score on the 
PANSS) and neuropsychological impairment (as assessed by an IQ measure 
and by performance on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test).
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3.3 The 'object' of insight in clinical psychiatry
It is striking and interesting to note that in the empirical studies reviewed, the 
focus has been, almost exclusively, on insight in relation to psychotic illnesses, 
particularly schizophrenia. In the few studies that have included patients with 
non-psychotic diagnoses, either these have not been specifically differentiated 
(e.g. Small, 1965) or the numbers have been too small to make meaningful 
comparisons between patients with different diagnoses (e.g., Amador et al, 
1994; Michalakeas et al., 1994). Why the exploration of insight empirically 
should be limited to the psychoses is unclear, except presumably that since 
loss of insight has long been intrinsic to the definitional criteria of certain 
psychotic symptoms such as delusions (Berrios, 1994b), examination of insight 
has been promoted by the conditions where its loss is so dramatically apparent. 
On the other hand, it may have something to do with the different 
conceptualisations of the clinical disorders themselves that may have 
influenced this particular focus. In other words, even if not stated explicitly, a 
pr/or/conceptualisation of the 'neurotic' disorders in terms of psychodynamic 
processes and hence including impairment of insight as part of particular 
defence mechanisms (see previous chapter) may have precluded its 
assessment in 'biological' terms. Whatever the explanation may be, this issue 
highlights again the lack of clarity in the meaning of insight itself. This lack of 
clarity in the meaning of insight relating, in part, to the differential 
conceptualisations (implicit or explicit) of psychiatric disorders is important 
clinically as well as theoretically. Insight assessment is intrinsic to the mental 
state examination, irrespective of the patient's disorder. Consequently, it is 
essential to define a common meaning or conceptualisation of insight. This will 
then enable the establishment of a framework on which insight assessments 
may be developed and applied to other conditions such as obsessive- 
compulsive disorders, hysteria, anxiety disorders and depression.
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3.4 Summary and discussion
Insight is a complex concept and this is highlighted in the review of the 
research in this area in clinical psychiatry. Firstly, insight itself is conceptualised 
in different ways resulting in the design and use of a variety of assessment 
methods. Secondly, there has been some neglect of discussion pertaining to 
the theoretical or conceptual aspects of insight as a mental structure, with the 
consequence that the validity of insight instruments/assessments may be 
questionable since they may be capturing different phenomena. Thirdly, the 
relationship between patients' Insight into their symptoms/illness and clinical 
variables such as the severity of their illness, prognosis, or cognitive function, 
remains unclear. Fourthly, research has focused predominantly on insight in 
psychotic illnesses, with little attention paid to insight in patients with non- 
psychotic psychiatric disorders.
These points in turn raise several issues. Most importantly perhaps, it is 
apparent that there is a need for more conceptual work in order to further clarify 
the meaning of insight and to determine the usefulness and validity in making 
distinctions between constituents or aspects of insight. Some of the issues 
needing explication and further exploration have already been raised, and here 
a few of the salient points will be discussed.
First, as seen above, a range of different terms have been used in defining 
insight. Terms such as 'attitude', 'awareness', 'belief, 'understanding', 
'consciousness', 'recognition', 'knowledge' and others, have all been employed. 
Yet, clearly, these terms have different meanings and imply different processes. 
Whether such variations are subsequently captured in the different types of 
assessments is another question. The point is that little consideration in terms 
of a theoretical basis has been apparent in the use of, and distinction between.
Chapter 3 / 8 0
these terms in the studies mentioned. The interchangeability of such terms or 
the assumption that they are referring to the same phenomenon, may have little 
significance in lay language or even in descriptive contexts. This issue, 
however, may be crucially important when mechanisms and explanations are 
sought for impaired insight. In particular, when, as has recently been the case, 
questions are asked concerning the association between brain mechanisms 
and impaired insight, then it would seem important to differentiate between, 
say, consciousness and belief. This issue is thus essential to the meaning of 
insight, and is one that is raised again in relation to the study of insight in 
relation to dementia (chapter 5).
Secondly, and directly related to the above, is the question of what is basically 
meant by insight or related terms as used in the empirical work. It seems that, 
common to the various approaches in assessing insight, there is nevertheless a 
fairly narrow notion of the meaning of the term that is apparent irrespective of 
the terms used in defining it. In other words, whether categorical or continuous, 
unitary, or multidimensional models are involved, the underlying meaning of 
insight in many studies seems to focus on either one or two components.
These appear to be, first, acknowledgement of mental illness/pathology and 
second, acknowledgement of the need/benefit of treatment. The former 
component is in some of the more recent studies further subdivided into (i) an 
awareness of the mental illness/symptoms and (ii) a judgement or attribution 
concerning the nature of this subjective experience (David, 1990; Amador et al., 
1991). Only a few studies have explored the possibility of a broader concept of 
insight (e.g. Greenfeld, 1989; Amador et al, 1991), yet the available 
assessments tend to reflect the somewhat narrower meaning. In part this must 
relate to, as mentioned already, both the difficulties inherent in the 
conceptualisation of insight and to the difficulties involved in translating the 
concept into an empirical approach. In addition, because the conceptualisation 
of insight is generally not addressed, such translations are likewise not overtly
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acknowledged. Hence, no distinction is made between the theoretical concept 
of insight and its clinical manifestation. As a result, this relationship remains 
undefined and this may contribute to the apparent narrowness of the meaning 
of insight, as well as to the general ambiguity of the concept itself.
Thirdly, further conceptual work is needed not just to determine a common 
meaning and structure of insight but also to clarify its relational aspects. This 
seems to be most confusing at present with respect to symptoms and disease. 
Thus, it is not clear whether insight should be examined in relation to individual 
symptoms or to the illness as a whole. The above studies are as divergent in 
this as in the other matters, with some relating insight to the illness (Heinrichs et 
al., 1985) and others relating it to specific experiences/symptoms, although in 
practical terms, they nevertheless assess insight in relation to the illness 
(McEvoy et al., 1989a,b,c). Still others incorporate the relationship between 
insight and both illness and some symptoms within the definitional criteria of 
insight (David et al., 1992; Amador et al., 1993). These latter researchers do 
not however specify on what basis they select the particular symptoms, though 
clearly focusing on symptoms either in psychotic illnesses (David, 1990; David 
et al., 1992) or in schizophrenia (Amador et al., 1993). The main issue arising in 
relation to this point has to do with the difficulties in 'translating' between a 
theoretical concept and its empirical assessment. Where, as in the work by 
David and Amador et al., insight in relation to symptoms is viewed as a 
dimension of insight as a whole, then, it would be important to also understand 
this relationship at a theoretical level. In particular, it would be useful to discuss 
the choice of specific symptoms for the clinical assessment since this will 
necessarily, according to their definition, have an effect on the overall validity of 
insight. Furthermore, there are clear implications for the assessment of insight 
in relation to different syndromes or disorders. Thus, since different disorders 
involve different symptomatology, this should be taken into account in the 
clinical assessment of insight in order to validate the theoretical concept
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proposed. In other words, it is questionable whether, using an instrument to 
assess insight in relation to some of the symptoms found in schizophrenia, it is 
equally valid to use it in patients with affective disorders (e.g. Amador et al, 
1994) who, even if they share some of the symptoms, may have other 
symptoms predominating, to which the 'insight' assessment is not addressed.
Lastly, it is essential to carry out conceptual work in order to draw meaningful 
conclusions from correlational studies. In particular, with advances and 
refinement in sophisticated technology such as neuro-imaging and 
neuropsychological approaches, the current mismatch between these and the 
level of understanding in insight meaning and assessment makes it difficult to 
conclude much when they are correlated (Cuesta & Peralta, 1994; Takai et al, 
1994).
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Chapter 4
Insight in neurological states
Before examining the concept of insight in relation to chronic organic brain 
syndromes (dementias), a brief overview of the notion of insight (and related 
concepts) in relation to neurological states needs to be given. This is important 
for two main reasons. Firstly, interest in loss of insight, albeit in a very specific 
sense, has been the focus of studies in neurological literature since the late 
19th century (Von Monakow, 1885 [cited in Prigatano & Schacter, 1991], Anton, 
1899). This specific interest sharply contrasts with the lack of interest or the 
rather vague, intermittent interest in the subject shown in relation to functional 
psychiatric disorders over this time. Secondly, such interest has led to 
extensive research in the area, and the approaches adopted within the 
neurological sphere have seemed to influence the direction of research on 
insight in relation to dementias. Indeed, more recently these approaches, 
particularly with respect to work on underlying mechanisms of unawareness, 
have likewise influenced research on insight In relation to the psychoses. 
Concentration in this chapter will be predominantly on examining some of the 
research on unawareness of deficits in neurological disease, though some 
mention will also be made of two other areas where the concept of insight or 
awareness has also been raised.
Perhaps the reason why the notions of insightlessness or unawareness in 
neurological states have so early on been the focus of reports, relates to the 
specific and rather dramatic manner in which these appear to be manifested. 
Thus, since the late 19th century, there have been descriptions in the literature 
of patients, seemingly oblivious to prominent and major neurological deficits 
who maintained their 'unawareness' and /or explicitly denied any disability in the 
face of confrontative evidence to the contrary. 'Anosognosia', the term coined
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by Babinski in 1914 to refer to the unawareness or denial of hemiplegia seen in 
patients following a stroke, has since then, also been used to refer to the 
unawareness displayed in patients with other neurological/neuropsychological 
syndromes. For example, it has been used to refer to cortical blindness 
(Anton's syndrome), aphasia (Rubens & Garrett, 1991), hemiballismus (Roth, 
1944), amnesic syndromes (McGlynn & Schacter, 1989), dementia (Reed et al., 
1993; Starkstein et al., 1995), head injury (Prigatano, 1991), tardive dyskinesia 
(Myslobodsky et al., 1986) to mention but a few. The question, whether 
'anosognosia' or unawareness in these conditions can be considered in a 
similar sense to the loss of insight as conceptualised in functional psychiatric 
disorders, is an important one and remains at present largely unanswered. In 
other words, does it make sense to talk about loss of insight in the face of gross 
(or indeed otherwise) brain pathology as manifested by difficulties in memory, 
communication, etc.? In relation to neurological states, McGlynn & Schacter 
(1989) distinguish between 'anosognosia' (which they use synonymously with 
'loss of insight' and 'unawareness of deficit') and 'denial of deficit'. The authors 
state that in the former, patients are unable to become aware of deficits, 
whereas in the latter, patients are aware at some (perhaps unconscious) level 
but unwilling to acknowledge this. This distinction may be of value within the 
neurological area but clearly does not address the issue with respect to how the 
concept is used in related specialities. In fact, most researchers do not make 
such distinctions and terms such as 'loss of insight', 'unawareness', 
'anosognosia', and 'denial' tend to be used interchangeably. (This issue is 
examined more closely in the next chapter and explored in general terms in 
chapter 8.) This is an area which needs addressing and which at present is a 
source of confusion. Thus, despite overlapping of terminology relating to insight 
and convergences in approaches to studying insight across different 
specialties, there has been relatively little work carried out in the clarification of 
meanings underlying the different terms and their relationship to one another.
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Since the early case reports (e.g. Anton, 1899; Babinski, 1914; Roth, 1944; 
Stengel & Steele, 1946), studies in anosognosia have in recent years become 
more systematic. Larger numbers of patients have been collected and attempts 
have been made to evaluate the degree of anosognosia in structured ways 
(Cutting, 1978; Bisiach et al., 1986; Starkstein et al., 1992, 1993). Qualitative 
differences in the type of awareness (and in the secondary elaborations 
developed) held by patients with neurological deficits have also been identified. 
Thus, anosognosic phenomena (e.g. anosodiaphoria, somatoparaphrenia, 
misoplegia, personification, kinaesthetic hallucinations, phantom 
supernumerary limbs) have been distinguished from anosognosia itself 
(Cutting, 1978). The recognition that such unawareness/anosognosia is specific 
and selective, i.e. patients could show awareness of some deficits (frequently 
mild ones) and yet be unaware of others in the face of more extensive 
pathology (McGlynn & Schacter, 1989), also helped to broaden the instruments 
used to assess anosognosia. Particularly in relation to brain injury, attention 
has been paid to the different resulting deficits (e.g. behavioural, affective, 
personality) and 'awareness' examined in relation to these (Prigatano, 1991). 
Recently, Blonder & Ranseen (1994) focused on 'anosognosia' or unawareness 
of cognitive and affective deficits, in preference to unawareness of hemiplegia, 
in patients who had suffered strokes. They found no evidence of unawareness 
in relation to any of these deficits in their sample of 10 patients. Likewise, 
similar approaches have recently been used in evaluating anosognosia in the 
dementias so that awareness is assessed with respect to a variety of individual 
impairments and not just in relation to memory function (Green et al, 1993; 
Vasterling et al, 1995; see next chapter).
4.1 Assessments of impaired insight/anosognosia
Just like with the various insight measures developed in clinical psychiatry, a 
variety of assessment methods have been applied to the study of anosognosia
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in neurological states. These range from simple dichotomous divisions, i.e. 
anosognosia is described as 'present' or 'absent' (Cutting, 1978; Hier et al.,
1983 a,b; Levine et al., 1991), to multiple categorisation based on several point 
scales (Bisiach et al., 1986; Cappa et al., 1987; Blonder & Ranseen, 1994). 
Such instruments also vary from clinician-rated scales with set criteria in 
relation to hemiplegia (Cutting, 1978; Bisiach et al., 1986; Starkstein et al.,
1992), to patient-rated deficits using questionnaires (Levine et al., 1991). With 
respect to the multiple deficits sustained following head injury, investigators 
have assessed patient awareness as a function of the difference between 
patients' and relatives' perception of deficits rated on structured questionnaires 
given to both (Sunderland et a!., 1984; Oddy et al., 1985; Prigatano, 1991). 
Similar methods of assessing awareness of deficits by comparing the 
discrepancies between assessments made by patients and assessments made 
by their relatives/carers (or between patient assessments and clinicians/test 
results), have been adopted recently in dementia research (see chapter 5). 
These particular methods are therefore more sophisticated in terms of the 
increasingly detailed information concerning awareness that can be obtained, 
though, as others have pointed out (McGlynn & Schacter, 1989), the validity of 
relatives' assessments of patient function/abilities is also likely to be influenced 
by a number of perhaps uncontrolled factors. In other words, some carers may 
not provide 'objective' assessments of functioning in patients but may both 
overestimate and underestimate levels of impairment. Such judgements on the 
part of the carers depend not only on personal differences in terms of contact 
and relationship with the patient and observational capacity, but may also be 
influenced by the effects of stress and affective disorder and by processes such 
as denial. In fact, with respect to unawareness of memory deficits, most work in 
this area suggests that carers' assessments of patients' memory deficits 
correlate well with 'objective' tests of patients' memory function (McGlone et al., 
1990; Feheret al., 1991; Koss et ai., 1993). Nevertheless, some studies have 
indicated that discrepancies (hence implying poorer insight in patients) are
Chapter 4 / 87
greater when the burden of care is perceived as greater by the carers (De 
Bettignies et al., 1990).
Much of the detailed and structured work in assessing impaired insight or 
anosognosia in neurological states has been carried out in amnesic syndromes. 
Foremost amongst such studies has been the work by Schacter and colleagues 
(e.g. McGlynn & Schacter, 1989; Schacter, 1991, 1992;), A detailed 
assessment measure of awareness of memory deficits comprising of three 
main components is described by Schacter (1991). The first part consists of a 
General Self-Assessment Questionnaire in which patients rate on a 7-point 
scale the degree to which they experience difficulty with various aspects of 
memory compared to before their illness. Relatives also complete this scale.
The second part consists of an Everyday Memory Questionnaire in which a 
number of hypothetical situations are described and patients are asked to rate 
the probability that they would remember information in these situations 
(currently and before their illness) after delays of a minute, an hour, a day and a 
week. In addition, patients are asked to make similar ratings of their relatives' 
abilities to remember the same situations. Similarly, the relatives also complete 
this for themselves and the patients. The last part consists of an item Recall 
Questionnaire in which patients have to predict how many items they would 
remember (currently and prior to illness) if they were shown lists of 10 items 
(further subdivided into 'easy' and 'difficult' items), and are subsequently tested 
at each of the delays. Using this assessment in 2 densely amnesic patients, 
Schacter (1991) describes different patterns of results. One patient, whose 
amnesia was secondary to a ruptured aneurysm of the anterior communicating 
artery (ACAA rupture), showed poor awareness of memory deficits and 
overestimated his ability to recall items on the questionnaire, as compared with 
his wife who made more accurate predictions. In contrast, the other patient, 
whose amnesia was secondary to herpes simplex encephalitis, showed much 
greater awareness of her memory problems with ratings on the questionnaires
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consistent with her spouse's ratings and with her performance on testing. 
Interestingly, the severity of memory deficits as measured by the tests was 
equivalent in both patients and the IQ of the second patient was much lower 
than that of the first. This suggests that the difference in awareness was 
unlikely to be due to generalised intellectual impairment.
This type of detailed assessment of awareness of memory deficit is an 
important example of the neuropsychological approach taken towards the 
concept of awareness in general. Thus, similar methods have been applied in 
the assessment of awareness of various impairments including social, 
behavioural and emotional in relation to head injury (Prigatano, 1991), cognitive 
and motor deficits in Huntington's disease (McGlynn & Kaszniak, 1991b) and 
similar deficits in Alzheimer's disease (McGlynn & Kaszniak 1991a, Green et al.
1993). This approach is important because it reveals crucial differences in the 
conceptualisation of insight between such approaches and those taken in 
psychiatric research. Such differences in turn become important when there 
seems to be some merging of disciplines (e.g. in dementia research, see next 
chapter), and need to be acknowledged before common underlying 
mechanisms of insight are sought. It seems apparent from the case 
descriptions and studies using the sort of assessments described above, that 
common to the neuropsychological approach to insightlessness/unawareness is 
a relatively narrow underlying concept of awareness. Patients either know or do 
not know they have a memory problem and/or are rated according to the 
perceived frequency with which they make 'mistakes' on account of this 
problem, and on the perceived severity which such mistakes affect them. This 
does not mean to say that the concept of awareness is regarded as an all-or- 
none phenomenon and Schacter (1992) explicitly argues against such a point 
of view. Rather, it means that the qualitative differences in awareness relate to 
the different tasks that would elicit the knowledge with respect to memory 
function. In other words, the types of awareness identified (see Schacter, 1992)
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are dependent on the types of memory tasks used to elicit them. (This bears 
some resemblance to the task-dependent insight concept described in chapter 
2 in the Gestalt cognitive psychological approach.) This concept thus contrasts 
with the wider notion of insight conceived in psychiatric research where, as 
mentioned earlier, this comprises not only of an awareness of a mental 
experience but, more importantly, involves a judgement of the nature and 
effects of this experience on the part of the individual. Clearly this latter 
approach is in part determined by the nature of the 'symptom' itself. This is so 
because in psychiatric practice, the symptoms being assessed with respect to 
insight, do not have a similar 'objective' correlate as do the 'symptoms' in 
neurology/neuropsychological research (i.e. paralysis, memory deficits, etc.). 
This reiterates a previous point suggesting the interdependency between the 
conceptualisation of insight and the 'environment' in which it is elicited. This 
subject matter will be discussed further in chapter 8.
4.2 Mechanisms underlying impaired insight/anosognosia
The predominant aim behind the refinement of instruments and larger studies 
has been to explore possible mechanisms whereby the phenomenon of 
unawareness or anosognosia can be explained. Numerous theories have been 
proposed and are comprehensively reviewed by McGlynn & Schacter (1989). 
Some will be briefly summarised here because they have been influential in the 
development of underlying mechanisms or explanations of insightlessness in 
the psychiatric disciplines. Broadly, these theories can be divided into three 
main groups, namely: (1) neuroanatomical, (2) motivational and (3) 
neuropsychological.
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(1) Neuroanatomical theories
A variety of neuroanatomical theories have been put forward as a possible 
aetiological basis to the phenomenon of anosognosia. Diffuse generalised brain 
disease (Stengel & Steele, 1946) has generally been deemed insufficient to 
cause anosognosia, particularly since patients can be well orientated and have 
little evidence of general intellectual impairment (Babinski, 1914; Roth, 1949; 
Cutting, 1978). In addition, the specificity of anosognosia for a particular deficit 
or deficits, in the face of awareness of other impairments, also goes against 
this. More interest has thus focused on focal brain lesions, for example, 
thalamic (Roth, 1944; Watson & Heilman, 1979) or striatal damage (Heaiton et 
al., 1982). Most focus, however, has been directed at the right hemisphere, and 
particularly, the parietal region has been implicated (Hier et al., 1983a; Price & 
Mesulam, 1985; Bisiach et al., 1986; Rubens & Garrett, 1991; Goldberg & Barr, 
1991; Bisiach &.Geminiani, 1991; Heilman et al., 1993; Starkstein et al., 1992). 
In general however, findings are inconclusive since although anosognosia does 
seem to be more prevalent in patients with right hemispheric lesions, some 
researchers have also shown anosognosia to occur in patients with left 
hemispheric damage (Cutting, 1978). Similarly, experimental studies examining 
individual hemispheric function by inducing temporary hemianaesthesia with 
intracarotid barbiturate injections have yielded mixed results. While some 
research (Buchtel et al., 1992; Gilmore et al., 1992) has found anosognosia 
restricted to patients who were given right sided injections and hence left 
hemiplegia, others (Kaplan et al., 1993; Dywan et al., 1995) have found no 
difference in the frequency of unawareness following right and left injections. Of 
course, in these studies, anosognosia/unawareness was elicited as a memory 
of the event rather than being elicited at the time of the hemiplegia developing, 
which, as the researchers pointed out, may influence the validity of the findings.
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Numerous mechanisms subserving right hemisphere damage as the basis for 
anosognosia have been suggested, including, e.g. disturbance of the body 
scheme (Roth, N., 1944; Roth, M., 1949), 'disconnexion' from the speech areas 
(Geschwind, 1965), and personality disorder (Horton, 1976). However, there is 
little empirical evidence for such mechanisms as, for example, a body scheme 
disturbance would not explain the unawareness manifest in relation to cognitive 
or behavioural deficits. Nor is there evidence that patients are aware of deficits 
but are unable to express this awareness (McGlynn & Schacter, 1989). The 
notion that the phenomenon of unawareness develops as a result of impaired 
position sense and sensory loss has recently also been refuted. Researchers 
found that neither somatosensory loss nor spatial neglect were sufficient to 
account for anosognosia of hemiplegia in patients with right hemispheric 
strokes (Bisiach et al., 1986; Levine et al., 1991).
A great deal of interest has been shown in the role of frontal lobe dysfunction In 
the pathogenesis of anosognosia. In particular, Stuss & Benson (1986) have 
reviewed work in this area and proposed a model of brain functioning in which 
the frontal lobes are viewed as serving an executive or control function, 
monitoring, exploring, selecting and judging all nervous system activities. 
Interestingly, they make a distinction between self-awareness and awareness 
of deficits in behavioural disorders such as neglect and aphasia (Stuss, 1991). 
The former is seen as the highest psychological attribute of the frontal lobes, 
interacting closely with organised function systems subserving various 
psychological processes, e.g. attention, language and memory. Thus, damage 
to the frontal lobes would result in a general disturbance of self-awareness, 
which, because of the varied nature of the 'self, in turn would lead to 
'fractionation' of disordered self-awareness (Stuss, 1991). Awareness of 
deficits, on the other hand, is related to the specific functional systems 
themselves, e.g. language, and hence impaired awareness of deficit involves 
impaired knowledge associated with the specific system and would relate to
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dysfunction in posterior or basal brain regions. Similar views, concentrating on 
the interaction between frontal and parietal regions and emphasising to 
different extents the functional role of each in relation to general and specific 
awareness, have been put forward by Prigatano (1991), Mesulam (1986) and 
Bisiach et al., (1986). Indeed, the latter authors state, that anosognosia for a 
specific deficit "betrays a disorder at the highest levels of organization of that 
function. This implies that monitoring of the internal working is not secured in 
the nervous system by a general, superordinate organ, but is decentralized and 
apportioned to the different functional blocks to which it refers" (Bisiach et al, 
1986, p480).
The evidence, pointing to the contribution of frontal lobe dysfunction in the 
development of anosognosia, has been coming from a variety of sources. For 
example, it has been observed that patients with the amnesic syndrome, 
involving frontal lobe impairment, tend to be unaware of their memory deficit, 
whereas patients with amnesic syndromes, involving temporal lobe damage, 
tend to show some awareness of their memory difficulties (McGlynn &
Schacter, 1989; Schacter, 1991). However, there have also been reports of 
patients with the amnesic syndrome and frontal lobe dysfunction with preserved 
awareness of memory deficits (Luria, 1976; Vilkki, 1985; Schacter, 1991). The 
prevalence of frontal lobe damage in patients with unawareness of deficits 
following head injury (Prigatano, 1991) has, on the other hand, also pointed 
towards a putative aetiological role of the frontal lobes towards awareness of 
dysfunction. With respect to cerebrovascular accidents, Starkstein et al. (1993) 
found that patients with anosognosia (n=8) for hemiplegia were significantly 
poorer on neuropsychological tasks of frontal lobe function compared with 
patients without anosognosia (n=8), though there were no differences on CT 
scan lesions. Interestingly, neuropsychological tests did not discriminate 
patients with and without awareness of deficits following head injury (Prigatano, 
1991). However, in this instance, patients with reduced awareness of deficits
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had greater incidence of frontal and parietal lesions on MRI or CT scans. A 
similar focus on neuroimaging and neuropsychological tests with respect to 
frontal lobe function has also been adopted in dementia research (see next 
chapter) and likewise brings out mixed results. These, as is discussed later, are 
likely to reflect differences not only in the type and object of awareness, but 
also the variable sensitivity and limitations of the different instruments, both in 
assessing 'awareness' and in the 'structural' and 'functional' correlates.
(2) Motivational theories
In contrast to the preceding 'organic' approaches, others have argued that the 
pathogenesis of 'anosognosia' can be explained on the basis of psychological 
processes or motivational factors within the patient. The main proponents of 
these theories were Weinstein & Kahn (1955) who suggested that people are 
motivated to varying extents to deny the presence of illness or disability in order 
to protect themselves from the consequent distress of recognition of 
dysfunction. Using the term 'denial of illness' preferentially, though 
interchangeably with 'anosognosia', they brought the level of explanation 
underlying unawareness of deficits to that of psychoanalytical theory. In other 
words, they invoked the action of defence mechanisms as the unconscious 
mental processes involved in the protection against overt distress. Whilst 
proposing psychological mechanisms, the authors stressed, nonetheless, the 
necessity of the presence of brain dysfunction itself, in contributing to the 
presence and expression of the multiple forms of denial/anosognosia. Thus, as 
Weinstein (1991, p254) later stated, "...The existence and form of 
denial/anosognosia are determined by the location and rate of development of 
the brain lesion, the situation in which the denial is elicited, the type of disability, 
and the way the patient perceives its meaning on the basis of his past 
experience." Furthermore, following clinical observation, Weinstein & Kahn 
(1955) suggested, that a particular personality type predisposed to the
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development of denial. Such patients premorbidly considered illness as a 
weakness/failure and were strongly concerned about the opinions of others and 
had strong drives to do well and succeed. Subsequently, Weinstein et al,
(1994) assessed such traits in the form of Denial Personality Ratings in their 
research on denial/anosognosia in dementia.
As McGlynn & Schacter (1989) point out, there are a number of problems with 
viewing anosognosia/unawareness of deficits predominantly in terms of 
motivational/psychological processes. For example, such theories don't account 
for the specificity of anosognosia seen frequently in relation to neurological 
states. Nor, if unconscious psychological mechanisms are postulated should 
the site of the lesion make much difference. Likewise, the time course of 
anosognosia is often inconsistent with the views on onset and course of 
motivated denial. Lewis (1991) also emphasised these difficulties and 
consequently, she distinguishes between psychogenic and neurogenic denial. 
However, she stresses the importance of interaction of both psychological and 
neurological factors in the overall picture presented.
(3) Neuropsychological theories
With the advances in development of cognitive neuropsychology (Shallice,
1988; McCarthy & Warrington, 1990), interest has focused on applying 
cognitive neuropsychological theories to both normal brain function and on 
explanation of specific deficits in brain dysfunction. In particular, models are 
being developed which seek to link neuroanatomical approaches with cognitive 
psychological approaches, aiming to integrate these into both a structural and 
functional level of explanation. Unawareness of neurological deficits, in the 
context of the concept of awareness or consciousness in general, has thus 
been important in this regard and subject to a variety of related theories (Marcel 
& Bisiach, 1988; Heilman, 1991).
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An interesting model attempting to account for the different types of awareness 
levels in relation to neurological deficits, primarily memory, has been proposed 
by Schacter (1990). This model, termed DICE (dissociable interactions and 
conscious experience), postulates the existence of a 'conscious awareness 
system' (CAS) which has direct links to individual 'knowledge modules' such as 
lexical, conceptual spatial, etc., as well as to an episodic memory information 
system. Whilst such modules/systems are in constant/ongoing operation to 
affect behaviour normally, it is only when the CAS is activated and when it 
interacts with such systems, that a conscious experience of the particular 
information is obtained. Concentrating on memory deficits, Schacter goes on to 
discuss how damage at different levels in such a model can explain both global 
and specific impairments of awareness. He then proposes different levels of 
explanation within his model to account for these various types of 
unawareness, including not only unawareness of deficits but also unawareness 
of knowledge or 'implicit memory' (see next section). A first order level of 
explanation would involve damage or impairment within the CAS or with its 
individual connections. He himself favours a second order level of explanation 
which would involve dysfunction at the level of the knowledge modules 
themselves. Sharing similarities with the various models proposed by Stuss & 
Benson (1986), Bisiach et al., (1986), Mesulam (1986), and Prigatano (1991), 
Schacter further links his model with neuroanatomical theories. He postulates 
that the CAS is a posterior system involving the inferio-parietal lobes, with 
connections to the 'executive system' situated in the frontal lobes (McGlynn & 
Schacter, 1989, Schacter 1990, 1991). In this way, the model is an attempt to 
provide both a structural and a functional explanation of impairment in 
awareness and the dissociations in awareness found in relation to different 
'modules' or functions. In line with cognitive theory, it assumes modularity of 
mental processes, and hence the level of functional explanation is directed at 
the connections and at the result of damaged connections between individual
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'psychological' systems. This approach may help to understand descriptively 
the clinical syndromes seen with amnesic disorders. However, it remains 
specific to them, and cannot provide explanations underlying the mental 
processes themselves, nor can it address issues such as delusional or 
confabulatory elaborations. This issue becomes important when generalisations 
are made concerning mechanisms underlying impaired insight in relation to 
other symptoms/disorders, and will be discussed in chapter 8.
4.3 Impaired insight of knowledge/function
Apart from studies exploring impaired insight with respect to neurological or 
neuropsychological deficits, interest has also been directed at impaired insight 
or unawareness in relation to knowledge or function. Korsakoff (1889), in his 
original descriptions of the amnestic syndrome was particularly interested in this 
aspect of insight. Thus, whilst commenting on the lack of concern (rather than 
lack of awareness) shown by patients about their memory impairment, he was 
struck by the level of their unconscious knowledge. This was evident both in 
their behaviour, e.g. whilst not recognising Korsakoff on repeated daily contact, 
patients nevertheless recognised that he was a doctor, and from the fact that 
months or even years after their illness, patients could recollect conversations 
or events occurring during their illness of which they had no awareness at the 
time. In addition, Korsakoff observed that the unconscious awareness was 
evident to differing extents in relation to different aspects of memory. For 
example, pleasant, sympathetic behaviour towards certain individuals and 
events and hostile or unsympathetic behaviour towards others, suggested that 
patients preserved unconsciously affective responses in the face of a lack of 
conscious recollection of the situations evoking such responses. Since the early 
observations by Korsakoff and others (reviewed also in Schacter, 1991), such 
unconscious knowledge, later termed 'memory without awareness' (Jacoby & 
Witherspoon, 1982) or 'implicit memory' (Schacter, 1995), has only been
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developed as an area of systematic research since the 1970s. Implicit memory 
has been demonstrated in patients with the amnesic syndrome, who are able, 
for example, to show effects of priming on memory tests without recalling the 
priming itself (Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1968, 1974, 1982; Cermak et al., 1985; 
Shimamura, 1986; McAndrews et al., 1987; Schacter 1991). Assessments of 
this type of awareness have tended to be restricted to demonstrating its 
presence in amnesic patients, either by such priming tasks or by skill-learning 
tasks. In these latter studies, patients are taught to learn and retain new skills 
such as computer training and yet they remain 'unaware' of having such training 
or skills (Glisky et al., 1986).
Impaired insight/awareness of knowledge or function has been described in 
other neurological syndromes. Most striking perhaps is the example of 
'blindsight', where there is "visual capacity in a field defect in the absence of 
acknowledged awareness" (Weiskrantz, 1986, p i66). The patient described by 
Weiskrantz had a left hemianopia following excision of a malformation within 
the occipital lobe, yet, was able to perform visual tasks in his left field at a level 
that was significantly higher than chance. At the same time, he appeared to be 
unaware of his ability to perform at such a level, expressing surprise when 
informed he had 'guessed' correctly. Similarly, in prosopagnosia, where patients 
are unable to recognise familiar faces overtly, implicit recognition has 
nevertheless been suggested by the fact that such patients show increased 
autonomic responses (skin conductance responses, respiration rate/depth) on 
testing with familiar faces (Bauer, 1984; Tranel & Damasio, 1988; Benton & 
Tranel, 1993).
A number of mechanisms have been proposed to explain such phenomena, 
including, e.g. damage to one of two postulated separate channels (holding 
different types of retinal information) involved in visual perception (Perenin & 
Jeannerod, 1975, 1978; Perenin et al., 1980). A different type of 'neural
Chapter 4 / 9 8
disconnection' has been put forward by Weiskrantz (1986, 1988) who 
suggested that there was a split between the capacity to perceive and an 
awareness or commentary on this, thus implying damage to a parallel 
'monitoring' system. Another 'disconnection' hypothesis, at a more 
neuroanatomica! level, based on damage to selective neural paths from the 
visual system to the limbic systems, was proposed by Bauer (1984, p466) in 
relation to prosopagnosia. He suggests that in prosopagnosia there is damage 
to the 'ventral' path which, following Bear (1983), is a "modality-specific 'foveaI 
system that recognizes objects [faces] by multiple attributes' and mediates 
modality-specific orienting and stimulus-response learning". The 'dorsal' path on 
the other hand, which carries emotional tone or 'relevance' for the face, is 
intact, and hence there is the observed autonomic arousal on presentation of 
familiar faces (Bauer, 1984, 1993). As mentioned above, Schacter (1990) in 
relation to amnesic syndromes, suggests a mechanism involving impairment to 
the memory system itself rather than invoking damage at the level of an 
awareness or monitoring system.
In these and other instances, such as blindtouch (Paillard et al., 1983), the 
'object' of awareness relates to knowledge or capacity. This is in contrast to the 
deficit or impairment of function that has been the 'object' of awareness in the 
research on anosognosia/unawareness discussed earlier. Likewise, insight in 
relation to mental illness and dementias has focused predominantly on the 
impairments or damage as a result of illness, rather than any residual 
functioning or ability. (There have been recent studies on implicit memory in 
dementias - see next chapter.) Whilst this distinction has been made at a 
definitional level and different mechanisms have been postulated (Schacter, 
1990), conceptually, this remains a relatively unexplored area. In other words, 
what is the relationship between these types of impaired awareness, and how 
do they relate within the notion of insight as a whole? If there is implicit 
awareness or knowledge with respect to capacity, is there also implicit
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awareness with respect to deficits? The problem is that such issues clearly 
involve the understanding of other major and complex concepts such as 
consciousness itself and the meaning of different types of knowledge. This in 
turn opens up ever increasing levels of explanation, and hence, greatly 
complicates exploration of this area.
Furthermore, closer examination of the implicit/covert knowledge exhibited in 
the different clinical situations suggests that these phenomena may not 
necessarily be the same. For example, in patients with prosopagnosia, their 
covert recognition of familiar faces is demonstrated by their autonomic 
responses in the face of their overt inability to recognise these faces. Similarly, 
amnesic patients demonstrate implicit memory through their ability to use 
knowledge they have learnt previously, without recognising that this is the case. 
With blindsight, however, it has been shown that awareness of the ability to 
discriminate visual objects varies according to the presented stimulus 
(location/distance/salience). In addition, even though the patient may say he is 
'guessing', he is aware of a "feeling" or different perception - " wave-like 
impression" (Weiskrantz, 1986, p167). A similar phenomenon was described by 
Paillard et al. (1983) in their patient with deafferentiation her right hand, who 
was able to discriminate tactile stimulation, though was unable to experience 
the stimulation as a 'touch' sensation. The question then has to be whether the 
observed phenomenon is really impairment of awareness, or whether the 
patient Is describing (or having difficulty describing) a qualitatively different 
perceptual experience which guides the discriminating capacity. In other words, 
it might be that in this case, 'awareness' is intact, but appears impaired because 
of the difficulties in linking a 'foreign' perceptual experience with tasks 
dependent on a 'normal' visual/tactile experience.
A brief mention should also be made of some related research examining 
awareness that falls perhaps in a level between the above implicit type
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knowledge and the previous conscious or explicit knowledge. The 'feeling of 
knowing' phenomenon has been used as a test of 'metamemory', i.e. 
"knowledge about one's memory capability and knowledge about strategies that 
can aid memory" (Shimamura & Squire, 1986, p452). Patients are asked to 
judge, on the basis of a 'feeling of knowing', whether they would 'recognise' the 
correct answers to questions even if they did not know the answers 
spontaneously. In this sense, it would appear that a particular type of 
awareness or insight is being sought which, although couched in 'cognitive' 
terms, nevertheless bears important similarities to the broad concept of insight 
as used in psychiatry (i.e., incorporating judgement as well as awareness). On 
the other hand, it is also interesting that this 'feeling of knowing' is not 
considered as constituting an aspect of insight in Gestalt cognitive 
psychological terms (Metcalfe, 1986). On the basis of such feeling of knowing 
tests, researchers have found, e.g. that whereas some amnesic patients show 
preserved metamemory, others, notably patients with Korsakoffs syndrome, 
show impaired metamemory, in the face of comparable severity of memory 
deficits (Shimamura & Squire, 1986; Shimamura, 1994). These authors 
conceptualise 'metamemory' as an independent 'cognitive' system, one that can 
become impaired separately from memory itself, but as noted already, the 
judgements being made here could be equally conceptualised as a form of 
insight.
Finally, a brief reference has to be made to experimental situations where the 
notion of awareness, albeit in a somewhat different sense, has also been 
raised. Penfield (1975) described 'experiential' phenomena evoked upon 
stimulation of the temporal cortex in patients with epilepsy. Patients reported 
complex hallucinations, illusions, memory flashbacks etc. accompanied by a 
sense of reality of the experience, though at the same time, aware of what was 
going on in the operating room. Penfield suggested that this double awareness 
was possible because of the independence of the 'mind' from brain
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mechanisms. In other words, "although the content of consciousness depends 
in large measure on neuronal activity, awareness itself does not" (Penfield,
1975, p55). In similar studies, Gloor et al. (1982), found that it was necessary to 
stimulate the limbic structures in order to confer the sense of 'experiential 
immediacy' to the evoked phenomena. They thus suggested that "limbic activity 
may be essential for bringing to a conscious level percepts elaborated by the 
temporal neocortex" (p140). They further postulated that this was achieved by 
the limbic structures through the attachment of affective/motivational 
significance to the percept. In other words, in order for an object to be 
consciously perceived, there has to be an affective dimension to the perceiving. 
This view has clear corollaries with the model proposed by Bauer to explain the 
covert recognition of faces in prosopagnosia.
4.4 Summary
In summary, 'insight' in relation to neurological states has been the focus of 
case descriptions since the late 19th century, primarily because of the striking 
presentation of patients 'denying' overt neurological disabilities. Since then, 
there has been increasing recognition of different types and degrees of 
awareness/knowledge including the possibility of unconscious knowledge.
In contrast to the somewhat broader and variable notion of insight as 
conceptualised recently in clinical psychiatry, insight in neurological states 
appears to be viewed in a much narrower, albeit more consistent, sense of 
'awareness'. In this latter sense, it is conceived more akin to a specific function, 
irrespective of whether this might be an independent system or intrinsic to 
specific 'modules' (e.g. memory, language) themselves. This distinction in 
meaning between 'awareness' and 'insight' becomes particularly apparent in the 
light of the seeming separation of 'metacognition' from research on awareness. 
In other words, where judgements about self-functioning are sought and
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explored, they no longer are conceived in terms of 'awareness' (or insight) and 
hence 'new' cognitive systems are postulated under the term 'metacognition'.
Numerous theories of underlying mechanisms for the phenomenon of 
unawareness or lack of insight have been suggested alongside advances in 
investigative techniques such as neuroimaging and neuropsychology. It seems 
that at present, the debate continues on whether there is a separate 
'awareness or monitoring system' and whether this can be localised both 
neuroanatomically and in terms of neural organisation. Alternatively, the 
question is whether unawareness in some situations can be explained on the 
basis of organisation of the 'object' of unawareness itself.
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Chapter 5
Insight in dementia
In the last decade, there has been growing interest in the concept of insight in 
relation to dementia. In particular, there have been increasing numbers of 
systematic studies focusing on the development of specific measures to assess 
insight as well as investigating the possible neurological and 
neuropsychological mechanisms underlying impaired insight. In contrast to the 
relatively consistent approach to awareness/insight in the neurological states 
(as reviewed in the last chapter), studies examining insight in the dementias are 
striking In the range of different approaches used (Kaszniak & Christenson, 
1996). This suggests that, as in functional psychiatric disorders, a variety of 
different conceptual frameworks underlying the notion of insight are being 
applied in such research. This makes comparisons between studies 
problematic and may contribute in part to the reported mixed outcomes.
One of the reasons for the different approaches to the concept of insight in the 
dementias may lie in the clinical status of the dementias themselves.
Dementias, or chronic organic brain syndromes, occupy both neurological and 
psychiatric domains, and hence are subject to the differing influences of 
physiological/neuropsychological versus psychiatric/psychological methods 
characteristic of each discipline. Another reason may lie in the nature of the 
clinical features of the dementias. Thus, rather than involving single/several 
specific neurological deficits, dementias may be characterised by various 
cognitive (including memory) deficits, motor abnormalities, affective and 
personality changes, psychotic symptoms and behavioural disturbances. 
Consequently, studies exploring insight in dementias include to different extents 
insight not only into memory function, but also insight into the other 
impairments. As has already been suggested, insight assessments and insight
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conceptualisations are to some degree dependent on and driven by the specific 
'objects' of their study (mental symptoms v deficits in function v 'observable' 
behaviour, etc.). Therefore, it seems likely that a number of different 
approaches have to be used, where a number of such 'objects' are studied 
concomitantly.
Evidence for the different approaches to the conceptualisation of insight in the 
dementias comes from two main sources: (1) terminology used and (2) 
assessments of insight. These will be examined in turn, before summarising the 
results of studies on insight in dementia. Lastly, some of the main issues arising 
from the review will be discussed.
5.1 The meaning of insight in dementia: terminology
A number of related terms are used in the research on insight in dementias 
including, 'loss of insight' (De Bettignies et al., 1990), 'lack of awareness’ (Ott & 
Fogel, 1992; Green et al., 1993; Auchus et al., 1994), 'anosognosia' (Reed et 
al., 1993; Starksteln et al., 1995), 'denial' (Sevush & Leve, 1993; Weinstein et 
al., 1994) and more recently, 'impaired self-awareness' (Kaszniak & 
Christenson, 1996). This raises questions concerning firstly, whether these 
terms are referring to the same concept, and, secondly, whether they are used 
in the same way by the different researchers. At a very basic level, the terms do 
of course imply differences. Thus, 'anosognosia' as stated earlier, refers to 
unawareness of a specific neuropsychological deficit, the latter being 
'objectively' ascertainable. It is thus not a term used in relation to the impaired 
insight seen in patients with, e.g. schizophrenia, where insight is assessed in 
relation to symptoms (generally psychotic) or disease. Neither of these can be 
considered as, or analogous to, specific neuropsychological deficits 
(irrespective of whether these patients show neuropsychological impairment on 
testing). Nor can symptoms such as hallucinations or delusions be considered
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as 'objectively' ascertainable. 'Lack of awareness' is a less specific term in that 
it carries no implication concerning the 'object' of awareness whether this be a 
neurological, physical or 'psychological' phenomenon. As examined in the 
previous chapter, 'awareness' in relation to neurological states appears to be 
used in a more specific sense of a function, differentiated from judgement. 
'Insight' on the other hand, following lexical definition and the 'psychiatric' 
approach, seems to refer to more than awareness. It includes also an 
understanding of what the object of awareness (memory deficit, paralysis, 
hallucination etc.) actually means for the individual. In this sense, awareness 
can be deemed necessary but not sufficient for insight. Interestingly, the more 
recently used term 'self-awareness' (recent, that is, in neurological usage) is 
suggestive of a closer relationship with insight. The term suggests an 
awareness of something as it relates to the individual and hence, implies some 
form of additional judgement. In fact, in common with general usage of these 
terms in dementia research, insight assessed as 'self-awareness' rather than 
'awareness', does not necessarily reflect this difference in meaning (Loebel et 
al. 1990). 'Denial' tends to have both a general and specific meaning with 
problems arising when these are not differentiated. In a general sense, 'denial' 
is often used descriptively to refer to the refusal made by a patient to admit to 
an overt dysfunction. However, the term is also frequently used in the sense of 
defensive denial or 'motivated denial' (McGlynn & Schacter, 1989) where the 
implication lies in an underlying psychological process operating to inhibit overt 
acknowledgement of the dysfunction. In this sense, the term has a two-fold 
meaning in that not only does it refer to 'unawareness' (though implying 
awareness at an unconscious level), but it also suggests a psychological 
mechanism underlying this unawareness (i.e. defence mechanisms, etc.). The 
term 'denial' in the specific sense, has generally been applied to functional 
psychiatric illnesses and particularly to the 'neurotic' disorders where lack of 
awareness or denial of symptoms has been explained as "a mental mechanism 
without conscious awareness and employed to resolve emotional conflict and
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allay anxiety by denying a problem" (Goodwin, 1989). Denial has also been 
used in this latter sense in dementia. For example, Weinstein & Kahn (1955) 
applied the term to organic syndromes postulating that (together with 
neurological mechanisms) a psychological process was in operation as a 
protective device against the distress of acknowledgement of the dysfunction, 
and that this contributed to the overt unawareness exhibited by the patient.
Problems arise when such terms are not defined and/or are used 
interchangeably without reference to possible distinctions. As a result, it 
becomes difficult to identify the particular sense or underlying concept (Feher et 
al., 1991). McGlynn & Schacter (1989), acknowledge such difficulties and they 
use the terms 'anosognosia', 'unawareness of deficit' and 'loss of insight' 
interchangeably. They make it clear, however, that they are using these terms 
to refer to an underlying concept of unawareness in the neuropsychological 
sense, maintaining the same meaning as used in relation to amnesic 
syndromes. On the other hand, they distinguish this concept from motivated 
denial which they view as a distinct and separate phenomenon. In contrast, 
however, Weinstein et al. (1994) use the terms 'anosognosia' and 'denial' 
interchangeably and differentiate these from 'loss of insight' which they consider 
as a distinct and unitary phenomenon. Unfortunately they do not actually define 
their concept of 'loss of insight' and it is consequently difficult to understand the 
grounds for their distinction. It is not clear, for example, why "loss of insight 
implies a unitary defect, which should become more marked as the disease 
[Alzheimer’s disease] progresses" (Weinstein et al., 1994, p i82). Using the 
term 'anosognosia', Starksteln et al. (1995) accept a definition of 'loss of insight, 
misinterpretation and explicit denial', thus broadening the concept in another 
direction. Along different lines, Mangone et al. (1991) consider impaired insight 
following frontal lobe dysfunction as equivalent to 'confabulation'. In contrast, 
they equate impaired insight following right hemisphere dysfunction, with
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'anosognosia'. They do not examine the concepts themselves but define them 
by putative underlying brain mechanisms.
5.2 Assessments of insight in dementia
The number and variety of assessment methods used in exploring insight in 
dementia likewise suggest differences in approaches to the concept of insight. 
These are reflected in both the range of methods developed by which insight is 
inferred, and the different types of content deemed relevant to the 
determination of insight and hence sought by the various assessment 
measures. First, in terms of methods, most of the earlier studies do not define 
their assessment criteria, and on the basis of subjective evaluation, subjects 
are categorised into those having and those not having insight/awareness (e.g. 
Gustafson & Nilsson, 1982). More recently, however, attempts have been made 
to use qualitative and quantitative methods. For example, structured or semi- 
structured interviews have been administered in order to categorise degrees of 
insight in Alzheimer's disease (Sevush & Leve, 1993; Weinstein et al., 1994). in 
these cases, patients are rated on the basis of responses to specific questions, 
as having either no insight, i.e. no acknowledgement of memory impairment, or 
full insight, i.e. acknowledgement of both the presence and the severity of 
memory impairment, or partial insight, i.e. showing some awareness of the 
presence of memory impairment but not its full extent. Similar categorical 
divisions have been used to evaluate insight in patients with Huntington’s 
Disease (Caine et ai., 1978) and Parkinson's disease (Danielczyk, 1983). 
Others have complemented information by interviewing relatives/caregivers 
before making such distinctions (Ott & Fogel, 1992). These methods thus seek 
to grade patients' insight or awareness on the basis of a fairly general and non­
specific concept of insight but without attempting to identify or qualitatively 
discriminate between different types or aspects of awareness.
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More specific notions of insight or awareness appear to underlie the insight 
assessments based on discrepancy measures. These methods determine 
levels of insight on the basis of discrepancies between the patient's 
assessment of self-functioning and either: (1) 'objective' measures of 
impairment, such as a battery of neuropsychological tests (Anderson & Tranel, 
1989) and/or, (2) the carer's assessment of patient functioning (De Bettignies et 
al., 1990; Mangone et al., 1991 ; Michon et al., 1992, 1994; Freidenberg et al., 
1990; Verhey et al., 1993; Vasterling et al., 1995). The greater the discrepancy 
that is obtained on these measures indicates a greater degree of unawareness 
or insightlessness shown by the patient. In other words, these methods assume 
that the 'objective' assessments of functioning (either clinical tests or carers' 
views) provide the standard, or relatively accurate representation of the level of 
functioning (memory or other) in the patient. Lack of concordance is thus 
attributed to disturbed awareness on the part of the patient. The concept of 
insight underlying such methods is thus fairly specific in that it is conceived as a 
('correct') evaluation of function in a particular area. In the sense that they focus 
on the differences between subjective and 'objective' evaluations, these 
methods stress quantitative differences in awareness, but tend not to explore 
the actual nature of awareness itself. Instead, qualitative differences, following 
the neuropsychological models of awareness, relate more to differential scores 
in discrepancy/awareness in relation to different tasks or functions (Green et al. 
1993, Vasterling et al, 1995). Such ratings clearly also cannot discriminate 
between impaired awareness and denial in the 'motivated' or 'defensive' sense. 
Furthermore, some of the assumptions behind these methods can be 
questioned. It can be argued, for example, that even if clinical tests of 
memory/cognitive function provide valid and accurate measures of ability, they 
may not necessarily correspond to the sort of subjective experiences of 
memory impairment that are asked in questionnaires/interviews (Sunderland et 
al, 1983; Kaszniak & Christenson, 1996). Similarly, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, some carers may not provide 'objective' assessments of functioning in
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patients but may, for various reasons, both overestimate and underestimate 
levels of impairment in the patient. De Bettignies et al. (1990), for example, 
used discrepancy measures between patients (with Alzheimer's disease and 
multi-infarct dementia) and informants as a measure of patients' insight into 
their living skills. They found that whilst insight was not correlated with age, 
mental status, education or level of depression in the patients, it was 
significantly related to the degree of caregiver concern or burden. In other 
words, the higher the degree of the burden perceived by the caregiver, the 
higher the discrepancy between patient and informant report. The authors 
suggested that the elicited impaired insight in this situation was not only due to 
the overestimation of capacity by the patients, but that caregivers with a greater 
perceived burden were underestimating the capacity of the patients. Most 
studies, however, seem to indicate that carers' assessments of patients' 
memory function have a good correlation with patients' performances on 
'objective' (psychometric) tests (McGlone et al., 1990; Feher et al., 1991; Koss 
et al., 1993; Freidenberg et al., 1990; Jorm et al., 1994).
Reisberg et al. (1985) (reviewed by McGlynn & Kaszniak (1991b)) compared 
ratings made by patients with Alzheimer's Disease of their own and their 
caregivers' cognitive (memory) function with equivalent ratings made by the 
caregivers of theirs and the patients' memory function. This assessment of 
insight was thus based on the difference between patients’ self-judgement and 
their judgement of others' function. A similar method has also been used by 
McGlynn & Kaszniak (1991a, see below), who suggest that in dementia, the 
cognitive breakdown results in patients being unable to monitor their own 
cognitive performance whilst still being able to make accurate judgements of 
their relatives' abilities.
An interesting and comprehensive method of assessing quantitatively patients' 
insight into deficits was devised by McGlynn & Kaszniak in Alzheimer's disease
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(AD) (1991a) and dementia in Huntington's disease (HD) (1991b). This was 
developed using a similar approach to that described by Schacter (1991, see 
chapter 4) in the assessment of awareness of memory deficit in amnesic 
syndromes. Similarly involving comparisons between patients and their 
caregivers, with respect to HD, three aspects of'insight' were explored. Firstly, 
a structured questionnaire (Daily Difficulties Questionnaire) was administered to 
both patients and caregivers to assess their own and their relatives' present 
functioning as compared to 5 years previously. Following this, the two other 
aspects of insight were assessed as the differences between patients' (and 
caregivers') predictions on performance on various motor and cognitive tasks 
and their actual subsequent performance. In other words, 'insight' was 
evaluated as a predictive judgement on tasks which could then be directly 
verified. A similar approach was used by Green et al, (1993) who likewise used 
the difference between patients' prediction of their performance on a word recall 
test with their actual subsequent performance as one aspect of insight 
assessment in dementia.
Apart from such differences in the methods used in assessing insight, the 
content of the information sought in such assessments also varies 
considerably, reflecting further the different notions underlying insight in these 
measures. This variation in content of insight assessment measures can, for 
the purposes here, be roughly divided into 2 main areas.
First, the object itself of the insight assessment is not always the memory 
function. Indeed, many studies do not directly specify the object of awareness 
and the general implication is that the insight refers to the disease as a whole 
(e.g. Danielczyk, 1983; Schneck et al., 1982). Some studies specify memory 
impairment as the sole object of the insight assessment (Feher et al., 1991; 
McGlynn & Kaszniak, 1991a; Michon et al., 1992; Reed et al., 1993). In other 
studies the object of insight is defined as 'independent living skills' and
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awareness of memory impairment is not part of the assessment (De Bettignies 
et al., 1990). Still others assess insight into memory function alongside insight 
into other cognitive, behavioural, affective and personality functions. For 
example, McGlynn & Kaszniak (1991b) looked at insight in motor as well as 
cognitive performance. Ott & Fogel (1992) in turn examined insight in relation to 
the patient's situation, memory impairment, impairment in activities of daily 
living (ADL) and progression of deficits. The assessment devised by Anderson 
& Tranel (1989) explored awareness In 8 specific areas. These included the 
following: reasons for hospitalisation, motor impairments, general thinking and 
intellect, orientation, memory, speech and language, visual perception and 
lastly, abilities on tests and future activities. Green et al. (1993) focused on 
recent memory, remote memory, attention and everyday activities. On the other 
hand, Vasterling et al. (1995), assessed memory, general health, self-care 
ability and mood disturbance.
The second aspect of content of insight assessments that needs to be 
mentioned concerns the variations that result from the differences in 
conceptualisation of insight, where the 'object' of assessment is constant. In 
other words, where the insight assessments relate specifically to memory 
impairment, the contents of the assessments nevertheless vary according to 
what is subsumed under the concept of insight. For example, some 
assessments focus on awareness of a general memory impairment (Mangone 
et al., 1991; Sevush & Leve, 1993; Verhey et al., 1993), whilst others examine 
awareness of memory impairment in numerous specific memory-dependent 
tasks (Feher et al., 1991; Green et al., 1993). Some researchers also explore 
patients' awareness of the effects of memory impairment in different aspects of 
their lives (Sevush & Leve, 1993; Starkstein et al., 1995). In a different vein, 
some insight assessments concentrate on awareness of current memory 
function (Mangone et al., 1991; Verhey et al. 1993;) whilst others focus also on 
awareness of change in memory functioning (McGlynn & Kaszniak, 1991a,b;
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Vasterling et al., 1995). Further disparities between studies are evident, for 
example, in the ratings of anosognosia/unawareness made by Reed et al. 
(1993), and Weinstein et al. (1994). The ratings in these studies are in part 
determined by views on patients' affective responses and levels of concern 
about deficits. Other researchers (Anderson & Tranel, 1989; Verhey et al.,
1993), on the other hand, limit their evaluations to awareness or knowledge of 
the deficits themselves.
5.3 Results of empirical studies
Not surprisingly, results of empirical studies are inconclusive. Variability in 
terms, definitions, assessment methods, and 'object of insight' as described 
above are likely to contribute to this, as well as the fact that different outcome 
measures have been used. In addition, most of this work has been carried out 
in Alzheimer's disease, where loss of insight is recognised as an important 
feature of the disease (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). There has 
been little systematic work on other types of dementia. In general, it is claimed 
that patients with cortical dementias (e.g. Alzheimer's disease. Pick's disease) 
show greater loss of insight (Lishman, 1987; McGlynn & Kaszniak, 1991b). 
Some studies also suggest that there is an earlier loss of insight in Pick's 
disease (Gustafson & Nilsson, 1982). It has also been claimed that 'subcortical' 
dementias are not associated with a great degree of insightlessness (e.g. Caine 
& Shoulson, 1983; Danielczyk, 1983). Patients with multi-infarct dementia (MID) 
are said to have preserved insight as compared with Alzheimer's disease 
patients (Lishman, 1987; De Bettignies et al., 1990), although more recent work 
has found no significant difference (Sultzer et al., 1993). Most of these findings, 
however, are based on work where insight is not assessed in a structured way 
or where the criteria for assessing its presence/absence (most of these studies 
assume a unitary conceptualisation) are not defined (Danielczyk, 1983). In 
addition, difficulties arise in the assessment of the stage of the disease, the rate
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of progression and the severity of dementia, all of which may influence the level 
and type of insight. In general, there has been less work on traumatic, radiation, 
space-occupying, myxoedematous, B12 deficiency, normal-pressure 
hydrocephalus, etc. types of dementia, perhaps reflecting the smaller 
prevalence of these clinical groups as compared with Alzheimer's disease. A 
summary of the results from recent studies on insight in dementias is given in 
table 2 (Appendix A, p238).
(1) Stage of dementia
With respect to stage of the dementia, most studies suggest that insight is 
preserved early on in the disease (Schneck et al., 1982; Seltzer et al., 1993) 
and diminishes with progression of the disease (Freidenberg, et al., 1990), 
though others point at a more complicated relationship. Thus, Reisberg et al.
(1985) (reviewed in McGlynn & Kaszniak (1991b)) found that patients showed 
less insight at the earliest stage of the illness, becoming more insightful during 
the 'confusional' phase, before losing this insight in the later stages. Neary et al.
(1986) suggest that there is considerable variation in the amount of insight held 
by patients with Alzheimer's disease, some patients with more global 
impairment showing greater insight into their illness than patients at an earlier 
stage.
(2) Severity of dementia
Examination of the relationship between the severity of the dementing illness 
and loss of insight has also yielded mixed results. Some workers report a 
strong positive correlation (Mangone et al., 1991; Ott & Fogel, 1992; Sevush & 
Leve, 1993; Verhey et al., 1993; Vasterling et al., 1995). Others find a weaker 
association (Feher et al., 1991; Michon et al., 1992) and yet others, claim that 
there is no relationship between the severity of dementia and loss of insight
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(Green et al., 1993; Reed et al., 1993; Weinstein et al., 1994; Auchus et al., 
1994). Results in this area are particularly variable (see table 2, Appendix A) 
and are likely to reflect not just the different methods used in assessing insight, 
but the difficulty and variability in determining the severity of the dementia itself. 
For example, many studies use the severity of cognitive impairments as a 
measure of severity of the dementia, whereas others rely to different extents 
also on measures of functional abilities, behavioural disturbance and 
personality change.
(3) Depression
In their attempt to 'explain' depression in dementia, some studies have 
examined the relationship between depressive symptoms and level of insight in 
dementia. Results are conflicting as, for example, Reed et al. (1993), found no 
relationship between 'anosognosia' in Alzheimer's disease patients and a 
diagnosis of major depression (according to DSM III criteria). De Bettignies et 
al. (1990) and Verhey et al. (1993) found no relationship between loss of insight 
in dementia (mixed groups of Alzheimer's disease, vascular dementia and 
others) and degree of depression (as assessed by the Hamilton Depression 
Rating Scale). On the other hand, Feher et al. (1991) have described a weak 
relationship between loss of insight and scores on the Hamilton Depression 
Rating Scale and Sevush & Leve (1993) claimed a significant relationship 
between loss of insight and severity of depression (depression in this study was 
assessed on a 3-item scale). In other words, the more insightful patients were 
found to be more depressed, and both studies suggested that the depression 
present in the patients with dementia might in part have developed as a 
reaction to the awareness patients had concerning their disease. In a large 
study, involving 235 patients with Alzheimer's disease. Seltzer et al. (1993) also 
found that preserved insight was significantly related to the presence of 
depression, but in this study, neither insight nor depression (or other symptoms)
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were assessed in a structured or systematic way. Instead, together with 10 
other psychiatric symptoms, they were rated simply as being present or absent. 
Interestingly, in direct contrast to the previous studies, Freidenberg et al. (1990) 
found a significant relationship between diminished insight in patients with 
Alzheimer's disease and both depressive and psychotic symptoms. On the 
other hand, Kaszniak et al. (1993) found no correlation between impaired 
awareness in Alzheimer's disease patients and ratings of depression or 
delusions.
(4) Brain mechanisms
In line with neurological research, where associations have been described 
between anosognosia and frontal lobe pathology (McGlynn & Schacter, 1989; 
Prigatano, 1991; Starkstein et al., 1993, see chapter 4), attempts have also 
been made to examine the role of the frontal lobes in the relationship between 
loss of insight and dementia. Weinstein et al. (1994) showed that patients with 
Alzheimer's disease, presenting with memory loss and behavioural 
disturbances indicative of frontal lobe involvement, had less awareness of 
deficits than patients presenting with features suggestive of posterior brain 
involvement such as writing/reading difficulties or visuospatial problems. 
Similarly, Mangone et al. (1991) and Michon et al. (1992, 1994) found a strong 
correlation between anosognosia and scores on frontal lobe dysfunction tests. 
Reed et al. (1993) carried out SPECT studies in 20 patients with Alzheimer's 
disease and found a significant correlation between anosognosia and right 
dorsolateral frontal lobe perfusion. Anosognosia in this particular study was 
determined on the basis of ratings made from casenotes on the patients, who 
were categorised as having 'full awareness', 'shallow awareness' or 'no 
awareness'. Starkstein et al. (1995) found that patients with anosognosia in 
relation to Alzheimer's disease had significantly lower regional cerebral blood 
flow in the right frontal lobe on SPECT studies in comparison with patients
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without anosognosia, though there were no differences on neuropsychological 
testing. The authors in this study used the discrepancies between patients' 
answers and caregivers' answers on a structured questionnaire as a measure 
of anosognosia. They conceptualised anosognosia broadly, examining 
awareness of intellectual functioning, changes in interests and personality 
changes. However, they then categorised the patients into those with and those 
without anosognosia on the basis of a cut off point on their questionnaire score. 
It is not clear, therefore, whether the two groups differed simply in degree of 
awareness into deficits or in the types of deficits towards which they were 
unaware. Auchus et al. (1994) have reported that patients with Alzheimer's 
disease showed a significant correlation between unawareness of deficits and 
visuoconstructional dysfunction (as assessed by clock drawing and block 
designing) suggesting also that right hemisphere dysfunction might be 
important as an underlying mechanism of unawareness. Unawareness of 
deficits (rated as present or absent) in this retrospective study, however, was 
elicited on the basis of a clinical judgement and no criteria were given to explain 
how this was determined.
5.4 Implicit memory in dementia
For the sake of completion, a brief mention should be made concerning one of 
the other aspects of awareness or insight that has been studied in relation to 
dementia, namely, implicit or unconscious memory. Work in this area has 
followed the neuropsychological approach to awareness as already described 
in amnesic syndromes (chapter 4). Using priming tasks, patients with 
Alzheimer's disease have been shown to display implicit memory in a similar 
manner to other patients with amnesic syndromes (McGlynn & Schacter, 1989; 
Schacter, 1995). In addition, dissociations have been found between not only 
implicit and explicit memory, but also between the types of implicit memory 
preserved. For example, the commonest finding with respect to Alzheimer's
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disease has been a dissociation between priming deficits in word-related 
priming tasks , visual tasks and motor tasks (Burke et al., 1994; Russo & 
Spinnler, 1994; Schacter, 1995). Interestingly, the converse, i.e. deficits in 
procedural, motor related tasks and sparing of verbal related tasks, has been 
found in Huntington's disease (Butters et al., 1994). In a detailed study, Keane 
et al. (1991) have been able to demonstrate a dissociation between perceptual 
priming (spared) and verbal priming (involved) in Alzheimer's disease, which is 
In keeping with the view that these functions are served by the occipital and 
temporo-parietal lobe, respectively. More recently, Gallie et al. (1993) 
compared 20 patients with Alzheimer's disease (mild, moderate and severe) 
with 40 controls on 4 different priming tasks (i.e., using spoken and written 
words, pictures and objects). They found that the patients with Alzheimer's 
disease and controls showed similar levels of priming on spoken and written 
word category completion tests (thus showing a dissociation between implicit 
and explicit memory in Alzheimer's disease). However, the patients with 
Alzheimer's disease showed lower priming effects on pictures (i.e., priming 
deficits) and greater priming effects on tactile identification (i.e., priming 
preserved) than did the control subjects. Differences were also observed at 
different stages of the disease.
Studies, examining this aspect of awareness in dementia, have generally been 
limited to demonstrating the presence (sparing) or absence (deficit) of implicit 
memory with respect to different modality-specific tests. In this sense, implicit 
memory is viewed very much as a distinct and separate neuropsychological 
phenomenon, with theories concerning its mechanism following the 
neuropsychological lines as described earlier. There has been little attempt to 
conceptualise this notion either theoretically or empirically within the framework 
of insight as a whole. It might be interesting, for example, to explore the 
relationship between this sort of unawareness of function and the impaired 
insight in relation to deficits in patients with dementia.
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5.5 Summary
With respect to the work on insight in dementia, it is evident that whether made 
explicit or not, insight is conceptualised in a variety of ways. On the one hand, 
many researchers have used the relatively narrow and specific meaning of 
'anosognosia' or 'unawareness', following the neurological/neuropsychological 
approach. In this sense, insight is viewed more as a function that may be 
present or absent in relation to particular memory deficits (analogous to 
anosognosia in relation to, e.g., hemiplegia). On the other hand, other 
researchers have followed a broader approach to insight, exploring not only the 
awareness of specific cognitive deficits, but, to varying extents, also the 
judgements of the effects of these impairments on the patients in relation to 
function, mood and behaviour. Such approaches have also widened the scope 
of insight assessments in examining insight not just into memory deficits, but 
into other aspects of the disease as a whole (e.g. mood disturbance, daily living 
skills, etc.). Judgements in this latter, broader sense, do not fit in with the 
conceptualisation of awareness in the neuropsychological sense, but are 
perhaps more akin to the neuropsychological concept of 'metacognition' 
(Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994).
As with empirical work on insight in relation to functional psychiatric disease 
(chapter 3), the studies examining insight in dementia yield mixed and 
inconsistent results. This must in part relate to the different approaches used in 
defining and assessing insight, as well as to the frequent overlapping of such 
approaches. Consequently, the theoretical distinctions made above become . 
blurred in the empirical situation, and it is not always possible to separate out 
the different aspects or awareness or insight that are being elicited. Clearly, 
patients with dementia show a range of insight both in terms of awareness of 
their specific deficits, and in terms of judgements relating to these. In addition, 
patients show different types of unawareness in relation to preserved cognitive
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function (implicit memory). However, the relationship between levels and type 
of insight or awareness and variables such as the type of dementia, the stage 
and severity of dementia, and associated depression, remains to be 
determined. Likewise, localisation of impaired awareness or insight to specific 
regions or systems in the brain has to be dependent on a much clearer 
understanding of what it is that is being assessed.
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Section II: The Structure of Insight 
Chapter 6
Study 1: Exploration of insight in clinical psychiatry
As the examination and analysis of the literature on insight in clinical psychiatry 
and related areas shows, the concept of insight raises a number of important 
and interesting questions. As the purpose of the thesis is primarily the 
clarification of the concept of insight as a mental structure, the empirical work 
described here is focused on what seems to be one of the most important 
issues, namely, the meaning of insight.
It is apparent that the meaning of the term 'insight' is unclear, in the sense that 
not only are there different definitions and approaches to the study of insight 
given across the various disciplines reviewed, but also within the individual 
disciplines themselves. As has been noted earlier, this raises further questions. 
For example, are researchers examining different phenomena, with the terms 
and approaches linked by a superficial resemblance, but in fact referring to 
overlapping but nonetheless distinct concepts? On the other hand, could it be 
that it is the different aspects of the same phenomenon that are being 
explored? Perhaps the differences are emerging predominantly through the 
different perspectives from which insight is examined or from the different 
constituents of insight that are being sought. Another possibility might involve a 
mixture of both kinds of explanation. The answers to such questions, however, 
carry important implications for the mechanisms postulated as underpinning 
insightlessness. Does it make sense, for example, to seek a common 
underlying brain mechanism by equating the anosognosia in hemiplegia or 
amnesia with insightlessness into psychotic symptoms? How valid is it to 
compare studies using different or mixed approaches to insight assessment
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and assume that the same phenomenon is being captured? How important are 
the 'objects' of insight assessments themselves (i.e. specific neurological 
deficits, psychotic symptoms, a particular illness, normal function, etc.) in the 
determination of the concept of insight and consequently also the possible 
mechanism underlying its expression?
The studies described in these next 2 chapters were both designed to further 
explore the nature of insight, with the aim of attempting to help answer some of 
the above questions, and in turn help lead to the development of a structural 
model of insight. The first study, described in this chapter, is examining insight 
in patients with functional psychiatric disorders, specifically schizophrenia and 
depression. The focus here is mainly on the construction of an instrument 
designed to explore and capture possible qualitative aspects of insight. At the 
same time, quantitative assessments of insight are also determined, and insight 
as a whole is compared between the patient groups, as well as related to 
changes in mental state and the degree of severity of mental illness.
The second study, described in chapter 7, is examining insight from a different 
perspective. Here, insight is assessed with respect to one particular mental 
experience, namely, memory function, but in relation to a mixed group of 
patients whose diagnoses range from functional psychiatric disorders to organic 
disorders, including both focal amnesic syndromes and dementias. In this 
sense, insight is being examined in a consistent manner but across several 
diagnostic groups.
6.1 Defining insight
In order to construct a measure of insight that can be applied to the patient 
groups, it is necessary to have a working definition of insight. It was evident 
from the analysis of the studies on insight in functional psychiatric disorders
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(chapter 3), that there were several kinds of problems relating to this. First, it 
was apparent that despite the variety of meanings of the term 'insight' used by 
different researchers, rarely was a theoretical basis or conceptual framework 
provided as underlying the definition of insight given. Second, it was also 
apparent that where consideration had been given to a theoretical analysis of 
the concept, there were nevertheless, difficulties in translating the concept of 
insight and its constituents into an empirical form of measurement (e.g. Amador 
et al., 1991, 1993; see chapter 3).
The question is how to define or conceptualise insight so that its different 
aspects and components can be determined, and subsequently translated into 
a form allowing clinical/empirical elicitation. It seems that common to much of 
the 'psychiatric' work on the notion is the view that insight does not just consist 
of awareness of a particular mental experience, but that it also involves some 
sort of correct understanding or knowledge of the experience. This latter aspect 
has been variously termed as 'judgement' (Jaspers, 1948), views about the 
nature of symptoms (Greenfeld et al, 1989), 'attribution' (Amador et al., 1993), 
or 'relabelling of symptoms as pathological' (David, 1990). It also appears that it 
is this secondary aspect of insight that has been proving most difficult to 
translate into an empirical form, at least in a broad sense. In other words, it 
seems difficult, without exploring further the components of this judgement or 
understanding, to make the qualitative assessments of insight. Consequently, 
the empirical translation generally takes the form of a categorical assessment of 
the belief that the symptoms either do or do not constitute an illness. However, 
as pointed out earlier, researchers have in different ways proposed, in theory at 
least, other aspects of insight, e.g. concept of self-formation, psychological 
defensiveness (Amador et al., 1991) or views about the symptoms themselves 
and one's vulnerability to their effects/recurrence (Greenfeld et ai., 1989). All 
such views are suggestive of a broader approach to the judgement made or 
understanding held by the patient with respect to his symptoms or illness.
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It was therefore with a view to determining and capturing some of the 
qualitative aspects of insight in this broader sense, that an attempt was made 
here to explore in more detail, what this judgement or understanding might 
entail. For example, if the notion of'correct attitude' (Lewis, 1934) is 
considered, then this term is suggestive of a process in which, in the first place, 
there is an awareness of the particular mental experience. This awareness is 
followed by some sort of assessment or judgement, and lastly there is an 
appropriate reaction to the assessment. In this case, the appropriateness or 
'correctness' is taken to refer to what would be deemed as correct by a general 
'non-iir public. Similarly, if the notion of'relabelling' something as pathological 
(David, 1990) is considered, the implication here is that some mental process 
takes place, whereby an experience is judged or assessed before then being 
'correctly' understood as morbid. In this sense, it would be simplistic to consider 
'relabelling' as corresponding 'closely to the concept of anosognosia' as 
suggested by Mullen et al. (1996), since making this sort of judgement must 
involve more than just awareness. The point is, however, that there must be 
some active process on the part of the patient. This will involve the gathering 
and assimilation of information that is to an extent apart or separate from the 
mental experience itself, so that the judgement or understanding of the 
experience can be reached. It is by trying to explore the nature and 
components of this other information constituting the judgement, that perhaps 
qualitative aspects of insight might be identified. For this purpose, Hamlyn's 
(1977) work on self-knowledge is particularly useful.
Hamlyn (1977) makes a distinction between the concepts of self-knowledge 
and the knowledge about the self. He argues that much literature in philosophy 
and psychology has been concerned with the knowledge about the self, that is, 
with the individual's awareness of his/her personality traits, with how he/she 
appears to others, with his/her self-esteem and self-evaluation. According to
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Hamlyn, this is not a true self-knowledge but only reflects beliefs about the self. 
Self-knowledge proper, Hamlyn argues, is one's knowledge about things as 
they affect oneself. For example, if a person knows he has a disfigurement or a 
propensity to avoid certain situations, then he knows these features about 
himself. However, only if this person recognises the ways in which his 
disfigurement or avoiding habit affect his perception of the world around him 
and his interaction with other people, can he be said to have self-knowledge. 
Whilst this concept of self-knowledge may encompass any aspect of knowledge 
of the self in Hamlyn's sense, the concept of insight in clinical practice could be 
restricted to self-knowledge in relation to symptoms or illness. Thus, insight 
may be viewed as a sub-category of self-knowledge, involving knowledge of the 
relationship between the symptoms/illness and the patient's individual, personal 
characteristics, as well as knowledge about the symptoms/illness themselves. 
Using this broad definition of insight, different components can be identified. To 
have full or complete insight, patients would require not only to be aware of 
symptoms or illness, and not only to have the understanding or knowledge 
about the known facts of such symptoms or illness. They would, in addition, 
have to know about the ways in which having the symptoms/illness affected 
them, both subjectively, and in relation to the ways they interacted with their 
social environments. Whether it is realistic or even desirable to expect patients 
to achieve complete insight in this sense, is a separate question. The important 
issue is, however, that this definition opens up different ways of approaching 
insight qualitatively and allows for translation into empirical forms. Clinical 
exploration can thus focus not only on awareness of a mental symptom and 
judgement of its pathological nature, but in addition, can be directed at issues 
involving awareness of changes in the self, at levels of understanding 
concerning the effects of the symptom/experience on the self, both in terms of 
subjective perception of the environment, and in terms of functioning within this 
environment.
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6.2 Aims of study 1
The main aim of this study was to construct a scale assessing insight, based on 
the definition of insight suggested above. Secondly, this scale would be used in 
patients with functional psychiatric disorders in order to explore some of the 
qualitative aspects of insight. Specifically, four questions are being asked in this 
study:
(1) Is it possible to identify and assess clinically, both qualitative and 
quantitative components of insight?
(2) Do changes in insight occur overtime or over course of illness episode, and 
is the insight assessment scale sensitive to any such changes?
(3) Are levels of insight, as assessed by the scale, related to the severity of the 
patient's disorder?
(4) Can quantitative and/or qualitative differences in insight be determined 
between patients with different psychiatric diagnoses?
6.3 Method
(1) Construction of the Insight Scale (Appendix B)
The Insight Scale (Appendix B) had 32 items to be answered 'yes', 'no', or 'don't 
know'. Although as part of this study, the scale was administered to the patients 
in conjunction with the rest of the protocol, it was designed to be a self-rating 
instrument and was thus phrased as simply as possible. Consequently, issues 
of inter rater reliability do not arise. The items were chosen on a face validity 
basis in relation to the definition of insight given above. Thus, it was attempted 
to break up the concept of insight into components thought to represent 
aspects of self-knowledge relevant to the patient's illness. Questions pertaining 
to the following categories were included:
Chapter 6 / 1 2 6
(1) hospitalisation (1,4,6a,21,25,26);
(2) mental illness in general (3,11);
(3) perception of being ill (2,5,6b,10,13);
(4) changes in the self (6d,8,9,14,16,17,18,21,22,23,24,30);
(5) control over the situation (20,27,28,29);
(6) perception of the environment (6c, 15,20,23,,26);
(7) wanting to understand one's situation (31,32).
Scoring
To facilitate analysis, a score of 2 was given for a positive response and 1 for a 
negative response, and items were subdivided into:
(a) Group A: those that if answered positively, would indicate greater (positive) 
insight (5,6b,8,9,13,14,16,17,18,22,23,24,26,32);
(b) Group B: those that if answered positively, would indicate less (negative) 
insight (1.3,7,10,11,15,20).
To determine the direction of insight with respect to individual items, the 
following assumptions were made:
(1) Items relating to general attitudes towards hospitalisation, mental illness and 
medication (categories (1) and (2)) mainly reflect the individual's cultural 
background. Positive insight was scored when the patient acknowledged that 
mental illness existed and could be treated with medication.
(2) Positive insight was also scored when individuals recognised that they were 
ill (and more specifically, mentally ill) and in need of treatment (category (3)). 
The acknowledgement of treatment need was included here, following general
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lines taken in insight research. Nonetheless, it should be considered in a 
tentative light since, as mentioned previously, acceptance of treatment may not 
be a necessary constituent of insight (see also chapter 8).
(3) It was assumed that when individuals become mentally ill, a number of 
cognitive and experiential changes occur, affecting perception of self, of the 
environment and of the interaction between the two. The items in categories
(4)-(7) relate to the awareness of such changes. Thus, positive insight was 
scored when the patient acknowledged a difference within him or herself and 
with his/her interaction with the outside world.
Items found to be ambiguous with respect to the direction of insight 
(2,4,6a,6c,6d,6e,12,19,21,27,28,29), were discarded before analysis took 
place. With regard to 'don't know' responses, these were discarded when no 
firm conclusions could be drawn concerning the direction of insight.
Semistructured interview
This instrument (Appendix C) was used in conjunction with the scale to allow 
further exploration of insight and to bring out any other aspects of insight which 
might be useful in the further development of the scale. Information from this 
interview was also used to check on the veracity of answers obtained to the 
insight scale. An individual qualitative analysis of the information from this 
interview was not however, carried out in this study.
Both the Insight scale and the semistructured interview were piloted for 
language validity.
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(2) Patients and assessments
Forty-three patients with a DSM-III-R diagnosis (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1987) of either schizophrenia or a depressive illness who were 
admitted consecutively to the acute general psychiatric wards in Fulbourn 
Hospital, Cambridge, were interviewed within 48 hours of admission. Since this 
was an exploratory study whose purpose was to focus predominantly on 
insight, patients were selected on the grounds that these disorders were 
relatively straightforward, common and had relatively reliable means of 
ascertaining their severity. Because of difficulties in classifying and rating 
severity of personality disorders and disorders relating to substance abuse, 
these were excluded. Patients with other diagnoses, e.g., manic illnesses, 
obsessive-compulsive disorders, etc., were excluded because the small 
numbers of patients admitted to hospital over the time course of the study, 
would have made comparisons by diagnosis, very difficult. The following 
protocol was completed:
(1) data sheet;
(2) the preliminary insight scale (Appendix B);
(3) a semi-structured interview to examine insight (Appendix 0);
(4) scales to measure the severity of the specific disorders, either:
(i) Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD) (Hamilton, 1967), or
(ii) Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) (Overall & Gorham, 1962)
Of the forty-three patients, twenty-two were reassessed using the same 
protocol within 48 hours of discharge from hospital. Because of early or 
unplanned discharges, it was not possible to follow up every patient. The 
SPSS-PCv.3.1 statistical package was used for data analysis.
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6.4 Results
The demographic data and diagnoses for the sample are shown in table 3.
T a b le  3
D e m o g ra p h ic  d a ta  a n d  d ia g n o s e s
V a r ia b le In te r v ie w  1 In te r v ie w  2 **
Numbers of patients 43 22
Sex (Males: Females) 19:24 11:11
Mean Age (range) 43 (22-68) 46 (22-68)
Diagnosis: Schizophrenia 19
(BPRSa range: 33-60)
12
(BPRSa range: 33-60) 
(BPRSb range: 17-33)
Diagnosis: Major 
Depression
13
(HRSDa range: 21-44)
5
(HRSDa range: 33-42) 
(HRSDb range: 2-11)
Diagnosis: Dysthymia 7
(HRSDa range: 24-33)
4
(HRSDa range: 24-33) 
(HRSDb range: 3-11)
Diagnosis: Bipolar 
Depression
4
(HRSDa range: 23-30)
1
(HRSDa: 27, HRSDb: 12)
a = score at interview 1, b = score at interview 2
** It was not possible to follow up 21 patients: 11 were discharged before notification; 
6 took their own discharge; 2 refused to cooperate with the 2nd interview; 1 was 
transferred to another hospital; 1 died. The attrition rate, however, should not affect 
the results concerning the structure of the scale, as the reason for the 2nd interview 
was to look at the sensitivity to change of the Insight Scale.
The results are summarised in 2 parts. The first part deals with the analysis of 
the preliminary insight scale, based on 43 patients. The second part deals with 
the analysis of the results based on the 22 patients interviewed twice.
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(1) Analysis of the preliminary insight scale
Questions belonging to groups A (positive insight) and B (negative insight) were 
analysed separately by exploratory principal component analysis (factor 
analysis).
Group A yielded 5 factors, which accounted for 63.5% of the variance (lowest 
eigenvalue = 1.21):
Factor 1 (23% of variance). This factor contains items concerning both 
perception of being ill and awareness of changes happening within the self. 
There is also the acknowledgement that other people recognise a change in the 
patient.
Factor 2 (12.4% of variance). The items in this factor are specifically 
concerned with the patients' recognition of thought processes being affected by 
the illness.
Factors (10.1% of variance). This factor is concerned with patients' 
awareness of changes within themselves and the reflection of such changes in 
their interaction with their environment. There also appears to be a need for 
self-understanding.
Factor 4 (9.3% of variance). The items in this factor reflect general 
awareness of changes within the self and the resulting difficulties in functioning.
Factors (8.7% of variance). This factor includes items that are concerned 
with the recognition of self-change and the need for help. Items also indicate an 
expectation that the patient's situation is treatable.
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The common theme underlying all these factors is the patient's recognition of a 
change in the self.
Group B yielded 3 factors and accounted for 63.6% of the variance (lowest 
eigenvalue = 1.13);
Factor 1 (28.3% of variance). Items in this factor relate to perception of 
being ill and also to attitudes towards mental illness in general.
Factors (19.1% of variance). This factor contains items which are 
concerned with perception of changes in the environment and may indicate 
delusional thinking.
Factors (16.2% of variance). The items in this factor are concerned with 
attitudes towards hospitalisation.
Reliability
Items in groups A and B were analysed for Internal consistency using 
Cronbach's alpha coefficient. This is an estimate for test reliability based on 
intercorrelations (Ghiselli et al., 1981). Group A yielded a standardised alpha 
0.71 and Group B, an alpha = 0.55. At this stage of the study, these alphas 
should be considered as adequate. No item proved to be redundant (i.e. its 
rejection increasing significantly the alpha value) in either group.
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(2) Analysis of 'insight* in patient sample
(i) Changes in insight over time
For the 22 patients seen twice, overall scores for items in groups A and B were 
calculated separately for interview 1 and interview 2. Then a comparison was 
made of scores at first and at second interview, using a two-tailed f-test for 
related samples (table 4). The data in table 4 show a significant change in both 
positive (t “  3.54, P< 0.002) and negative insight (t = 2.75, P< 0.01) between 
the first and the second interviews, indicating an improvement in insight prior to 
hospital discharge. Thus the preliminary insight scale showed sensitivity to 
change.
Table 4
Comparison of global scores obtained for group A and group B items 
between 1st and 2nd Interviews
Interview Group A (insight- 
positive) 
mean global scores(s.d.)
Group B* (insight- 
negative) 
mean globai scores (s.d.)
Interview 1 18.2(3.5) 11.5(1.8)
Interview 2 20.3 (2.3) 12.6(1.2)
* For facility, the scoring of insight-negative or group B items has been 
reversed, i.e. the greater the score, the greater the level of insight.
(ii) Relationship between the severity of the mental disorder and insight
Correlations were calculated between insight scores at 1st and 2nd interviews 
and severity of mental disorders at both times, as measured by the BPRS and
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the HRSD. The results at first interview showed a negative correlation 
(Pearson's) between the severity of psychotic disorder (BPRS scores) and the 
overall positive insight score (P< 0.01); patients with higher BPRS scores at 
initial interview showed lower levels of insight. The results at second interview 
also showed a negative correlation (P< 0.01) between severity of depressive 
illness (HRSD scores) and the overall positive insight score; i.e. patients 
showing a greater degree of severity of depression around the time of 
discharge from hospital had lower levels of insight at that time.
(iii) Comparison of insight scores between patients with schizophrenia and 
patients with depression
At first interview, patients with schizophrenia (n-19) had higher positive insight 
scores than patients with depression (n=24) (Mann-Whitney /7-test, P< 0.02).
No significant differences were found between these two diagnostic groups in 
regard to negative insight scores.
6.5 Discussion
This study describes the development and testing of a preliminary insight scale 
in a mixed sample of 43 patients. As stated earlier, the principal aim here was 
to explore the possibility of eliciting different qualitative aspects of insight. Thus, 
the work presented is in its early stages and can only form the basis of more 
substantive exploration in conjunction with further development and refinement 
of the insight assessment.
The insight scale was constructed on the basis of the definition of insight as a 
subcategory of self-knowledge described above. This broader conception of 
insight suggested a number of different aspects to the knowledge patients
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might have in relation to their illness and its effects. In turn, this provided the 
insight scale with a variety of items thought to represent some of these aspects.
Factor analyses of group A items and group B items reveal a consistent pattern 
and the factors obtained show similar features. This indicates that patients were 
not responding randomly to the items (i.e. sometimes 'yes' and sometimes 'no' 
to similar questions). The most important factor emerging in both groups 
appears to centre around the perception of being ill. In addition, the factors in 
group A and factor 2 in group B are all concerned with the patients' recognition 
of changes in themselves and with the perception of change in their 
environment and their relationship with their environment. It seems therefore, 
that the most significant characteristics or aspects of insight as measured by 
the insight scale, relate to the patients' awareness of qualitative changes in 
themselves and their outside world. Other aspects of insight brought out by the 
scale, though to a lesser degree, include the recognition of the need for help 
(factors 4 and 5, group A) and hospitalisation (factor 3, group B). These seem 
to be linked to an awareness that other people can perceive changes in the 
patients.
The second part of the study examined changes in patients' insight between 
the state of acute illness and the state of improvement as determined by 
hospital admission and hospital discharge, respectively. The relationship 
between insight scores and the severity of the mental disorders was also 
examined.
In accordance with some other studies (Birchwood et al., 1994), the results 
show a significant improvement in insight scores between hospital admission 
and discharge. This contrasts, however, with the results of McEvoy et al. 
(1989b) who found no significant change in their study. Several reasons could 
account for this difference. McEvoy et al. (1989b) were examining patients with
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schizophrenia, whereas the patient sample in this study also included patients 
with depressive illnesses. Splitting the results according to diagnosis might 
have given a different picture, but the sample size did not allow for this. It might 
be interesting, however, for future studies to compare the changes in insight 
over illness episode between patients with different diagnoses. More 
importantly perhaps, the insight instruments in the two studies are very 
different. As described in chapter 3, the insight scale used by McEvoy et al. 
(1989b) (ITAQ), focused specifically on the issue of being mentally ill and 
requiring treatment. By trying to separate out components of such judgements, 
in an attempt to capture more qualitative aspects of insight, the scale that was 
used in this study included, in addition, questions concerning awareness of 
subtle changes going on in the patient and in his/her relationship with outside 
events. In other words, before coming to a judgement about what is happening, 
and specifically about being mentally ill, there has to be some perception or 
awareness of change. In fact, this goes back to the distinction made by Jaspers 
(1948) between, firstly, being aware of illness or change and, secondly, making 
a correct judgement as to the nature of the mental illness. As indicated earlier, 
most insight assessments in clinical psychiatry focus on this latter component of 
insight, i.e. the judgement that one is suffering from a mental illness, and tend 
not to explore the earlier stages. Thus, it could be hypothesised that the 
improvement in insight over time, as shown in this study, might be related to the 
fact that verbal recognition of general changes may be less threatening to the 
patient than the verbal recognition of being or having been mentally ill (in other 
words, it might be easier to say 'I feel different' than to say 'I am mentally ill'). 
Although significant, the change in insight as represented by the increase in 
total insight scores, appears relatively small in terms of the mean values given 
in table 4, and follows similar results reported in other studies (Birchwood et al.,
1994). In part this is a consequence of some patients showing marked change 
in responses between admission and discharge, and others showing little 
change. The small size of the patient sample in this study precluded a more
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detailed analysis but future work would need to be directed at some of the 
issues arising. For example, it would be interesting to examine whether specific 
items or factors were more sensitive to change than others. It would be also 
useful to explore the relationship between both qualitative and quantitative 
changes in insight and the illness affecting the patient. It may be that other 
variables or factors related to the patient (e.g. past experiences, intelligence, 
interests, cultural/environmental influences, etc.) are important in determining 
both the sort of insight expressed and the change shown in insight over time.
In agreement with some studies (e.g. David et al., 1992; Takai et al., 1992;), but 
in contrast to others (Bartko et al., 1988; McEvoy et al., 1989b, 1993b; Cuesta 
& Peralta, 1994), this study shows a significant negative correlation between 
the severity of the disorder and level of insight. In other words, the more ill the 
patients are (as assessed by the rating scales), the less insight they show. 
Interestingly, correlations are different in relation to the various disorders. Thus, 
in schizophrenic patients, the more severe the psychotic disorder at time of 
admission (as measured by the BPRS), the lower the level of insight (as 
assessed by the insight scale). On the other hand, in the patients with 
depressive illnesses, it was only at the second interview (i.e. prior to discharge), 
that the severity of their (residual) depression, as measured by the HRSD, 
showed an inverse correlation with insight. Once again, the sample numbers 
were too small to allow firm conclusions to be drawn here. Nevertheless, this 
differential effect is suggestive of factors other than severity of disease, being 
important in modulating the type and extent of insight shown by patients. This 
would need to be explored further by examining other patient variables and 
involving a larger sample of patients. For example, it may not be the severity of 
a particular disorder that contributes significantly to the insight held, but 
perhaps the presence of psychotic symptoms, be they in the context of 
schizophrenia or depression or mania. Work in this area and conclusions drawn 
must, however, be tempered with recognition of the problems inherent in
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comparing severities of different illnesses. Clearly, the scales, i.e. BPRS and 
HRSD are necessarily different and will be assessing a different type of seventy 
in each disorder. In addition, the issue of how far or to what extent a rating 
scale is measuring severity of the pathological process is a complex one and 
cannot be explored here. The point is, however, that the rating on the scales 
does not have to reflect the severity of either the pathology in the brain or the 
effects on the functioning of the patient, either of which may be important in the 
sort of insight held by the patient.
The last part of this study examined differences in overall scores on the insight 
scale between schizophrenic patients and patients suffering from depression. 
Interestingly, the schizophrenic patients scored significantly higher on group A 
(positive insight) items, i.e. on the items concerned with awareness of self­
change and in the recognition of such change as affecting the individual's 
functioning, compared with the depressive patients. In contrast, items in group 
B (negative insight), concerned more with general attitudes towards mental 
illness and hospitalisation, did not differentiate between the diagnostic groups. 
Again, in view of the small sample sizes, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions, 
but the indication of such differences must merit further exploration in both the 
quantitative and qualitative aspects of insight in relation to different mental 
disorders.
6.6 Conclusion
This study provides some answers to the questions raised at the beginning of 
this chapter, but also uncovers more as insight is explored further. With respect 
to the first question, although crude in its present form, the preliminary insight 
scale does provide both a qualitative and a quantitative assessment of insight. 
The items on this scale were chosen in an attempt to reflect the theoretically 
derived definition of insight as a subcategory of self-knowledge. Factor analysis
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brought out dimensions approximating to some of the aspects of insight that 
were thought to be relevant to the original definition. Thus, emerging as 
important, were factors relating to the patients' awareness of change in 
themselves and in their environment, their awareness of the perception by 
others of changes in themselves, hospitalisation and the need for help. The 
scale also provides quantitative measurements, although the scoring system at 
present is cumbersome and needs simplification.
In relation to the second question, the results show that over the period of 
hospital admission, insight scores change in the direction of improvement. The 
third question, concerning the relationship between insight and severity of the 
patient's disorder is more difficult to answer. Overall, insight scores were found 
to be inversely related to the severity of the patients' illness but this result has 
to be qualified, as was seen above, by the both the time of insight assessment 
(interview 1 or 2) and the type of psychiatric disorder (schizophrenia or 
depression) affecting the patient. At this stage it can only be postulated that the 
severity of a particular disorder is likely to affect the extent of insight shown by 
the patient, but the degree to which this might be important and the contributing 
effects of other factors, remains to be discovered.
The issues raised in this study can only be addressed in the context of both 
further theoretical exploration and a more substantive study involving a greater 
number of patients and ideally, including patients with different functional 
psychiatric diagnoses. Thus, the fourth question also remains only partially 
answered but merits more exploration. It seems that different qualitative 
components of insight can be elicited and it is likely that many other such 
components exist. The next important questions have to deal with the 
significance of individual qualitative aspects of insight, as items or factors. Is 
endorsement of specific items related to the type of illness, the stage of the 
illness, personality factors, prognosis, etc.?
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Chapter 7
Study 2: Insight into memory function
Just like the study described in chapter 6, the study described below was 
designed to explore the nature of insight and to determine its possible 
components. In comparison with the previous study, however, the present 
study asks questions from a different perspective. The previous study, in light of 
some of the conceptual and empirical problems that had emerged from 
reviewing insight research in functional psychiatric disorders, was concerned 
predominantly with the definition of insight and the translation of its theoretical 
components into an empirical instrument designed to capture more qualitative 
aspects of insight. The present study, on the other hand, focuses on a 
somewhat broader problem with respect to the nature of insight. This problem 
relates to the already mentioned issue concerning the conceptualisation of 
insight across disciplines, and the question of whether the same phenomenon 
is being sought in these different areas. If, because of the diverse paths of 
development taken by the various disciplines as well as their different foci of 
interest, this has resulted in different phenomena being explored, albeit under 
similar terminology, this must carry important implications for any conclusions 
concerning the neurobiological basis or localisation of insight. Specifically, it is 
apparent that increasingly researchers are attempting (both explicitly and 
implicitly) to link the approaches used and models held to underlie 
unawareness/anosognosia in neurological states with ideas concerning loss of 
insight in functional psychiatric disorders. For example, several studies have 
concentrated on searching for correlations between neuropsychological 
variables specific to frontal lobe and right hemispheric dysfunction and impaired 
insight in patients with schizophrenia (McEvoy et al., 1993b; Young et al., 1993; 
Cuesta & Peralta, 1994) or with bipolar affective disorders (Ghaemi et al.,
1996). Such studies appear to be based on the finding that anosognosia has
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been linked with frontal lobe dysfunction and right hemisphere damage (e.g. 
Bisiach et al., 1986; Starkstein et al., 1992; see chapter 4). In other words, it is 
assumed that anosognosia as assessed in neurological conditions and 
impaired insight as assessed in schizophrenia, are both referring to the same 
phenomenon. Young et al. (1993), for example, whilst acknowledging 
difficulties in determining a clear definition of 'unawareness' in relation to 
schizophrenia, nevertheless base their study on a possible association between 
such unawareness and anosognosia in neurological states. They define 
'unawareness' in schizophrenia as 'the phenomena in which individuals with 
long standing schizophrenic symptomatology state upon intensive questioning 
that they are not ill, do not have symptoms or have no difficulties or 
abnormalities which they attribute to a psychiatric illness' (Young et al., 1993, 
p i 18). They consider this an analogous phenomenon to the anosognosia seen 
in neurological disorders. Mullen et al. (1996) are even more explicit in equating 
these phenomena. They state that 'the ability to relabel certain mental events
as pathological corresponds closely io the concept of anosognosia the
recognition by a patient of neurological symptoms is conceptually identical mth 
the recognition of psychiatric symptoms' (p645, my emphases). In 
consequence, common explanatory hypotheses and underlying mechanisms 
are sought for the impaired insight and unawareness present in schizophrenia 
and neurological states. Similarly, it is evident from the research on insight in 
dementia (as pointed out in chapter 5) that mixed approaches are applied with 
respect to unawareness or insightlessness. These are drawn from 
'neurological', 'psychiatric' and 'psychodynamic' disciplines with the assumption 
that the same phenomenon is being explored in the various studies.
The important question that has not been addressed is, however, whether the 
concepts of awareness or insight in the 'organic' and the 'functional' states can 
validly be considered as being the same. This issue is not one concerning the 
distinctions, valid or otherwise, between 'organic' and 'functional' states. Rather,
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irrespective of the validity of such distinctions, this issue concerns the question 
of whether the different approaches to conceptualising insight and awareness 
in these disciplines have resulted in different meanings behind the terms. Is it 
valid, for example, to assume that because schizophrenia is currently 
considered to be 'organic', that the concepts and approaches used in the 
'neurological' disciplines may simply be applied to schizophrenic symptoms in 
an analogous fashion? If it is the same phenomenon, namely insightlessness 
that is being examined in neurological disorders as in psychiatric disorders, 
then the mechanisms proposed as underlying anosognosia are likely to hold for 
insightlessness in psychotic illnesses. On the other hand, if different 
phenomena are being captured, it would make little sense to try to 'explain' 
insightlessness in schizophrenia purely in terms of frontal lobe dysfunction.
The study described below is designed in part to address the question of 
whether the same or different phenomena are being elicited in relation to 
different pathological states. First, however, in view of the important 
implications of this issue, the problem needs to be formulated explicitly. The 
question is whether unawareness of a specific neuropsychological deficit 
(anosognosia) can be considered as roughly equivalent to unawareness of 
mental illness. If equivalence of these phenomena is assumed (e.g. Young et 
al., 1993; Mullen et al., 1996), then two further broad assumptions need to be 
considered.
First is the assumption that the 'unawareness' has the same meaning or relates 
to the same process in both cases. From the work already analysed it seems 
apparent that this assumption may not necessarily be correct. Anosognosia or 
unawareness in the neuropsychological sense has been conceptualised, more 
or less, as a specific function whose elicitation and assessment is task or test 
dependent (see chapter 4). Unawareness of mental illness or impaired insight 
in clinical psychiatry has been conceptualised in a broader sense. In this
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discipline, it generally is viewed as comprising not only awareness but also 
secondary elaborations in the form of judgements, attributions, views etc., 
concerning the nature of the illness or symptoms in relation to the self (chapters 
3 & 6). In this latter sense, unawareness is therefore not conceived only as a 
function (albeit, this may be part of the concept of insight as a whole), but as a 
composite including other 'diffuse' mental processes.
The second assumption is that 'specific neuropsychological deficit' can be 
viewed as comparable to 'mental illness'. At various points throughout this 
thesis it has been suggested that the 'object' of insight research has a close, 
interdependent relationship not just with the clinical insight assessment, but 
also with the conceptualisation of insight itself, in other words, there seems to 
be a common evolution where the development, refinement and elaboration of 
the 'object' of insight assessment (e.g. intellectual tasks in Gestalt cognitive 
psychology: memory tests in cognitive neuropsychology) occurs in conjunction 
with the refinement and elaboration in the conceptualisation of insight and its 
assessment in the particular area. In a sense, this sort of interdependency 
serves also to maintain the distinctions between the notions of insight in the 
various disciplines. However, the issue relates, in addition, to a more specific 
problem. The problem lies in the fact that there is a basic, categorical difference 
between the meanings underlying the terms 'specific neuropsychological deficit' 
and 'mental illness'. The former refers to something that is 'objectively' 
ascertainable in the sense that it is in principle determinable by a 3rd person 
either through observation or specific tests. In other words, there is a relatively 
direct one-to-one relationship between the pathological dysfunction or 'object' 
(e.g. hemiparesis, dysphasia) and its determinable manifestation (inability to 
move limb, difficulty with speech). On the other hand, with regard to 'mental 
illness' there is not the same sort of direct correspondence between object and 
manifestation. The term 'mental illness' refers to a construct; one that may have 
biological/organic determinants, but in addition, its wider 'meaning' is
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constituted by the contribution of other and fluctuating factors such as cultural, 
environmental, current fashion etc. Hence, this is not a fixed concept, nor is it 
relating to a specific pathology. Signs taken to indicate mental illness in one 
decade may not necessarily apply in another decade. Similarly, they may differ 
from one culture to another or even from one clinician to another. Furthermore, 
patients may not experience 'illness' in the conventional sense, thus giving 
further scope to distortion of the relationship between 'object' and its 
manifestation. This will be discussed further in the next chapter, but it appears 
that there are theoretical objections to the assumption that unawareness of 
deficit and unawareness of mental illness refer to the same phenomenon.
The question of whether one refers to the same or different phenomena under 
the terms 'unawareness' or 'insightlessness', in relation to different diagnostic 
groups, does not seem to have been tackled at an empirical level. In the first 
place, this would be difficult to do without addressing the problem theoretically. 
Secondly, the distinctions that can be made theoretically, e.g. between 
awareness as a function and awareness incorporating wider judgements, are 
likely also to pose problems for empirical translation. Nevertheless, in an 
indirect way, the study described here is attempting to explore this problem 
empirically. This study is designed to assess insight into memory function 
across both organic and functional disorders. It is indirect in addressing the 
above problem in the sense that it is a post hoc examination of the pattern and 
extent of insight shown by patients as assessed by the insight instrument. This 
examination, in turn, questions whether the obtained insight patterns can best 
be 'explained' by the hypothesis involving a single/common phenomenon being 
elicited, or whether it makes more sense to consider the possibility of different 
phenomena being captured. In contrast to the previous study, the focus is on 
the relationship between insight and the object of insight assessment, in this 
case, memory function.
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Focusing on memory function as an object of insight assessment is useful for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, memory complaints are common and occur in both 
'organic' and 'functional' disorders (as well as in the general population) and 
can, in a sense, be explored 'independently' of the primary diagnosis. Secondly, 
as the previous chapters have shown (chapters 4 & 5), there has been a 
considerable amount of research on insight into memory function, though this 
has been carried out predominantly in relation to memory pathology. Both 
awareness of memory dysfunction and awareness of memory function (implicit 
memory) have been studied in relation to focal brain disease (amnestic 
syndromes) and generalised brain disease (dementias). With respect to 
'normal' or non-ill subjects, self-reports of memory function have been treated 
mainly in experimental psychology where, rather than 'insight' or 'awareness', 
somewhat different frameworks are used. For example, Hermann (1982), 
reviewing the current self-report questionnaires on everyday memory function 
found only a moderate correlation between self-assessments and performance 
on clinical tests of memory. These results were then discussed in terms of 
people's beliefs about their memory and factors that might influence such 
beliefs. Similarly, in functional psychiatric disorders, whilst memory 
function/dysfunction has not in itself been the subject of insight research, there 
is indirect reference to this issue, e.g. in recognition of the syndrome of 
'pseudodementia' (Gelder et al., 1996). Likewise, studies examining subjective 
memory complaints in depressed patients have noted discrepancies between 
such complaints and actual memory performance (Grut et al.,1993), thereby 
implying some disturbance in awareness or insight.
7.1 Aims of study 2
The principle aim of this study was to explore and compare the extent and 
patterns of insight into memory function held by patients with an organic basis 
and patients without an organic basis to their memory problems. As explained
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above, the overall objective was to help achieve a further understanding of the 
structure of insight and thereby also to determine its valid conceptualisation in 
clinical practice. By focusing specifically on memory function as a problem, this 
study aimed to explore insight across major diagnostic groups, hence enabling 
the comparison between patients with organic and non-organic brain 
impairment In contrast to previous studies, 'memory problem', rather than 
'memory dysfunction', was deliberately chosen as the 'object' of insight 
assessment. This meant that patients' insight could be examined, in a sense, 
independently of their memory dysfunction (or rather the cause of the memory 
dysfunction - thus avoiding the preconceptions specific to the 
conceptualisations of insight in neurological and psychiatric disciplines). It was 
further hoped that by thus separating insight from memory dysfunction as the 
object of insight assessment, other qualitative features specific to insight itself, 
rather than to the memory problem, could be identified. Apart from this broad 
explorative purpose, this study had several specific aims:
(1) to develop and test an instrument assessing insight into memory function,
(2) using this instrument, to explore the extent and patterns of insight into 
memory held by patients with a range of disorders,
(3) to compare the qualitative and quantitative assessments of insight between 
patients with organic memory problems and those without evidence of organic 
impairment,
(4) to carry out a limited, and at this stage preliminary, analysis of correlations 
between the qualitative and quantitative measures of insight and clinical 
variables (psychiatric ratings, neuropsychological performances).
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1.2. Method
(1) Construction of the Memory Insight Questionnaire (MIQ) (Appendix D)
The 'Memory Insight Questionnaire' (henceforth the 'MIQ') was designed to be 
as simple and straightforward as possible so that it could be completed also by 
patients with mild/moderate degree of cognitive impairment. In line with some of 
the assessments described earlier in relation to memory problems (chapters 4 
& 5), patients' insight was measured as a function of the discrepancy between 
patients’ views and their carers' or relatives' views on their memory function. 
Thus, a self-administered version of the instrument was given to the patients 
whilst the same questions, phrased in the third person, were filled out 
independently by the carers. (For the sake of simplicity, the term 'carers' shall 
continue to be used to refer to the people who accompanied the patients and 
completed the MIQ. It should be understood that whilst many of these 
(family/close friends) were indeed carers in the sense of having to help patients 
in their daily functioning, others were family or close friends who, because there 
was no real need by the patient, did not have the role of carers. What was 
considered important was that they knew the patient well and were in a position 
to observe any changes in his/her memory function.)
The MIQ consists of 19 items concerning different aspects of memory function 
and patients were asked to choose one of four possible views relating to each 
item (see Appendix D). The items themselves were based on the broad concept 
of insight, elaborated in the previous chapter, as an awareness of the specific 
experience (in this case memory impairment) and judgement concerning the 
nature and effects of the memory impairment on the patient's general 
functioning. In practice, it is clearly impossible to separate out these aspects of 
insight into distinct components since elements of judgement necessarily enter 
expressions of awareness and likewise, expressed judgements have to be
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dependent on some form of awareness. With respect to the MIQ content, the 
items were designed, on a face validity basis, to evaluate 4 main areas likely to 
be affected by memory difficulties:
(1) general functioning (items 3, 10, 19)
(ii) memory - general, autobiographical, procedural (items 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 16)
(iii) language function (items 9, 11, 18)
(iv) cognitive - general, executive (items 12, 13, 14, 15, 17)
Scoring on the items was based on a simple 4-point scale. Thus with respect to 
the function/problem addressed by each item, 1 was scored for the view that 
there was improvement, 2 was scored for the view that there was no change, 3 
was scored for the view that the problem was mildly worse, and 4 was scored 
for the view that it was much worse. A higher total score obtained by the patient 
therefore indicates a perceived greater degree of memory/functional 
impairment. Similarly, the higher the score obtained by the carers indicates a 
greater degree of memory impairment in the patient (as evaluated by the 
carers). The level of insight using this instrument is calculated as the difference 
in scores on the items between ratings by patients and ratings by their carers.
(2) Patients
One hundred consecutive patients referred to the 'Memory Clinic' at 
Addenbrooke's Hospital, Cambridge, were given the MIQ as part of their overall 
assessment. The 'Memory Clinic' is a regional specialised clinic for patients with 
memory problems and acts as a tertiary referral service and also accepts 
referrals from primary care. Patients, referred on account of memory problems, 
either because of subjective complaints or following the concerns of others, are 
thus a mixed group. Their diagnoses range from various forms of dementias 
and other organic amnesias to functional psychiatric disorders (e.g. depression.
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anxiety disorder etc.) or indeed to no specific organic or functional disorder.
This latter group, whilst not fitting into psychiatric conditions as classified by the 
1CD10 (World Health Organization, 1992) or the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994), nevertheless consists of patients showing distinct patterns 
of affective/cognitive/behavioural symptoms and personality traits which may 
thus be putatively related to some ongoing mental or personality disorder.
(3) Assessments
Patients referred to the clinic are examined in turn by the neurology team, the 
psychiatric team and the neuropsychology team. They thus receive a full 
neurological examination including, where appropriate, further investigations 
such as neuroimaging. They are given a battery of neuropsychology tests, the 
number and type depending on both clinical need and the capacity of patients 
to complete these. In general, a core battery includes: Verbal IQ (WAIS-R), 
MART IQ, digit span, vocabulary, arithmetic, similarities, block design, 
fragmented letters (VOSP), McKenna Naming Test, Warrington Recognition 
Memory Test for words and faces, Wechsler Memory Scale for passages and 
designs (immediate and delayed recall), verbal fluency, Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test and/or the Weigl (details and references of individual tests are in Lezak 
(1995)). The psychiatric examination is in two parts. First, patients are 
interviewed and a full history and mental state examination is obtained. Their 
carers are interviewed separately. Second, where possible, the patients 
complete a core of computerised questionnaires consisting of iGeneral Health 
Questionnaire 28 (Goldberg & Hillier, 1979), Cognitive Failures Questionnaire 
(Broadbent et al., 1982), Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1961), Signal 
Detection Memory Test (Miller & Berrios: Recognition memory by means of a 
word-based signal detection analysis, unpublished, based on Miller & Lewis, 
1977), a Scale for the Self-assessment of Irritability (Snaith et al., 1978), 
Dissociation Questionnaire (Riley, 1988), and a Personality Inventory (Bedford
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& Foulds, 1978). Where indicated, additional questionnaires relating to specific 
symptoms are given, such as the Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory 
(Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). In addition, carers are asked to complete the 
TRIMS Behavioral Problem Checklist (Niederehe, 1988).
All patients were seen personally by the author who supervised all the 
computerised psychiatric questionnaires and who carried out the psychiatric 
examinations in over 50% of the patients.
The SPSS for MS Windows version 3.1 was used for analysis of data.
7.3 Results
(1) Patients
On the basis of the psychiatric, neurological and neuropsychiatrie assessments 
described above, the patients were divided into those with an 'organic' (n=56) 
and those with a 'psychiatric' (n=44) diagnosis. The sociodemographic data for 
both samples are shown in table 5. The 'organic' sample was slightly older but 
there were no other differences in terms of sex ratio, duration of memory 
problems, education, alcohol dependency or smoking.
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Table 5
O rg a n ic  a n d  p s y c h ia tr ic  p a t ie n ts  c o m p a re d  o n  s o c io d e m o g r a p h ic  v a r ia b le s
V a r ia b le O rg a n ic  G ro u p
(n=56)
P s y c h ia tr ic
G ro u p
(n=44)
S ta t is t ic s
Mean Age (Std. 
Dev.)
63.02 (12.76) 52.16(11.64) P< 0.001^
Sex
{males;females)
34:22 23:21 NSb
Mean Duration of 
Memory Complaints 
in months (Std. 
Dev.)
39.79 (35.89) 
(n=56)
51.45 (38.18) 
(n=42)
NS^
Alcohol (significant :
non-significant
intake)
3:53
(n=56)
3:40
(n-43)
NSb
Smoking 
(significant: non­
significant)
11:37
(n"48)
4:36
(n~40)
NSb
Education (primary: 
secondary: higher)
19:26:10
(n=55)
14:20:9 
(n—43)
NSb
a -  t-test for independent samples 
b = Chi-Squared
Comparison of the two samples in terms of the computerised psychiatric 
instrument is shown in table 6 and of neuropsychological performance in table 
7.
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Table 6
O rg a n ic  a n d  p s y c h ia tr ic  g r o u p s  c o m p a re d  o n  m a in  p s y c h ia tr ic  m e a s u re m e n ts
'
'■'I
I
P s y c h ia tr ic
M e a s u re ^
O rg a n ic
G ro u p
P s y c h ia tr ic
G ro u p
M a n n -
W h itn e y
S ig n if i
c a n c e
mean value 
(s.d.)
mean value 
(s.d.)
U 2-
Tailed
Beck Depression 
Inventory
7.45 (6.57) 
(n=44)
13.66 (13.01) 
(n=44)
570.0 P<
0.0009
Carers' Checklist 
(TRIMS-BPC)
60.19 (52.17) 
(n=47)
79.86 (66.89) 
(n=29)
579.5 NS
Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaire
87.51 (18.52) 
(n=39)
70.89(18.27)
(n=44)
422.5 P<
0.0001
Dissociation
Questionnaire
8.71 (3.52) 
(n=24)
9.06 (3.60) 
(n=31)
329.0 NS
General Health 
Questionnaire 28
5.67 (5.81) 
(n=48)
8.82 (7.07) 
(n=44)
766.5 P<
0.02
Maudsley Obsess.-
Compulsive.
Inventory
6.5 (3.66) 
(n=8)
8.10(5.58)
(n=19)
67.0 NS
Personality Invent. 
- dominance 
subscale
29.32 (4.04) 
(n=31)
28.88 (3.07) 
(n=34)
514.0 NS
Personality Invent. 
- extrapunitive 
subscale
27.10(3.51)
(n=31)
27.71 (3.62) 
(n=34)
479.0 NS
Personality Invent. 
- intropunitive 
subscale
32.52 (5.92) 
(n=31)
30.56 (2.45) 
(n=34)
394.5 NS
Signal Detection 
Memory -13, value
3.46 (6.41) 
(n=44)
7.66 (9.71) 
(n=44)
572.5 P<
0.001
Signal Detection 
Memory - d' value
1.22 (0.69) 
(n=44)
1.87 (0.63) 
(n-44)
436.5 P<
0.0001
Snaith's Irritability 
Questionnaire - 
anxiety subscale
3.73 (2.62) 
(n=34)
5.51 (3.40) 
(n=35)
411.5 P<
0.02
Snaith's Irritability 
Questionnaire - 
depress, subscale
3.85 (2.24) 
(n=34)
5.23 (3.55) 
(n=35)
478.0 NS
Snaith’s Irritability 
Questionnaire - 
inward irritability
2.82(1.90)
(n=34)
2.94 (2.55) 
(n=35)
566.0 NS
Snaith's Irritability 
questionnaire - 
outward irritability
3.24 (2.30) 
(n=34)
4.23 (2.44) 
(n=35)
457.5 NS
1 = References for psychiatric measures are in section on Methods
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Table 7
O rg a n ic  a n d  p s y c h ia tr ic  g r o u p s  c o m p a re d  o n  m a in  n e u r o p s y c h o lo g ic a l
m e a s u re m e n ts
N e u r o p s y c h o lo g y
M e a s u re ^
O rg a n ic
G ro u p
P s y c h ia tr ic
G ro u p
M a n n -
W h itn e y
S ig n if i ­
c a n c e
mean value 
(s.d.)
mean value 
(s.d.)
U 2-Tailed
Verbal IQ 95.64 (14.85) 
(n=44)
102.77
(14.22)
(n=31)
518.5 NS
Arithmetic 9.22 (3.66) 
(n=46)
10.74 (3.28) 
(n=31)
565.5 NS
Block Design 9.38 (4.02) 
(n=50)
11.68 (3.27) 
(n=31)
525.5 P< 0.01
Digit Span 8.67 (3.21) 
(n=51)
9.50 (3.02) 
(n=32)
688.0 NS
Fragmented Letters 
(VOSP)
16.36 (6.00) 
(n=47)
19.28 (0.90) 
(n=28)
355.5 P< 0.0005
Similarities 8.28 (3.40) 
(n=50)
10.59 (2.47) 
(n=32)
479.0 P< 0.002
Vocabulary 9.44 (2.98) 
(n=50)
10.91 (3.03) 
(n=32)
612.5 NS
MART IQ 105.12 (12.78) 
(n=50)
107.22
(11.67)
(n=32)
735.5 NS
McKenna Naming 
Test (raw score)
14.91 (8.37) 
(n=47)
23.00 (3.95) 
(n=30)
260.5 P< 0.0001
Verbal Fluency 
(using 'S')
12.66 (6.13) 
(n=41)
15.21 (5.33) 
(n=29)
431.5 P<0.05
Wechsler Memory 
Scale:
Passages - 
immediate recall^
22.31 (23.45) 
(n=32)
53.56 (31.21) 
(n=27)
185.5 P< 0.0002
Wechsler Memory 
Scale:
Passages - 
delayed recall^
19.69 (23.87) 
(n=29)
55.36 (27.12) 
(n=25)
110.5 P< 0.0001
Wechsler Memory 
Scale:
Design -
immediate recall^
40.58 (33.65) 
(n=26)
78.63 (26.49) 
(n=19)
85.5 P< 0.0002
Warrington 
Recognition 
Memory Test: 
Words-50^
5.95 (3.69) 
(n=42)
9 .4 7 ( 4 .1 5 )
(n=30)
334.5 P< 0.0009
Warrington 
Recognition 
Memory Test: 
Faces-50^
5.69 (2.92) 
(n=32)
8.64 (3.29) 
(n=28)
223.0 P< 0.0006
 ^ = References for the neuropsychological tests are in section on Methods 
2 = raw scores have been age adjusted to give scale scores (Warrington) 
and percentiles (Wechsler)
Chapter 7 / 1 5 3
The 'organic' sample showed significantly lower mean scores on the Beck 
Depression Inventory (p< 0.001) and on the anxiety and depression subscales 
of the Snaith's Irritability Scale (p< 0.01). They also had significantly worse 
scores on the Signal Detection Memory Test (d' scores - p< 0.001; Q> scores -
p< 0.01).
With respect to neuropsychological performance, the organic patient group 
performed significantly worse on a number of measurements, particularly on the 
memory tests for recognition and recall but also on verbal fluency, Mckenna 
Naming Test, fragmented letters and block design. The organic patients were 
also significantly worse in tests of frontal lobe dysfunction, i.e. the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Test and/or the Weigl (Chi-Squared = 9.57, P< 0.001).
(2) Memory Insight Questionnaire
a. Reliability of Instrument
Item analysis of both the self-administered and carer's version of the MIQ 
showed variance, range, skewness, and endorsement rate to be adequate for 
all 19 items (see Appendix E - tables 8 & 9).
The reliability of both versions of the MIQ was then measured by determining 
their Alpha Cronbach coefficient (for the whole scale) (Appendix E - tables 10 
&11) and by the method of split-half coefficients (Appendix E - tables 12 & 13). 
In all cases, the coefficients were >0.80 which is a very adequate internal 
consistency for an instrument.
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b. Comparison of insight scores between organic and psychiatric groups
(i) Total Insight Scores
For each of the 19 items on the MIQ, the patients' score was subtracted from 
the carers' score. This yielded 19 discrepancy values which, in turn, fell into 3 
groups:
(1) discrepancy values of 'O' - indicating full agreement between patient and 
carer on evaluation of memory item.
(2) positive discrepancy values - indicating that the patient's memory problem 
was evaluated as more severe by the carer than by the patient.
(3) negative discrepancy values - indicating that the patient's memory problem 
was evaluated as more severe by the patient than by the carer.
The first objective was to obtain a purely quantitative assessment of Insight in 
terms of the size or amount by which evaluations were discrepant. Therefore, to 
obtain a total insight score, the discrepancy values for all the 19 items were 
added up for each patient. The Values were added up numerically, irrespective 
of the direction (i.e. whether positive or negative) in which the values lay. On 
this basis, a greater size of discrepancies indicated a lower level of insight held 
by the patient.
Next, in order to take account of the direction of the discrepancies, the sum of 
the positive discrepancies and the sum of the negative discrepancies were 
separately calculated for each patient.
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Results are shown in table 14.
T a b le  1 4
C o m p a r is o n  o f  to ta l  in s ig h t  s c o re s  (a s  fu n c t io n s  o f  d is c r e p a n c y  v a lu e s  o n  th e  
M IQ ) b e tw e e n  o rg a n ic  p a t ie n ts  a n d  p s y c h ia tr ic  p a t ie n ts
D is c re p a n c ie s  
o n  M IQ
O rg a n ic
G ro u p
(n=56) 
mean (s.d.)
P s y c h ia tr ic
G ro u p
(n=44) 
mean (s.d.)
M a n n -W h itn e y
U
S ig n if ic a n c e
2-Tailed
Total
discrepancy
score
11.41 (6.04) 11.93 (5.45) 1143.5 NS
Total positive 
discrepancies
7.16(6.06) 3.39 (2.99) 773.0 P< 0.001
Total negative 
discrepancies
4.25 (4.98) 8.54 (6.08) 662.5 P< 0.0001
The results show that there is no significant difference in the total discrepancy 
scores between the organic and the psychiatric groups of patients, in other 
words, the 2 samples show similar amount and range of 
agreements/disagreements and thus, a similar range of insight into their 
memory problems. There is, however, a significant difference between the 2 
samples with respect to the direction of the discrepancy values. The 'organic' 
patients show significantly more positive discrepancies than the 'psychiatric' 
patients, and similarly, the 'psychiatric' patients show significantly more 
negative discrepancies than the 'organic' patients. This indicates that the 
'organic' patients' evaluation of their memory problems is of less severity than 
that of their carers. In contrast, the 'psychiatric' patients' evaluation of their 
memory problems is of greater severity than that of their carers.
Chapter 7 / 1 5 6
(ii) Grouped insight scores
The 19 discrepancy values were then grouped into the areas mentioned in the 
section on the MIQ construction as sharing related aspects of memory function. 
This yielded the 4 'discrepancy' supervariables;
(i) general (sum of discrepancies on items: 3,10,19)
(ii) memory (sum of discrepancies on items: 1,2,4,5,6,7,8,16)
(iii) language (sum of discrepancies on items: 9,11,18)
(iv) cognitive (sum of discrepancies on items: 12,13 14 15 17)
Organic and psychiatric patient groups were then compared on their responses
in relation to each supervariable. The results are shown in tables 15 and 16.
T a b le  1 5
D is tr ib u t io n  o f  in s ig h t  re s p o n s e s  c o m p a re d  b e tw e e n  o r g a n ic  a n d  p s y c h ia tr ic  
p a t ie n ts  in re la t io n  to  th e  4  s u b s e c t io n s  o n  th e  M iQ : g e n e ra l,  m e m o ry , la n g u a g e
a n d  c o g n it iv e .
S U P E R V A R IA B L E
(items, whose 
discrepancy values 
are added, are in 
brackets)
O rg a n ic  G ro u p
(n=56)
P s y c h ia tr ic
G ro u p
(n=44)
C h i-S q u a r e d
(D of F. = 2)
G E N E R A L
(3,10.19)
19/30/7* 10/25/19 8.75 (P< 0.05)
M E M O R Y
(1,2,4,5,6,7,8,16)
18/29/9 7/21/16 6.73 (P< 0.05)
L A N G U A G E
(9,11,18)
14/26/16 5/17/22 5.73 (NS)
C O G N IT IV E
(12,13,14,15,17)
17/29/10 5/23/16 7.28 (P< 0.05)
"(a/b/c) a = frequency with which discrepancies are positive
b -  frequency with which discrepancies are 0 {concordant responses) 
c = frequency with which discrepancies are negative
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Table 16
O rg a n ic  a n d  p s y c h ia tr ic  p a t ie n ts  c o m p a r e d  o n  in s ig h t  s c o re s  in  re la t io n  to  th e  4  
s u b d iv is io n s  o f  m e m o ry  fu n c t io n :  g e n e ra l,  m e m o ry , la n g u a g e  a n d  c o g n it iv e .
S u p e r v a r ia b le
(items, whose 
discrepancy 
values, are 
added are in 
brackets)
O rg a n ic
G ro u p
(n=55) 
mean (s.d.)
P s y c h ia tr ic
G ro u p
(n=44) 
mean (s.d.)
M a n n -
W h itn e y
U
S ig n if ic a n c e
2-Tailed
G E N E R A L
(3.10,19)
1.78 (1.45) 1.36 (1.28) 1025.5 NS
M E M O R Y
(1,2,4,5,6, 
7,8,16)
3.61 (2.83) 3.18 (2.40) 1141.0 NS
L A N G U A G E
(9,11,18)
1.55(1.58) 2.30(1.91) 952.0 P< 0.04
C O G N IT IV E
(12,13,14,
15,17)
2.27 (2.08) 2.52 (2.15) 1154.5 NS
Table 15 shows a comparison of the distribution of discrepancies in relation to 
each supervariable between the organic and psychiatric samples. Table 16 
shows a comparison of the mean values for each supervariable between the 2 
patient groups.
As can be seen from table 15, with respect to each supervariable, the organic 
patient group shows a higher proportion of positive discrepancies compared 
with the psychiatric group which shows a higher proportion of negative 
discrepancies. This is consistent with the previous results and indicates that 
'organic' patients are evaluating their problems in these areas as less severe 
than are their carers. The converse is true for the 'psychiatric' patients who, 
compared with their carers, are evaluating their problems in each area as more 
severe. It is only in the language area that the groups show a comparable
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proportion of positive and negative discrepancies. Results indicate that both 
patient groups have a higher relative frequency of negative discrepancies in 
this area. This shows that a greater proportion of both 'organic' and 'psychiatric' 
patients are evaluating their language function as more severely impaired than 
are their carers.
In quantitative terms (table 16) again both groups appear to be showing similar 
degrees of impaired insight (i.e. no significant difference in size of 
discrepancies) in each area. The exception to this is once more the language 
area where 'psychiatric' patients appear to show a significantly greater extent of 
discrepancy (p<0.04), indicating less insight into their problems.
(3) Examination of Item responses on the MIQ
Table 17 shows the range of frequencies with which items were answered 
concordantly and discrepancy for each patient group. The psychiatric patients 
clearly show the widest range of responses and in line with the previous results, 
they have the greatest frequency of negative discrepant responses.
T a b le  17
F r e q u e n c y  w ith  w h ic h  M IQ  ite m s  w e r e  a n s w e re d  c o n c o rd a n t ly  a n d  d is c r e p a n c y
fo r  e a c h  p a t ie n t  g ro u p
F r e q u e n c ie s T o ta l  P a t ie n t  
G ro u p
(n=100) 
range in %
O rg a n ic  G ro u p
(n=56) 
range in %
P s y c h ia tr ic
G ro u p
(n~44) 
range in %
Frequency of 
concordant responses
37-62 37-59 23-68
Frequency of positive 
discrepant responses
14-34 18-46 4-31
Frequency of negative 
discrepant responses
9 -4 9 7 -34 9 -6 8
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To obtain an idea of whether particular MIQ items were more likely than others 
to give rise to discrepancies and to concordances, the frequency with which 
each item was answered concordantly and discrepancy was counted in relation 
to each patient group. Items responsible for the highest and the lowest 
frequency of response were identified and are listed in table 18. The 2 highest 
and 2 lowest frequencies were arbitrarily chosen in order to select the items.
T a b le  1 8
O rg a n ic  a n d  p s y c h ia tr ic  p a t ie n ts  c o m p a re d  o n  th e  ty p e s  o f  WliQ ite m s  
g iv in g  r is e  to  th e  h ig h e s t  a n d  lo w e s t f r e q u e n c ie s  o f  d is c r e p a n c ie s  a n d
c o n c o rd a n c e s
M IQ  Ite m  R e s p o n s e s O rg a n ic  G ro u p
(n=56)
MIQ items
P s y c h ia tr ic
G ro u p
(n=44) 
MIQ items
Items responsible for most 
frequent positive discrepancies
6. 1 3, 10,4
Items responsible for least 
frequent positive discrepancies
11,4 15,7
Items responsible for most 
frequent negative discrepancies
11. 18 11, 12
Items responsible for least 
frequent negative discrepancies
1, 10 10, 3
Items responsible for most 
frequent concordances
15, 10,7 10, 8. 13, 15
Items responsible for least 
frequent concordances
18,6 11,4,6
Inspection of the items shows that, most strikingly, item 11 gave rise to the 
most frequent negative discrepancies for both patient groups. This particular 
item is concerned with evaluation of language function (Appendix D) and the 
results thus indicate that language problems were most frequently
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'overestimated' as problems in both patient groups, in 'organic' patients, this is 
further reinforced by the result that item 18 (similarly concerned with language 
evaluation) was also responsible for the highest frequency of negative 
discrepancies (table 18). Items 6 and 1 were responsible for the greatest 
frequency of positive discrepancies in the 'organic' patients, both these items 
relating specifically to the memory subsection of the MIQ. In other words, these 
particular aspects of memory function were most frequently underestimated as 
problems by the 'organic' patients.
(4) Correlations between insight, psychiatric and neuropsychological variables
The total insight scores and positive and negative subscores were correlated 
with the computerised psychiatric tests and with neuropsychological 
performance. The results showed that total insight scores did not correlate 
significantly with any psychiatric or neuropsychological variable.
With respect to psychiatric measures, the total positive discrepancy scores 
showed negative correlations (Pearson's) with Beck Depression Inventory 
scores, GHQ28 scores (P< 0.05) and the Signal Detection Memory score (d') 
(P< 0.01). There was a positive correlation with the Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaire score (P< 0.01). This shows that the greater the positive 
discrepancy, indicating greater underestimation of memory problems, the less 
depressed and/or less emotionally disturbed were the patients (as determined 
by the BDl and GHQ) and the worse they performed on the Signal Detection 
Memory test (indicating organic impairment) and on the Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaire (indicating attentional difficulties). In contrast, the total negative 
discrepancy scores showed only a significant negative correlation with the 
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (P< 0.01) and a positive correlation with the 
outward irritability subscale of the Snaith's Irritability Scale (P< 0.05). This 
shows that the higher the negative discrepancy, indicating greater
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overestimation of memory problems, the greater the outward irritability measure 
and the lower the score on the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire.
With respect to neuropsychological measures, the total positive discrepancy 
scores showed significant negative correlations with Verbal IQ, Similarities, the 
Wechsler and Warrington recall and recognition tests (P< 0.01) and Block 
design. Fragmented letters and McKenna's naming test (P< 0.05). This shows 
that the higher the positive discrepancies, indicating greater underestimation of 
memory problems, the worse the performance on these neuropsychological 
tests. The total negative discrepancy scores showed significant positive 
correlations with the Warrington recognition of words test (P< 0.01) and 
Similarities and McKenna's naming test (P< 0.05). This shows that the higher 
the negative discrepancies, indicating greater overestimation of memory 
problems, the better the performance on these particular neuropsychological 
tests.
(5) Relationship between neuropsychological performance, patients' self- 
evaluations and carers’ evaluations
In order to get an indication of whether patients' self-evaluations of their 
memory problems and carers' assessment of patients' memory problems bore 
any relationship to actual memory impairment as elicited on neuropsychoiogical 
testing, further analyses were carried out. In this case, discrepancy values were 
not used and instead, the total scores obtained by patients on the MIQ were 
correlated with neuropsychological performance. Similarly, the total scores 
given by carers on the MIQ were correlated with the patients' 
neuropsychological performance. It was predicted that carers' assessments 
were more likely to correlate with degree of memory impairment as determined 
by the neuropsychoiogy results. Results showed this to be the case. There 
were no significant correlations (Pearson's) found between patients' self­
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assessments and their performance on neuropsychoiogy tests. In contrast, 
there were significant correlations between carers' assessments and 
neuropsychology results. The strongest correlations were with Similarities and 
Warrington Recognition Memory Test for Faces (P< 0.01). Other significant 
correlations were with Block design, McKenna Naming Test and Verbal IQ (P< 
0.05).
7.4 Discussion
In order to help lead to further understanding of the structure and components 
of insight, this study set out to do two main things. Firstly, the aim was to 
construct and test an instrument assessing insight into memory function 
irrespective of the cause of the memory problem. Secondly, the aim was to 
compare, using this instrument, the insight shown in patients with an organic 
basis to their memory impairment and those with no organic basis underlying 
memory complaints.
(1) The Memory Insight Questionnaire
With respect to the instrument, the MIQ was relatively simple to administer. 
Patients with a fairly wide range of cognitive abilities (as assessed by 
neuropsychology) were able to complete it and similariy, carers did not have 
problems with it. Analysis of the responses showed the instrument to have 
good reliability and internal consistency.
Insight was assessed as a function of the difference between patients' and 
carers' responses on the MIQ. In other words, levels of discrepancy between 
patients and carers were viewed as reflecting the level of insight held by the 
patient. Higher levels of discrepancy, signifying greater degree of disagreement 
thus indicated lower levels of insight. This approach to evaluating insight is one
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that has been followed in many recent studies exploring insight in neurological 
syndromes and in dementias (see chapters 4 & 5). The main problem with this 
method lies in the assumption that the carer's assessment of the patient's 
memory function is correct, and hence, any discrepancies are due to the 
patient’s 'wrong' evaluation of function. This is a major assumption since clearly 
the carers may not be providing a 'correct' evaluation. They themselves may, 
for example, be unaware of the extent of the patients' problems. This could be 
the case if they were not closely involved with the patient and/or had little 
opportunity or ability to observe the patient's functioning. Partly in order to 
minimise this problem, items on the MIQ were specifically designed to examine 
fairly overt functional difficulties with little emphasis on subjective feelings and 
not requiring in-depth knowledge of the patient. Furthermore, ratings on the 
MIQ were kept deliberately crude (i.e. better, same, worse, much worse). 
Equally, carers might underestimate the patients' functional difficulty if they 
themselves were distressed or frightened by the possible consequences of the 
patients' memory problems. In other words, for a variety of reasons, carers 
might be denying patients' difficulties. On the other hand, carers might also 
overestimate the patients' problems. This could happen if they were under 
exposure to the constant complaints made by patients. Another reason for 
overestimation of patients' problems, as has been found by De Bettignies et al. 
(1990), might be caused by carers' considerable stress in looking after patients. 
Similarly, if carers were themselves suffering from an affective disorder, they 
might perceive a greater impairment in the patients' functioning.
In spite of such factors which are likely to affect the evaluations made by carers 
of patients' memory function, the carers' assessments remain one of the better 
standards against which patients' self-evaluations can be measured.
Comparing self-assessments of memory function with more 'objective' 
measures such as neuropsychology tests has been found to be unreliable both 
in normal subjects and in patients with various neurological impairments
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(Sunderland et al, 1983). This suggests that specific memory tests may not 
necessarily be capturing the sort of memory problems that are experienced in 
daily functioning. However, studies have also shown that carers' assessments 
of patients' problems correlate better with psychometric tests (McGlone et al., 
1990; Koss et al., 1993; Jorm et al., 1994). This, in turn, suggests that carers 
may, nevertheless, be detecting some abnormalities that are apparent in the 
patients' functioning. Results in this study are in agreement with such studies. 
Thus, patients' evaluations of their memory function, as assessed by the MIQ, 
showed no correlation with any neuropsychological variables, in contrast, the 
evaluations of patients' memory function given by carers on the MIQ, showed 
significant negative correlations with some neuropsychological variables 
(Similarities, Warrington faces, Block design, McKenna, Verbal IQ). In other 
words, the higher the scores given by the carers on the MIQ, indicating a 
greater severity of dysfunction in the patient, the worse the patients' results on 
the neuropsychology testing. This adds force to the argument that carers 
provide a relatively good 'objective' assessment and hence gives validity to the 
discrepancy method of assessing insight. Interestingly, correlations were not 
found with all neuropsychological variables, suggesting that either the 
psychometric tests may not be capturing the same sorts of impairments that 
become evident in daily functioning or that carers may be more 'observant' in 
some areas than in others.
Assuming therefore that carers' evaluations on the MIQ gave a valid 
assessment of the patients' memory function, the discrepancy between 
patients' and carers' responses on each item was viewed as reflecting the 
degree of insight into memory function heid by the patients. It followed that the 
greater the discrepancy between the responses, the poorer the insight held by 
the patient. Analysis of the results showed that the MIQ yielded 2 types of 
responses, namely, concordances signifying good insight and discrepancies 
signifying poor insight. The discrepancies were themselves of 2 types, firstly.
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positive discrepancies indicating that patients were underestimating their 
degree of memory difficulties, and secondly, negative discrepancies indicating 
that patients were overestimating their degree of memory dysfunction. Thus, 
the MIQ identified impaired insight of 2 types as manifest by the opposing 
directions of discrepancy values. The question then is how can these different 
types of impaired insight help towards the understanding of insight as a whole, 
of the components that may be important in its structure. In order to answer 
this, the 2 types of impaired insight need to be examined in turn.
The first type of impaired insight as manifested by positive discrepancies 
indicates that the patient is underestimating his memory dysfunction. In other 
words, the patient would appear to lack awareness or knowledge of the extent 
to which his memory is impaired and causing difficulties in functioning. This 
type of insightlessness is of the sort that has been the focus of the neurological 
and neuropsychological studies exploring unawareness/anosognosia in relation 
to organic memory impairment (chapters 4 & 5). As such, insightiessness has 
been predominantly conceptualised in terms of disturbance of awareness. 
Following neuropsychological models, this disturbance has been postulated to 
arise either as impairment of a general awareness system or as a specific 
module-linked (in this case, memory) awareness function (McGlynn & Schacter, 
1989; Schacter, 1990). The crucial aspect to this approach to insightiessness 
lies in the necessary link with the neurological or neuropsychological deficit 
itself. Both the conceptualisation of insightiessness and the postulated 
underlying mechanisms are only possible in the context of a specific (and 
ascertainable) neuropsychological deficit. In the absence of such a deficit the 
question of insightiessness, conceived as disturbance of an awareness 
function, simply does not arise. This approach to conceiving insightiessness as 
a disturbance of an awareness function in relation to a deficit, is consequently 
committed to a view of insight as a unitary phenomenon. Even where 
unawareness is sought in relation to different aspects of the deficit, the basic
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idea of insightiessness remains that of a disturbed awareness function. 
Furthermore, this approach to the structure of insightiessness lends itself, as is 
evident from studies mentioned earlier, to the search for brain localisation.
The MIQ in this study, however, identified another type of insightiessness, as 
manifested by negative discrepancies, indicating that the patient is 
overestimating the extent of his memory problems. Should impaired insight of 
this type be conceptualised in a similar way? if a consistent approach were to 
be taken, and again assuming that carers are giving an accurate evaluation, 
then impaired insight of this type would have to be conceived as some sort of 
hyperawareness. In other words, one would have to view the disturbed insight 
as an excitation of an awareness function in relation to experienced memory 
difficulties. In turn, following the previous model, this disturbance of awareness 
should carry similar implications for the localisation of insightiessness to 
particular brain systems. The problem with this conception of insightiessness is 
that it makes little sense in a situation where there is no actual or organic deficit 
present. How and why should a putative awareness function become thus 
disturbed or overactive in isolation? The question then is whether it would make 
more sense to conceptualise this type of insightiessness in a different way. To 
reiterate, the negative discrepancies identified by the MIQ indicate that patients 
are overestimating the extent of their memory problems. This suggests that, 
irrespective of whether or not there is a 'reai' memory deficit present, processes 
other than just awareness may be involved in patients' self-evaluations. In other 
words, it seems to make sense to return to the wider conceptualisations of 
insight that have been proposed in clinical psychiatry (see chapters 1, 3 & 6). 
These conceptualisations have included, in addition to awareness, also further 
elaborations termed variously as judgements (Jaspers, 1948), attitudes (Lewis, 
1934), attributions (Amador et al., 1991), reiabelling (David, 1990), self- 
knowledge (Markova & Berrios, 1992a,b) etc. Applying this wider approach to 
insight conceptualisation to this type of insightiessness, identified by the
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negative discrepancies on the MIQ, may prove more useful here, particularly 
when no 'organic' memory deficit is present. This is because emphasis is 
shifted from the disturbance of a putative single awareness function to |
consideration of other factors that may be important in the formation of 
judgements or self-evaluations. Awareness of memory difficulties may or may 
not be disturbed. In addition, however, the over-estimation of the extent of such 
difficulties may, on this wider view of insight, be influenced by various and 
multiple factors. These, moreover, are unlikely to be confined to single, specific 
brain systems. At this stage, one can only speculate about the nature and 
influence of such factors (e.g. affective state of patient, past experience, current 
stresses, family experiences, such as other family members [or close friends] 
suffering from organic memory disorders, etc.). Larger studies with more 
homogenous patient samples would be necessary for the further exploration of 
the nature and relative contribution of such factors in the formation of self- 
evaluations.
(2) Comparison of Patient Groups
The subdivision of the patients into an organic group (n=56) and a psychiatric 
group (n=44) was based on the joint views held by the individual teams 
(psychiatric, neurology and neuropsychology) following assessment of the 
patients. Since the principal purpose of the present study was to compare 
insight in patients with an organic basis and patients without an organic basis to 
their memory problems, the specific diagnosis for each patient was not 
considered important at this stage. Moreover, since the sample of patients was 
heterogeneous, attempting to categorise patients on the basis of individual 
diagnoses would have resulted in too many small subgroupings to allow a 
meaningful statistical analysis. In broad terms, the organic group consisted of 
patients who were mainly suffering from mild or moderate chronic organic brain 
syndromes, most commonly Alzheimer's disease but also vascular dementia. A
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small proportion of the organic group included patients with organic brain 
damage following road traffic accidents, cerebrovascular incidents and 
encephalitis. The psychiatric or non-organic group consisted of a more mixed 
group of patients. Some had affective disorders which could be classified under 
the current diagnostic systems (ICD-10, (World Health Organization, 1992); 
DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, 1994)) into forms of depressive 
and/or anxiety disorders. Other patients were more difficult to classify as their 
patterns of symptoms/behaviours/personality traits did not fall under particular 
categories in the diagnostic systems. Their psychopathology remains to be 
explored but was not the remit of this study. The main point, however, was that 
the psychiatric group of patients, whether or not they had a conventional 
psychiatric diagnosis, nonetheless had distressing and disabling memory 
complaints.
As expected, the psychiatric group showed more psychiatric morbidity with 
respect to the results on the computerised psychiatric rating scales (table 6) 
and the organic group showed greater impairment on the neuropsychological 
testing (table 7).
Comparison of insight between the patient groups
The results show that in quantitative terms, there was no significant difference 
in the total amount of insight held between the 2 patient groups (table 14). The 
'organic' patients and the 'psychiatric' patients did not differ in terms of sizes 
and range of discrepancies obtained on the MIQ. When the insight scores were 
subdivided into the 4 areas of related functions (i.e. the supervariables), then 
similarly, the results indicate similar ranges of insight in relation to each area in 
both patient groups. The exception was insight into language function (sum of 
discrepancies on items 9,11,18) where the 'psychiatric' patients showed a 
greater amount of discrepancy, indicating greater loss of insight into this
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particular area. This result, however, needs to be discussed in context of the 
type of impaired insight this represents (see below).
The most striking finding is the qualitative difference in insight held between the 
2 patient groups (tables 14 & 15). Thus, whilst both groups appeared to 
demonstrate similar ranges and extents of impaired insight, they differed 
significantly in the type of insightiessness they exhibited. This is evident from 
the result that 'organic' patients had significantly more positive discrepancies, 
indicating that they were underestimating the extent of their memory problems. 
In contrast, the psychiatric patients showed significantly more negative 
discrepancies, suggesting that they were overestimating the extent of their 
memory problems. As far as could be ascertained, no previous studies have 
directly compared 'organic' and 'non-organic' patients for the amount and/or 
type of insight held in relation to a specific problem. Many studies have 
explored insight into memory dysfunction but this has been in the context of 
organic memory impairment, either dementias (e.g. Feheret al., 1991; Reed et 
al., 1993) or amnesic syndromes (e.g. McGiynn &.Schacter, 1989; Schacter, 
1992) (see chapters 4 & 5). Consequently, insightiessness has been conceived 
in terms of patients underestimating or being unaware of their memory 
difficulties. In the psychiatric literature, studies exploring insight have focused 
on psychotic symptoms or the mental illness as a whole (chapter 3) and 
insightiessness here has been conceived in terms of patients' judgement of the 
morbidity of their experiences. However, in spite of some theoretical linking 
between the conceptualisation of insightiessness in these disciplines as 
mentioned earlier, there have been no empirical studies examining insight into 
a problem that cuts across disciplines. This study, in contrast, by focusing on 
insight into memory problems perse, identified qualitative differences in insight 
held between patients with organic and patients with non-organic memory 
impairment. In other words, the emphasis here was on insight as a whole, 
rather than on aspects of insight brought out in relation to, and dependent on.
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specific disorders. The qualitative differences emerged from the opposing 
direction of discrepancies obtained on the MIQ. Insightiessness, defined as a 
function of such discrepancies must, if consistency were to be preserved, be 
constituted from the discrepancies irrespective of their direction. Models 
seeking to explain insight must correspondingly include mechanisms that 
incorporate evaluations in both directions.
In the light of the earlier discussion concerning the possible conceptualisation 
of the different types of insightiessness identified by the positive and negative 
discrepancies, the distribution of these discrepancies in the patient groups 
makes sense. Thus, in line with other studies (e.g. Green et al., 1993), patients 
with organic memory impairment showed impaired insight predominantly of the 
type characterised by underestimation of their memory problems. This 
disturbed insight could be conceptualised in terms of disturbed awareness 
relating to the organic deficit. In contrast, the psychiatric group tended to 
overestimate their difficulties and it was suggested that impaired insight of this 
type could be conceptualised in term of disturbed judgements. These, in turn, 
could result from numerous diverse factors relating to patients' mental states, 
past histories/experiences and current life events. Correlations between the 
different types of insight and some psychiatric variables were carried out simply 
to check for any unexpected relationships. As expected, negative discrepancy 
values (i.e. type of insightiessness characterised by overestimation of 
problems) showed no significant correlation with psychiatric variables. This is 
most likely to be due to the heterogeneity of the patient sample which 
manifested this type of insightiessness. In other words, the 'psychiatric' patients 
who were more likely to show this type of impaired insight than the 'organic' 
patients, were a mixed group. Their judgements would be influenced by 
different factors, both individual (e.g. personality traits, personal circumstances, 
culture) and general (e.g. presence and type of mental disorder). To determine 
which factors were related to the judgements made and to what extent, a larger
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study would need to be carried out, involving comparisons of more 
homogenous 'psychiatric' patient groups. Interestingly, more significant 
correlations were obtained with positive discrepancy scores on the MIQ. The 
'organic' patients who exhibited this type of insightiessness compared with the 
'psychiatric' patients, were a more homogeneous group. Results indicated that, 
in the presence of organic deficit, patients who were more depressed or 
emotionally disturbed (as determined by the BDl and GHQ), showed greater 
insight into the severity/extent of their memory problems. At this stage, little 
more can be said about this and again further studies with more homogeneous 
groups are indicated. Moreover, this study was primarily concerned with the 
testing of a new instrument in a patient sample. To validly explore relationships 
between the insight measure and clinical variables, a second sample of 
patients would be required.
The only area in which the 2 patient groups differed significantly in terms of a 
quantitative measure of insight was language. As is evident from the results in 
table 16, 'psychiatric' patients differed from the 'organic' patients not only in the 
type of insight but also in the amount of insight they held as determined by the 
greater discrepancy values on the MiQ. This indicates that 'psychiatric' patients 
appear to show less insight into their language function than do 'organic' 
patients. A number of reasons could account for this.
First, the 'organic' patients may be showing apparently better insight into their 
language function because their language, or memory for words, is relatively 
preserved in the face of a specific memory deficit (e.g. in episodic or short term 
memory deficits). In other words, the concordance between patients and carers 
with respect to language might be because they both are detecting few 
problems. Results of this study, however, suggest that this is unlikely. It is 
evident from the neuropsychological tests that organic patients show significant 
impairment on a number of tests relating to language function (e.g. verbal
Second, in view of the type of impaired insight that is more prevalent in this 
area of memory function, other explanations for the quantitative difference in 
insight between the patient groups need to be examined. Specifically, 3 of the 
results provided by the study indicate that language problems tend to be 
overestimated by the patients, principally by the 'psychiatric' patients but also, 
relative to the other areas, by the 'organic' patients. First, of the 4 areas of 
evaluation (i.e. generai/memory/language/cognitive), it is only In the area of 
language that patient groups show a comparable proportion of positive and 
negative discrepancies (table 15). Second, the language area was the only 
area giving rise to a quantitative difference between the patient groups, the 
psychiatric patients showing less insight (table 16). Third, item 11, specifically 
concerned with language, was the item that produced most negative 
discrepancies in both groups of patients (table 18). These results, taken 
together, raise the question as to what is it about the language items
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fluency, McKenna Naming test). Rather, It seems more likely that patients, 
whilst showing significant language impairment, appear nevertheless to be 
relatively aware of language difficulties. One reason for this relative insight 
could be that their awareness into memory difficulties with language is spared 
in the context of specific memory deficits. Such an explanation would fit with 
some of the neuropsychological models of module-specific awareness systems 
although would entail a high degree of selectivity and specificity in the types of 
deficits affecting the patients. Another reason as to why 'organic' patients 
should show comparatively better insight into their language function might be 
related to the different nature of language itself. Talking or conversing 
represents a more continuous activity and is one that, in a sense, patients are 
engaged in even whilst answering the questionnaire. Hence, perhaps patients 
are less likely to forget that they are having problems in conversing and finding 
the right words. In contrast, it might be easier to forget that they had difficulties 
with recalling past events or with carrying out various tasks.
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themselves that might predispose to the overestimation of dysfunction? One 
possibility is that, in contrast to the other items on the MIQ, these ones are 
rather specifically directed at the evaluation of a wider and more subjective 
experience. To take an example, item 11 asks patients to evaluate their 
difficulties in expressing themselves. Whilst this question can refer to the 
experience of having difficulties in remembering words, it can also refer to the 
experience of having other difficulties causing problems in conversing. If 
patients are distressed or depressed, for example, they may find it a greater 
effort to talk, and likewise, if they are preoccupied with fears or worries. They 
might have a degree of psychomotor retardation and again find it more difficult 
to express themselves normally. Another possibility could be that because of 
attentional difficulties, patients may find it difficult to respond as they would 
'normally' do in a conversation. All such factors and others, are likely to result in 
patients experiencing difficulties in expressing themselves. At the same time, 
however, these subjective difficulties may not necessarily be apparent to an 
outside observer. Thus, unless there are fairly overt language problems, such 
as major word-finding difficulties or paraphasias, carers may not be as sensitive 
to the subjective problems experienced by the patients in expressing 
themselves. In other words, it is possible that with respect to the language area, 
the carers are more likely to underestimate difficulties than in relation to the 
other areas, and this may contribute to the prevalence of the negative 
discrepancies in both patient groups.
Interestingly, the study showed that although both patient groups showed 
impaired insight predominantly of the one type, both positive and negative 
discrepancies were obtained in both groups (tables 15, 17, & 18). A number of 
explanations could account for this result. Firstly, in relation to the 
conceptualisation of insight as a whole, it would seem unlikely that disturbances 
of awareness and of judgement would occur in isolation. In the first place, 
judgements are clearly dependent on some form of awareness. In addition.
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irrespective of whether or not there may be an impairment of awareness, other 
factors (e.g. long-standing beliefs, current situations, past experiences etc.) 
may become more important in the formation or expression of some 
Judgements. Secondly, the patient groups were not 'pure' in the sense that they 
were exclusively 'organic' or 'psychiatric'. In fact, many of the organic patients 
showed concomitant psychiatric problems such as depressive disorders or 
anxiety states. These psychiatric problems could develop either in reaction to 
the disability experienced as a result of the organic condition, or spontaneously, 
as a direct result of the organic impairment or in the context of a past 
psychiatric history. In consequence, however, patients' responses were likely to 
represent a mixture of awareness/unawareness of their memory problems and 
judgements concerning these as coloured by their mental state. For example, 
patients with fairly mild dementia, might, primarily on account of a depressed 
mental state, overestimate the extent of some of their memory/functional 
difficulties. This could thus result in a mixture of positive and negative 
discrepancies on the MIQ. Thirdly, it may be that some carers are giving 'wrong' 
evaluations either generally or in relation to specific items on the MIQ. Fourthly, 
perhaps some items on the MIQ, either because of the way they are phrased or 
because of the particular issue they are addressing, encourage discrepancies 
in particular directions. This might be the case, as was discussed above, with 
respect to the language items.
7.5 Conclusion
In contrast to previous investigations, this study explored insight in relation to a 
particular problem (memory complaints) that cut across a wide range of 
diagnostic categories. It was hoped that this study design would enable the 
examination of insight as a whole, irrespective of and separate from the factors 
affecting the 'object' of insight assessment itself.
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First, concerning the specific aims of this study, results show that the MIQ 
provided a useful assessment of insight into memory function in this patient 
sample. It was reliable and able to evaluate both quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of insight shown by patients with a range of disorders. Most 
significantly, the MIQ identified qualitative differences in the insight shown 
between patients with an organic basis to their memory difficulties and those 
without an organic deficit. In addition, results also indicated that the patient 
groups showed a quantitative difference in insight with respect to language 
function. At this stage however, it is not clear whether this quantitative 
difference in insight represented 'better' insight in 'organic' patients, 'worse' 
insight in 'psychiatric' patients or a poorer evaluation made by carers. A more 
detailed exploration of insight into memory difficulties relating to language 
function would be necessary to help clarify this issue.
Second, concerning the underlying objective of this study of seeking to 
understand the structure of insight, the results are also interesting. The 
qualitative difference in insight identified by the MIQ between the patient groups 
demands further exploration and explanation. Whilst the type of impaired 
insight manifested by the organic patients could be understood in terms of an 
impaired awareness function as conceptualised by researchers in this area, this 
same conceptualisation is difficult to apply to the type of impaired insight 
manifest in the psychiatric patients. Consequently, it was suggested here that 
impaired insight in this latter group of patients might more usefully be conceived 
as impairment of judgements made by patients concerning their experiences. 
Since such judgements are likely to depend on multiple and diverse factors, 
apart from awareness itself, then the structure of insight must correspondingly 
be conceptualised in multidimensional terms.
Returning to the question posed earlier in the chapter, namely, whether the 
concept of insight in the organic and functional states (as has been studied
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empirically) can be considered the same, results from this study would thus 
suggest that there are, in fact, important conceptual differences. In part, it is 
likely that these differences have been hidden because studies have restricted 
their examination of insight into either organic or functional conditions. This 
study, by examining insight across these diagnostic categories, revealed the 
need for wider explanatory models to cover the different phenomena relating to 
insightlessness. Identification of the different aspects or types of insight is 
important in the consideration of the structure of insight as a whole. In 
particular, where research is focusing on the determination of a neurobiological 
basis to Insight and its brain localisation, it must be essential to clarify which 
specific phenomena of insight or insightlessness are being studied.
Chapter 8 / 1 7 7
Chapter 8
Towards a structure of insight
The notion of insight has now been examined across various areas related to 
and of relevance in psychiatry. Two empirical studies have been presented in 
which separate instruments for assessment of insight were designed and tested 
in patients with a view to further exploring the meaning and components of 
insight in clinical practice. This last section is now concerned with bringing 
together some of the issues raised and the ideas emerging from this work, in 
order to develop a model for the structure of insight. In turn, the purpose of 
such a model is several fold. First, it can provide a framework against which the 
various components and aspects of insight, together with their 
interrelationships, can be identified and understood in a structured and 
consistent manner. Second, a structured model of insight may help clarify the 
sites and types of differences evident In the variety of approaches to insight 
conceptualisation and assessments reviewed. As a result, mechanisms 
underlying insight formation/impairment may be understood/explained in terms 
of such differences. These can then be conceived as involving changes in the 
structural aspects or levels of insight as a whole, including the relationship with 
the 'object' of insight. Lastly, further systematic theoretical and empirical work 
can be developed on the basis of predictions derived from the model.
It is now important to make a distinction between two aspects of insight. First, is 
the question of what insight is from a theoretical standpoint, i.e. the concept of 
insight in terms of all its possible constituents, relationships and expression. 
Second, is the question of what insight is from a clinical standpoint, i.e. the 
phenomenon of insight in terms of its appearance and behaviour, which may 
represent only an aspect of the theoretical concept. In other words, the 
theoretical concept of insight can be viewed as a broader notion, which
Chapter 8 / 1 7 8
incorporates the phenomenon of insight in its definition. From a semantic 
viewpoint, this distinction may be artificial, but from a practical viewpoint, it may 
prove to be useful. The concept of insight is wide, and its contents and extents 
have no clearly defined boundaries. Nevertheless, it is the concept which has to 
provide the scaffolding upon which the clinical phenomenon is based. It is 
because of this wide, rather blurred nature of insight as a concept, as well as 
the factors that are involved in its clinical representation and interpretation (see 
below), that the concept of insight is unlikely to be captured clinically in all its 
entirety. In other words, the clinical phenomenon of insight can only represent 
some aspects or components of the concept of insight as a whole. The practical 
value in making this distinction between the concept and phenomenon of 
insight is that aspects or components of the concept of insight can be identified 
in a systematic manner, enabling a more structured translation into clinical 
terms. Thus, this translation between a theoretical concept and a clinical 
phenomenon can be made explicit, and hence, what is actually being captured 
clinically, can be demarcated. Before going on to examine the concept of 
insight and its relationship with the phenomenon of insight, a brief consideration 
has to be given to the phenomenon of insight with respect to the perspectives 
from which this is discussed.
8.1 The phenomenon of insight: ontology and epistemology
As has been described above, the phenomenon of insight refers to the 
appearance or manifestation of insight in clinical terms. There are however, two 
main aspects to consider in relation to this definition. First, from an ontological 
perspective, the phenomenon of insight, whether relating to normal or 
pathological experiences, has to correspond to or represent some real entity. In 
other words, it is assumed that there is something called 'insight' that exists in 
reality, and that this is manifested as the phenomenon of insight. It is not 
necessary, at this point, to commit oneself to the level of definition of such
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reality, be it described in terms of brain receptors, signals, networks, etc. It is 
sufficient for the purposes here to say that the phenomenon of insight is 
supervenient upon some form of physical reality. The term 'supervenience' is 
used here in the technical sense put forward by Davidson (1970), that 'mental 
characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical 
characteristics'. Without elaborating on this, the point behind the use of this 
term is that it implies a specific relationship between 'mental' and 'physical' 
events, involving dependence but non-reducibility (see also Kim, 1993).
Treating the phenomenon of insight as supervenient upon some sort of physical 
reality may be theoretically correct but is not very helpful from an empirical or 
clinical point of view. The very nature of the concept of insight suggests that it 
reflects a process that pervades all experiences, and that it might be impossible 
simultaneously to capture all its multifarious appearances. Nor is it likely that 
account could be taken of all the situations, actual or potential, where insight 
might be apparent in relation to a particular experience, not least because of 
additional interacting factors such as time and contexts that must affect the 
expression of insight.
This leads to the second aspect from which the phenomenon of insight can be 
considered, namely, the epistemological perspective. In this sense, the 
phenomenon of insight, rather than being viewed as something happening in 
reality (and hence in its entirety), can be considered in terms of what is being 
presented or assessed clinically. In other words, this has more to do with the 
relationship between what is actually happening and the way in which this is 
clinically conceived. Thus, the phenomenon of insight, from the epistemological 
viewpoint, can be regarded as representing only contingent and particular 
aspects of the phenomenon of insight in its ontological sense. From a practical 
or empirical point of view, it is clearly more useful to consider the term 
'phenomenon of insight' in this epistemological sense, and hence is the way in 
which the term will be used here.
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8.2 The concept of insight
It is now important to clarify what is meant here by the 'concept' of insight. 
Detailed psychological (Komatsu, 1992; Medin, 1989; Smith, 1988) and 
philosophical (Geach, 1971; Peacocke, 1992; Porter, 1868; Wagner, 1973) 
work exists attempting to explain the formation and structure of concepts in 
general. It is beyond the scope of the thesis to review such theories. Suffice it 
to say that all forms of conceptualisation involve cognitive-emotive processes 
whereby judgements are constructed. Such judgements act as markers of real 
or abstract entities or referents. Earlier on, it was emphasised that the 
phenomenon of insight would be considered from the epistemological 
perspective and that in this sense, it would represent only some of the aspects 
or components of the concept as a whole. However, when trying to determine 
its structure, it is important to note that the concept of insight will need to be 
considered as wider even than the phenomenon of insight from an ontological 
perspective. This is because, insight (in patients/subjects) is observer 
determined. This means that in addition to elements pertaining to the patient, it 
will include the cognitive contribution of the clinician (dependent in turn on e.g. 
previous experience, general knowledge, attitudes, personal mental state, etc.) 
and his/her negotiation with the patient (i.e. the pragmatics of the situation). In 
other words, the concept of insight becomes a composite construct that does 
far more than mirror the phenomenon in its ontological sense; indeed, it creates 
a bridge between the patient and the context within which it is elicited.
Exploring and developing a possible structure to understand the concept of 
insight in this wider sense, including this bridging function, and enabling the 
systematic delineation of the phenomenon itself is the purpose of this next 
section.
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8.3 Determining the structure of insight
Having established the distinction between the concept of Insight and the 
phenomenon of insight, the next issue deals with the determination of the 
structure of the concept of insight. The work presented so far, as analysed from 
the reviews of research into insight, as well as from the results of the empirical 
studies, has indicated that 2 aspects of the concept of insight have been, to 
varying extents, explicitly distinguished. These aspects relate to: (1) awareness 
and (2) some form of secondary process or elaboration that has been variously 
termed 'judgement', 'attribution', 'relabelling' or 'self-knowledge' etc. To briefly 
reiterate, with respect to clinical psychiatry, these two aspects have generally 
been described either overtly (e.g. Jaspers, 1948; Amador et al., 1991) or 
implicated in the definitions and approaches taken to study insight (e.g. McEvoy 
et al., 1989a,b,c; David, 1990). With respect to neurological disorders, insight 
has been predominantly defined and conceptualised in terms of awareness. In 
relation to the dementias, approaches involving mixtures of both aspects have 
been apparent in such research (chapters 4 & 5).
Irrespective of the extent to which the secondary elaborations are made part of 
the conceptualisation of insight, it is evident that some form of awareness of a 
particular experience must constitute the initial process or component of the 
structure of insight. The question is, what does this 'awareness' mean? And, to 
what sort of experience does it refer? It may help to start by examining the 
latter question first, namely, the relational issue, i.e. the 'object' of awareness. 
This would make sense from the already emphasised interdependency 
between insight/awareness and its relational 'object'. In other words, it is 
important from the structural viewpoint because of the likely differential effects 
of the various types of 'objects' (e.g. mental symptoms, physical symptoms, 
functional deficits, 'normal' experiences, etc.) on the structure of awareness
Chapter 8 / 1 8 2
itself. In addition, tackling this relational element first must also help to clarify 
the nature and effects of the categorical differences (see chapter 7) between 
the 'objects' of awareness (e.g. functional deficit versus mental illness) on the 
structure of insight as a whole. In theory, awareness in this context may refer to 
any event (mental/somatic) along the continuum of normal to pathological 
experience. The primary interest here being clinical psychiatry, it makes sense 
to start by examining the structure of insight in relation to mental symptoms. 
Subsequently, other 'objects' of insight/awareness, including abnormality or loss 
of function and 'illness' will be explored to determine whether a similar structure 
of insight holds, or whether modifications are necessary.
8.3.1 Insight in relation to mental symptoms
In order to build up a structure of insight in relation to mental symptoms, there 
first has to be some idea of how mental symptoms might arise and become 
expressed. For this purpose, it is useful to follow a model, described elsewhere 
(Berrios, Markova & Olivares, 1995), in which a number of pathways are 
proposed as possible routes in the formation of mental symptoms. This model 
is based on the view that declared 'symptoms' are concepts jointly constructed 
by the patient and the clinician, whose relative contribution may vary according 
to the particular pathway of symptom formation. Because symptoms are 
formed, expressed, and elicited in different ways, the term 'symptom' embraces 
a wide range of heterogeneous constructs. The subject of symptom 
heterogeneity is vast and complex and again has been explored elsewhere 
(Markova & Berrios, 1995). Here, it may be sufficient to note that mental 
symptoms are heterogeneous, not only simply from the descriptive point of 
view, but also in terms of origin and structure, and indeed also with respect to 
their ontological status as symptoms. This is an important point and relevant to 
emphasise because not only does symptom heterogeneity entail that symptoms 
should be 'treated' (or regarded/conceived) differently, but also, in view of what
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was said earlier concerning the interdependency of 'object' and insight, it 
carries implications for the structure of insight.
Clearly, it is not practical to attempt to examine awareness in relation to each 
individual mental symptom. Instead, following the model of symptom formation 
mentioned above, an account will be given of 3 postulated pathways (pathways 
(a), (b) and (c), below), along which mental symptoms might develop (figures 1 
& 2). In the context of these pathways, the construction of insight will be 
explored, and subsequently, on the basis of this, a model of insight structure in 
relation to mental symptoms will be formulated.
Pathway (a) (figure 1)
It can be postulated that some symptoms arise directly as a result of some form 
of pathological brain lesion or abnormality in neurobiological signalling. The 
figure shows that the initial stage in this pathway can be conceived in terms of 
such abnormal signalling penetrating consciousness to produce a formless, 
inchoate experience. This experience, termed in the model as the 'primordial 
soup' (PS), is as yet unnamed, a state of pre-cognitive experiential material, 
which requires to be conceptualised before it becomes named as a particular 
symptom. In order however to be conceptualised, this experience clearly has to 
reach conscious awareness. Since the notion of a PS has been proposed as 
part of this pathway, it follows that such conscious awareness occurs by 
definition. Nevertheless, at this point, a theoretical distinction could be made 
between the actual expression of the pathological signal and awareness of the 
same. In other words, this pathway to symptom formation could be viewed as 
consisting of two parallel pathways, one representing ( I )  the actual process 
(pathological signalling PS), and the other pathway (echoing it) relating to (ii) 
awareness of this process. This distinction, it has to be emphasised, is purely 
theoretical as in practice, it would be very difficult to separate out the 2
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processes. From a structural point of view, however, it could be important and 
in this sense, bears similarity to the 1st and 2nd order explanatory hypotheses 
put forward in Schacter's (1990) model concerning awareness of memory 
function/dysfunction (see chapter 4). Thus, the first order explanation in his 
model relates to the existence of a separate conscious awareness system, 
which can be considered analogous to the echoing pathway (ii) described here. 
The second order explanation, on the other hand, relates unawareness to an 
intrinsic abnormality in the 'object' of awareness itself, and hence can be 
considered analogous to the process of pathology effecting change to result in 
the abnormal experience, i.e. process (i). The important issue is that this 
symptom formation model proposes that irrespective of whether pathway (a) is 
conceived of as a double, parallel, process, or a single unitary process, the 
common result is the conversion of a pathological signal into a conscious 
experience. The essential consequence of this is, from the perspective of 
insight construction, that this conscious awareness of the initial experience 
must represent a common core in the structure of both, the symptom, and 
insight relating to the symptom. In other words, it would appear that some of the 
processes involved in insight formation are enmeshed with those pertaining to 
symptom formation.
Following the registration of the triggering of the PS as a conscious experience, 
the next step would logically entail for this registered experience to be 'matched' 
against templates of both normal and abnormal earlier experiences in order that 
conceptualisation could proceed. This conceptualisation is likely to involve a 
number of cognitive-emotive processes whereby a judgement of the experience 
is constructed that will be dependent on factors such as previous experience, 
general knowledge, intelligence, cultural and environmental contexts, capacity 
and inclination to assess and organise information, etc. For example, a PS 
experienced ab initio as 'fuzzy' and 'unpleasant' might be constructed as, e.g. 
somatic discomfort, depressed mood, anxiety or depersonalisation. Clearly, the
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types of factors involved (as listed above), suggest that it is possible for the 
same or similar brain signalling to result in different symptoms being presented 
as a result in turn of different conceptualisations. Thus what might be 
conceptualised and named by one patient as anxiety, may be conceptualised 
and named by another patient as guilt or depression. In addition, the final 
construct will also be determined by the patient's capacity to verbalise, by the 
clinician's own construction or interpretation of the patient's description and by 
the pragmatics of the interview.
To summarise briefly, pathway (a) indicates that patients may conceptualise, on 
the basis of a number of both internally and externally determined factors, an 
initially formless conscious experience into a declared 'symptom'. It is proposed 
here, that this initial awareness of change in experience must be viewed as a 
common structural core to both the symptom and the insight in relation to this 
symptom. Thus, the symptom, by the time it becomes 'formed', can be said to 
be 'insight-tagged'. Insight tagging can be considered as the primary layer or 
level to insight structure in relation to symptoms formed by this pathway, and as 
such, is inextricably linked to the symptom itself. Logically, this makes sense for 
subjective mental experiences, since expression of these is dependent on an 
awareness of something new or changed. Without such awareness of change, 
there could be neither the subjective mental experience nor insight.
Successive levels to insight structure (see below) have to relate to the 
awareness of the symptom after it is formed, and thereafter, to the effects of the 
symptom in terms of progressively more advanced or sophisticated judgements 
in relation to the self and to the environment.
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Pathway (b) (figure 1)
Some symptoms do not seem to be accompanied by any overt awareness of 
them as symptoms or experiences (e.g. thought disorder, neologisms, forms of 
dyskinesia, etc.). This suggests that construction processes on the part of the 
patient may not have such a role in their expression, and indeed in their naming 
and classifying. Hence, to some extent, their construction as 'symptoms’ occur 
largely due to the clinician. In this case, the symptom formation is likely to follow 
a different path. Since what is being postulated here is a lack of awareness in 
association with pathological signalling, it would seem that in this case, the PS 
is bypassed and the 'signal' is expressed indirectly by its modulation of other 
processes. For example, 'incongruent affect' could be viewed as being formed 
along this pathway, in that the 'normal' affective responses are modulated by 
the effects of the pathological brain signalling. The construction of symptoms 
along this pathway thus represents an interaction between the behaviours 
modulated by the brain signal and the clinician's construction of perceived 
events. Hence, the resultant symptom structure is unlikely to directly 
incorporate processes of 'awareness' and judgement. In this case, insight 
construction, when it occurs, will be determined predominantly by the degree of 
awareness held in relation to the formed symptom, and to what the patient may 
ulteriorly perceive as the effect that such a 'symptom' (as recognised by the 
clinician or others) may have on his/her life.
Pathway (c) (figure 2)
The proposed third pathway suggests that some symptoms may be formed as 
secondary (and subsequent) constructions issuing out of primary constructs 
rather than from pathological brain signals. In other words, it may be that not all 
'symptoms' will develop in consequence to a pathological brain signalling, but 
that instead, their construction may be 'triggered' by the experiencing of a
#
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primary construct. For example, a persecutory hallucination, developing from 
the conceptualisation of a PS triggered by distressed brain signals, may itself
i;
give rise to a feeling of anxiety or fear, either via a change in the PS experience 
(c1 : figure 2), or through the direct conceptualisation of the hallucinatory 
experience (c2; figure 2). In this case, the symptom of anxiety or fear, whilst 
also mediated by brain signals, will not necessarily relate to the type of brain 
signalling giving rise to the anxiety expressed as a primary construct in the 
context of a primary anxiety disorder.
The construction of insight in relation to such symptoms will thus have to be 
more complicated. First, as in pathway (a), the processes of awareness and 
judgement that operate in the conceptualisation of the symptom will contribute 
to the structure of the symptom (whether this occurs through c1 or c2). In the 
context of this pathway, however, such processes are secondary to the initial 
processes of insight (and symptom) construction involved in the formation of 
the primary or original construct. Thus, at this stage, the structure of insight can 
be envisaged as a nesting system of such processes, the number of levels 
being dependent on the number of successive constructions. Subsequent 
stages of insight construction in relation to these symptoms will again involve 
processes similar to the ones mentioned for pathways (a) and (b), i.e. with 
respect to the symptom as a whole and to its effects on the patient’s self and 
functioning (see below).
Three different types of pathways to symptom formation have been described.
They will help to illustrate how the core structure of Insight might be linked with 
the structure of some symptoms themselves, and how this might vary according 
to the way in which symptoms may arise. It seems likely that many other 
pathways may be involved in the formation and expression of symptoms. For 
example, it is conceivable that changes will occur in the PS either through the 
effects of pathological brain signalling or mediated indirectly through the effects
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of formed constructs. For various reasons these may not become 
conceptualised and hence may not result in the formation of individual 
symptoms. Nonetheless, although unconceptualised, such PSs may influence 
the construction of other symptoms and consequently the structure and 
expression of insight. However, for the sake of clarity, further possible pathways 
to symptom formation will not be explored here. Instead, based on the above 
pathways, a model for the structure of insight as a whole, in relation to mental 
symptoms, will be described.
A model for the structure of insight (figure 3)
So far, the construction of insight has been described only in terms of the 
general model of symptom formation (via pathways (a),(b) and (c)). Next, a 
more specific model of insight structure is proposed, based on its relationship 
with symptom formation, and at the level of detail required to lead to empirical 
work. It should be emphasised again, that the mechanisms proposed here as 
underlying insight construction in relation to mental symptoms, can be viewed 
as the same as those utilised in the appraisal of any PS experience, whether 
'normal' or pathological. This model suggests that insight structure is 
hierarchically constructed, involving mechanisms that run parallel to symptom 
formation (figure 3). Successive levels in such functional hierarchy will 
incorporate increasing information (individual experiences, attitudes, biases, 
etc.) and hence generate ever more elaborate (in terms of the types and 
numbers of judgements involved) and progressively more individually 
determined versions of insight.
Level 1
This primary or basic level of insight structure applies, as described above, to 
insight constructed in relation to symptoms formed along pathways (a) and (c)
■
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(see figure 3). The term 'symptom' will continue to be used, but, as already 
mentioned, should be taken to refer also to normal changes in conscious 
experience formed along these pathways. At this level, to reiterate, the 
processes involved in the construction of such symptoms and insight must be 
closely linked because of the shared core of conscious awareness that is 
essential for both. In other words, the awareness of some experience as 
generated by brain signalling must be considered as the basic 'unit of analysis' 
in the structure of both insight and the particular symptoms. Such 'insight- 
tagging' has been described as difficult to tease apart in practical terms, though 
theoretically useful to conceptualise as distinct. It was therefore suggested that 
pathway (a) (constituting also the primary part of pathway (c)), could be 
conceived of as existing in the form of 2 parallel pathways. One pathway could 
represent the actual pathological process and the other pathway, 'echoing' it, 
could represent awareness of this process. Elaborating further, the 
experiencing of a PS can therefore be viewed as being 'echoed' in a parallel 
system that involves both emotional and cognitive registration of the 
experience. As this experience is being formed into a 'symptom', the 
information contained in the echoing function is 'matched' against templates of 
earlier experiences so that a judgement concerning the nature of this 
experience can be made.
Registration occurs in stages and it may be that emotional awareness has 
primacy over cognitive registration. This would make sense from an 
evolutionary point of view, as emotional processing is likely to be older and 
essential to survival. The subsequent addition of cognitive processing 
(awareness, attitudes, judgements, motivations, etc.) could be seen as the 
result of increasing adaptational sophistication. This, in turn, would enable the 
individual to assess himself 'with the eyes of others' and hence be in a better 
position to predict reactions and readjust his behaviour accordingly. Such 
postulated parallel processes of insight and symptom construction are likely to
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have bi-directional links. This would allow for the echoing process to feed back 
emotional, volitional and cognitive information during the conceptualisation of 
the PS, and hence make possible the final structure of the symptom to be 
insight tagged.
Thus far, the model applies more readily to the construction of insight in relation 
to symptoms formed along pathways (a) and (c), i.e. to those symptoms based 
on conscious awareness of some experience via the presence of a PS. 
However, symptoms formed along pathway (b) seem to bypass the PS and are 
expressed as effects on other behaviours. Insight in relation to such symptoms 
will have to have a different core structure. In this case, there is no shared 
'awareness' to form the basis of the symptom structure and hence no insight 
tagging. Awareness in relation to these symptoms must occur at a later stage in 
symptom evolution, i.e. closer to the stage of symptom completion - level 2 (see 
below). The structure of insight will thus be relatively independent of the 
symptom structure, in contrast to the strong link between insight and the 
symptoms formed via the PS. The issue of whether any triggering of the PS 
occurs, at perhaps different levels of awareness, such that echoing also takes 
place, resulting in subconscious registration, can only be speculative at this 
stage. It may be that there is a continuum along which registration occurs and 
that conscious judgement of the experience will take place only when a certain 
threshold of registration is reached. The fact that some symptoms, although not 
accompanied by overt conscious awareness, seem to be associated with some 
awareness, albeit not at a conscious level, as evidenced by the patient's 
behaviour in the case of implicit knowledge, suggests that there must exist 
different levels of registration. This, in turn, suggests the presence of 
continuous echoing, again with thresholds determining the triggering of 
conscious processes. Whatever the mechanisms involved, this first level of 
insight structure is likely to vary depending on the extent to which conscious 
processes are involved in the formation of the particular symptom.
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Level 2 (figure 3)
The second level in insight construction can be specified as the conscious 
awareness of the presence of the symptom once it is formed or completed. In 
other words, at this level, the patient becomes aware consciously of the 
symptom as a symptom. The structure of insight at this level will therefore 
incorporate not only the components involved in level 1 construction (where 
applicable), but, in addition, the symptom as a new whole will be subjected to 
similar processes of registration and judgement. Possibly, different factors will 
become important in these secondary elaborations. Again, whether in fact the 
mechanisms of registration and awareness in relation to the symptom as a 
whole are similar to those in level 1 construction can only be speculative at this 
point. It is likely, however, that once more thresholds in registration processes 
may be important for awareness of the symptom as an entity to occur.
Level 3 (figure 3)
A third level of insight construction involves more elaborate construction, in that 
the symptom as experienced consciously is then judged in terms of its effects 
on the patient. At this level, or perhaps even at successive levels, various types 
and degrees of judgement must take place in relation to the patient's self, 
his/her functioning, and his/her relationship with external factors. At this level of 
insight construction, individual factors (e.g. general intelligence, attitudes, past 
experiences, personality traits, tendencies to introspect/analyse, cultural/social 
background, etc.) are likely to play an increasingly important role in the 
construction processes. Thus it is also at this level that the greatest 
interpersonal variation will occur in relation to the amount and type of insight 
held.
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In summary, based on a model of symptom formation, three structural levels in 
the concept of insight can be identified. In relation to a symptom, these levels 
could be represented simplistically as, 1) how it is (relating to subjective mental 
symptoms), 2) that it is (awareness of the symptom), and 3) what it does 
(knowledge of nature and effects of the symptom).
The first level links the development of insight with the actual formation and 
expression of subjective mental symptoms themselves. Such symptoms have 
to be formed on the basis of awareness of change in experiential 
consciousness. Therefore, the processes involved in their conceptualisation 
and construction as particular symptoms, have to depend on the assessments 
or judgements made by patients, also on the basis of this initial awareness of 
change. This means that at this level, the two processes are inextricably 
interwoven, or bound up with each other. From an empirical perspective, it 
would be difficult to assess insight at this level since the phenomenon of insight 
could only be determined if there were a known correspondence between a 
pathological lesion or abnormality and a specific mental symptom. Only in the 
face of this contingency could this basic aspect to insight structure be assessed 
as a function of the distortion between the symptom as it was expressed and its 
known gold standard. Clearly, this is at present not a feasible situation, at least 
with respect to subjective mental symptoms.
The second level of insight structure identified is that of awareness of the 
symptom once this is formed. The independence of this awareness from the 
symptom it relates to, will depend on two factors. First, it will depend on the 
particular path of formation taken by the symptom (particularly whether 
pathways (a)/(c) or pathway (b) are involved). Second, it will depend also on the 
as yet unresolved issue concerning the nature of awareness or consciousness 
as a separate or inherent function. It is evident from the empirical studies
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reviewed and analysed in this thesis that most of the work on insight or 
awareness into neurological states, and some of the earlier work on insight in 
clinical psychiatry, has concentrated on this second level of insight structure. In 
other words, research on the assessment of insight has been directed at 
capturing the phenomenon of insight as an explicit acknowledgement or 
recognition of the given symptom (or neurological deficit/abnormality).
The third level of insight structure has been identified as one which involves not 
only awareness (and its structural constituents) of the existence of a symptom, 
but also some form of understanding concerning its nature and effects on the 
subject. This latter aspect can be taken to the widest extent, including the 
effects on the subjective feelings and experiences of the patient, his/her 
functioning and his/her perceptions and outlook in relation to the external 
environment. From an empirical perspective, aspects of this structural level of 
insight have been addressed in some of the recent studies on insight in clinical 
psychiatry and by some of the researchers examining insight in dementias.
The importance of the distinctions made here, particularly in differentiating 
between levels 2 and 3 of insight structure, is that they highlight the structural 
differences underlying the approaches taken to studying the phenomenon of 
insight. Whereas in level 2, the phenomenon of insight is elicited as an 
awareness of the presence of a given symptom, in level 3, the phenomenon is 
elicited as an understanding or knowledge or judgement of the nature and 
effects of the symptom. The processes and hence mechanisms underlying the 
notion of awareness perse, compared with those underlying the judgements or 
evaluations made at the higher level, must be very different.
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8.3.2 insight in relation to 'mental illness*
So far, insight construction has been explored in relation to individual symptoms 
and related to the mechanisms of symptom formation. Much of previous work in 
clinical psychiatry (see chapter 3) however, has focused on 'mental illness' 
rather than mental symptoms, as the 'object' of insight research and 
assessments. Many studies, as was seen earlier, did not actually differentiate 
explicitly between the notions of symptoms and illness. Yet, this may be an 
important distinction to make, both with respect to understanding the structure 
of insight, and in terms of the conclusions that can be drawn in comparing intra- 
and interdisciplinary work. The question here therefore is how the above model 
of insight structure, as formulated in relation to mental symptoms, might apply 
to 'mental illness'.
To a certain extent, the answer will depend on the view one takes of the term 
'mental illness'. On the one hand, the term could be used in the same sort of 
sense of 'object' as 'symptom' or 'deficit', i.e. as a distinct ontological entity. In 
this case, the meaning of 'mental illness' could be considered as simply 
encompassing the totality of its perceived or understood constituent mental 
symptoms. On this view of mental illness, factors similar to those involved in the 
construction of insight in relation to symptoms would also operate. In addition, 
there would have to be some overall assimilation of the global effect of all the 
symptoms contributing to the illness. Moreover, there are two further points that 
would need to be considered. First, symptoms may have differential effects in 
terms of their contribution to the overall insight. For example, in schizophrenia, 
the degree of insight (or lack of) in relation to a delusion might contribute more 
to an overall insight structure than that related to apathy. Second, because 
some of the processes in insight construction are inherent to the structure of 
the symptoms themselves (level 1), then the relationship between insight and 
illness would be one of double implication (i.e. they would entail one another).
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Thus, not only would changes in and evolution of the illness produce changes 
in the degree of insight held, but the degree of insight would also determine to 
some extent the expression of the illness.
On the other hand, however, this issue is likely to be more complicated, since 
the term 'mental illness', as argued in the previous chapter, belongs to a 
different category of 'objects'. Thus it cannot simply be the case that 'mental 
illness' refers to a distinct ontological or experiential entity in a similar sense to 
that referred by 'symptom' or 'deficit'. Instead, the term 'mental illness' as stated 
earlier, is a construct which may in part be determined by the presence of 
constituent symptoms, but which also is to a large extent determined by factors 
pertaining to the environment, the culture and the current scientific frameworks 
shaping the world of the individual. While in the case of symptoms, deficits or 
functions, insight will depend simply on an awareness (and subsequent 
judgements) of a specific internal experience, it is not so simple with respect to 
insight into having a 'mental illness’. Here, insight must also depend on the 
beliefs held by the individual (and the society) concerning the nature and status 
of mental illness. Clearly, viewing 'mental illness' as a construct conveys a 
sense of a different order of 'object' to that represented by 'symptom' or 'deficit'. 
This would suggest that the phenomenon of insight would be based on a 
structure of insight that in turn has to relate more to level 3 processes. 
Consequently, variables relating more to the individual and his/her 
social/cultural environment may be more important in the constitution of the 
insight structure than the variables relating to symptom formation and symptom 
effects.
8.3.3 Insight in relation to organic deficits/abnormalities
The model of insight structure has been developed on the basis of a postulated 
system of symptom formation. The heterogeneity of mental symptoms has been
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emphasised and particular focus placed on subjective mental symptoms. These 
are viewed as arising directly or indirectly from some form of distressed brain 
signalling. In addition, their formation and expression is also dependent, to 
variable extents, on multiple factors (relating to the individual, environment and 
pragmatics) which may be some 'distance' removed from the actual putative 
pathological lesion. Consequently, the relationship between organic brain 
pathology and the presence of an individual subjective mental symptom or 
symptoms is far from clear. Furthermore, in contrast to 'objective' mental 
symptoms (i.e. signs such as flight of ideas, incongruent affect) and to the 
organic deficits discussed below, there are few reliable means of external 
verification of the presence of such symptoms. This brings the issue to this 
current section dealing with another type of 'object' of insight assessment, 
namely organic deficit or abnormality. The question is whether the model of 
insight structure described in relation to mental symptoms, can be applied to 
the symptoms and signs that are 'overtly' (from a third person perspective) 
present and whose relationship with organic pathology is much more direct.
As discussed in chapter 4, work in this area has concentrated on assessment 
of insight or awareness into quite prominent deficits such as hemiparesis, 
blindness, movement disorders, speech disorders and amnesia. Clearly, such 
abnormalities are readily ascertainable by a third person, either through clinical 
observation and/or specific tests. Thus, these 'symptoms' or abnormalities are 
evident in a way that subjective mental symptoms are not. Where such 
abnormalities are apparent in the patient, in the context of his/her unawareness 
or anosognosia, these will be elicited and named by the clinician. In this way, 
these deficits/abnormalities may be said to behave similarly to the mental 
symptoms described as being formed along pathway (b), i.e. modulating 
existing functioning/behaviours without entering experiential awareness and 
thus being constructed as 'symptoms’ by the clinician or external observer. The 
structure of insight in this situation must, according to the model, be
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conceptualised along level 2, i.e. in terms of degrees of awareness of a 
symptom once this has been formed. In fact, as was apparent from the review 
of research in this area, particularly with respect to the neurological 
abnormalities, the assessment of the phenomenon of insight has generally 
been based on this aspect of the concept of insight. Particularly in the face of 
major and dramatic deficits, insight or awareness is sought as a function that is 
present, partially present or absent in relation to the deficit. The fact that 
patients can also have these deficits, and yet not show the 
unawareness/anosognosia, has further served to emphasise the idea of a 
distinct awareness or insight function which is subject to independent 
impairment. In the light of evident discrepancy between the presence of an 
'objective' deficit/symptom and the patient's lack of Its acknowledgement, there 
has been, in relation to most such deficits, little need to explore further 
judgements or understanding. Specifically, there has been little need to 
examine the sort of cognitive-emotive elaborations that have been suggested 
for level 3 of insight structure. Once again, however, as with mental symptoms, 
symptoms falling in this category of 'organic deficits or abnormalities' must be 
considered as heterogeneous, and as such, they would ideally merit individual 
exploration. Here, brief consideration will be given to memory deficit, partly 
because of the considerable research that has been directed specifically at 
insight in relation to amnesia (see chapters 4 & 5), and partly to reflect the 
interest of the second empirical study (chapter 7). In contrast to the work on 
anosognosia e.g. in hemiparesis, more attempts have been made to explore 
wider judgements concerning the types and effects of memory deficits, 
particularly in dementias. In addition, this particular 'object' of insight 
assessment raises some further interesting issues with respect to the structure 
of insight.
It is apparent first of all that the structure of insight, as developed in the model 
here, is highly dependent, at all its levels, on a working memory function. Thus,
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the first level or insight-tagging depends not only on the initial matching of the 
qualitatively and/or quantitatively new experience to templates of past 
experiences, i.e. episodic memory, but the ongoing subsequent 
conceptualisation of this experience depends also on more general information 
from a variety of sources (cultural, personal knowledge, etc.), i.e. involving also 
semantic memory. Similarly, at level 3, both semantic and episodic memory 
function would be essential to an even greater extent. This is because the 
symptoms/deficits are here evaluated and integrated within their overall 
contexts and related to the subjects' knowledge of their selves, their functioning 
and the environmental and interactive effects. At level 2, where the structure of 
insight has been conceptualised in terms of awareness of a particular 
symptom/deficit, depending on the pathway involved in the formation of the 
symptom, memory function may not be as intrinsically essential to the structure 
of insight. In other words, if pathway (b) is involved, i.e. bypassing the 
conscious registration of the pathological experience, then awareness of the 
symptom, once this has been formed, will not depend on memory function in 
the same sort of way. Memory function at this level may, however, be important 
to insight assessment from a different perspective. In this case, rather than 
being of such structural importance to the concept of insight, it may instead 
affect the phenomenon of insight from a temporal viewpoint. For example, it 
could be envisaged that if immediate recall were to be impaired, then, even in 
the face of an intact awareness mechanism, the phenomenon of insight at this 
level could appear impaired simply because the patient forgot that he had 
registered a particular experience. Clearly, this would also carry implications for 
research aimed at localising an 'awareness' function.
The dependency of the structure of insight on memory function raises two 
important points. First, this suggests that depending on the type, extent and/or 
selectivity of the memory impairment, the structure of insight and hence the 
phenomenon as assessed clinically, will be differentially affected. Moreover, the
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variability in the insight held in the context of organic memory impairment is 
likely to be present also with respect to other experiences or functioning, both 
normal and pathological. For example, it is conceivable that patients with a 
greater proportion of anterograde memory impairment compared with 
retrograde memory impairment may have less awareness or insight into their 
occurrent memory difficulties than into their capacities to do various intellectual 
or technical tasks. This however, is an empirical issue and raises further 
questions concerning the relationship between a specific type of memory deficit 
and insight into various different experiences, including the memory deficit 
itself. Although insight into a variety of different symptoms/experiences or 
functions has been studied in dementia (Green et al., 1993; Vasterling et al., 
1995), the relationship between the extent of insight in relation to different 
'objects' of insight assessments and the type of memory deficit involved, 
remains to be explored.
The second point arising from the interdependency between memory function 
and insight structure, is to what extent this issue might concern other 
'symptoms' or experiences. When considering insight of the 'healthy' individual 
into 'normal' experiences or functions, it is generally assumed that the actual 
processes involved in insight formation are functioning normally and hence that, 
in principle, full or complete insight is possible. With respect to mental 
symptoms, and in the context of psychiatric illness such as schizophrenia, this 
may not be a tenable assumption. It seems likely that in many psychiatric 
disorders the 'normal' processes of judging, evaluating, attributing etc. are also 
affected by the pathology of the disorder and thus are likely to affect the 
possible construction of insight. As Lewis (1934) had questioned earlier, is it 
appropriate to ask whether, in view of the fact that he/she would be looking at 
his/her illness with distorted eyes, a patient with mental illness could have 
insight? The problem is that in contrast to the 'organic' impairments mentioned 
above, such distortions of cognition in the presence of mental illness may be
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subtle and are at present difficult to assess or demonstrate in a reliable and 
useful sense. The various and mixed impairments found on neuropsychological 
tests in schizophrenic patients (McKenna, 1994) indicate cognitive problems, 
but not how judgements and perceptions about things in general are affected.
8.4 The structure of insight as a construct
The concept of insight is thus a composite construct, comprising not only the 
phenomenon of insight, but also of constructions by the patient, the clinician, 
and the interactive process itself. In this respect, insight is elicited and 
evaluated clinically by processes similar to those involved in the assessment of 
psychiatric symptoms in general. It may be useful to briefly mention some of the 
factors that may contribute to these processes of construction.
Insight as a patient construct
From the patient's perspective, individual factors will play a variable role in 
determining the type and degree of insight held and expressed by the patient.
In part, this will depend on the relational aspects of the insight assessment, i.e. 
whether insight is assessed in relation to symptoms, to illness, or to function, 
etc. Where insight is related to symptoms, then the particular pathway involved 
in the formation of the symptom is likely to influence the extent to which 
individual factors will be important. For example, symptoms formed along 
pathway (a), because of their construction based on conscious awareness, will 
be shaped to a greater degree by factors pertaining to the individual, such as 
past experience, personal attitudes/biases, and intelligence, than the symptoms 
whose construction follows pathway (b). Thus, since the structure of symptoms 
formed along pathway (a) is so closely linked with the core insight structure, 
then the above factors will likewise help shape the insight held by the patient. 
The level of insight chosen for the assessment of insight will also determine the
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degree to which individual factors will play a role in the amount and type of 
insight held. Where insight is assessed at level 3, for example, individual factors 
will be of much greater importance in the structure of insight. This is because at 
this level, increasingly complicated judgements are made on the part of the 
patient. Such judgements, because they involve not just the recognition of the 
symptom's presence, but also the effect of the symptoms on the patient and 
his/her interaction with the environment, are thus more dependent on personal 
factors. These, in turn, relate to the patient's capacity to assess, analyse, 
integrate the variety of internal and external information they receive in the 
context also of their environment and culture. Individual factors will therefore 
shape the overall insight structure to a much greater extent at this level than 
insight assessed at level 2. On the other hand, where insight is assessed at 
level 2, the contribution of individual/personal factors to the insight held will not 
only depend on the pathway of formation of the particular symptom, but also on 
the degree to which the awareness at this level is an independent function.
This issue, namely the extent to which individual factors are important in the 
construction of insight, is important because of the implications this carries for 
research programmes, particularly in relation to the current interest in 
correlating insight with neuropsychology and neuroimaging (Takei et al., 1992; 
Young et al., 1993). Such factors need to be taken into account, as does the 
level at which insight is being assessed. In addition, relational aspects should 
be defined clearly before conclusions are drawn about the relationship between 
insight and a brain function or location.
Furthermore, although the assessment of insight is based on patients' speech 
and behaviours, the patients' speech and behavioural acts do not necessarily 
correlate with their actual degree of insight. This is often indicated by the 
manner in which patients express themselves (arousing suspicions concerning 
the 'real' nature of their thoughts/beliefs) or by a disparity between the content
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of their utterances and their behaviour. Such a lack of correlation may result 
from limitations on capacities to express knowledge/understanding and the 
influences of underlying motivations, e.g. fear of the 'madness' connotation, or 
wanting discharge from hospital, or a change in medication, etc. Clearly, it is 
important to be aware of these issues because they also carry implications for 
the assessment of and research into insight.
Insight as a clinician construct
The assessment of insight is carried out by clinicians, and their evaluation will 
include not only what is presented to them in the form of the patient's speech 
and behaviour, but also their own interpretation of the patient's speech and 
behaviour. In other words, they also will be constructing their own concept of 
the patient's insight and individual factors relating to the clinicians' knowledge, 
attitudes, past experiences, theoretical views, biases, etc. will be important in 
the evaluation of insight.
Insight in the interactive process
Finally, insight is assessed in the clinical situation and the patient-clinician 
interaction will also contribute to the end-of-line construct. Thus, the manner in 
which the clinician and patient relate to each other in terms of reactions and 
responses elicited will affect the conceptualisation and verbalisation processes 
in each of them.
8.5 Relational aspects of insight
The relational aspects of insight as a concept have already been discussed 
with respect to the model of the structure of insight. Some of the main 
implications for the phenomenon of insight will be mentioned here. In practice.
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the focus of current empirical work on insight in clinical psychiatry has been on 
psychotic illnesses. This raises two immediate questions. First, does insight 
across different diseases represent the same phenomenon? Second, following 
from this, is it meaningful for the same type of insight assessment to be carried 
out in patients with different diseases?
It can be argued that whilst insight as a concept has to be consistent across 
diseases, the phenomenon of insight, as manifested clinically, will differ from 
disease to disease. There are two main reasons for this. First, insight is a 
relational concept, i.e. its formulation is dependent on the existence of other 
entities or constructs (e.g. symptoms, diseases, functions, deficits, and normal 
experiences). Clinically, insight cannot be assessed as an isolated 
phenomenon (in contrast to hallucinations, depressed mood, etc.), but only in 
relation to something else. In other words, there cannot be insight without there 
being something to have insight about. Since different diseases will involve 
different symptomatology, the insight-symptom interdependency will result in 
differences in both the structure and manifestation of insight in relation to 
different diseases. In addition, once formed, insight has to show some 
specificity for the individual disease and symptoms. If insight is defined as self- 
knowledge in relation to the disease, then it entails knowledge about the 
particular disease, inevitably, different diseases will involve different types and 
amounts of knowledge, i.e. the knowledge held in relation to alcohol 
dependency, for example, may be different from the sort of knowledge held in 
relation to bipolar affective disorder. This, of course, also has bearing on the 
previously discussed issue concerning the meaning of the term 'mental 
disease/illness' as a construct and hence determined also by the changing 
ideas or knowledge about it within a particular society, time and culture.
Second, psychiatric illnesses consist of different disorders with variable effects 
on 'mental functioning'. Thus, schizophrenic disorders may affect the processes
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of thinking in different ways than, for example, phobic states. Such differential 
effects by different diseases on the cognitive and emotive processes will thus 
give rise to different clinical phenomena of insight.
it would seem that the relationship between insight and symptom structure and 
disease suggests that the manifestation of the phenomenon of insight will vary 
in relation to different disorders. This in turn suggests that in order to be valid, 
insight assessments should be adapted specifically to the individual disorders. 
In turn, this would also mean that with further understanding of both symptoms 
and 'illness', further modifications will have to be considered with respect to the 
evaluation of the phenomenon of insight.
8.6 Summary
A hierarchical model of insight construction, closely linked to symptom 
formation has been described, and mechanisms suggested to explain insight 
structure in relation to the different ways symptoms arise. Conceptualised in 
this way, insight is a continuous process where the factors operating in its 
construction will be changing according to the dynamics of symptom structure 
formation as well as in relation to the continuing changes externally 
(environment, contexts).
Three distinct levels have been identified in the postulated structure of insight. 
The first, or 'insight-tagging' level has been linked directly to the formation and 
expression of subjective mental symptoms themselves. The implication is that 
this level of insight structure can only be understood in relation to the 
understanding of symptom formation and expression. Additionally, at this level, 
questions concerning degrees/types of awareness involved, can likewise only 
be undertaken in conjunction with the exploration of the construction of 
individual symptoms. The second level has been identified as awareness of a
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symptom once this has been formed, and is dependent on the further 
understanding of the nature and mechanisms underlying awareness or 
consciousness. The third level in the structure of insight has been related to 
subsequent judgements made on the basis of the second level, and 
consequently, it involves the addition and interaction of multiple wide-ranging 
processes, themselves increasingly dependent on individual and cultural 
factors.
The model thus provides a structure to a broad concept of insight, built on 
successive levels of increasing sophistication of awareness and knowledge in 
relation to a patient's experience. Delineating such levels theoretically enables 
a choice to be made in relation to which level might be addressed in clinical 
assessment and research. Different levels of insight structure may have 
different applicability with respect to clinical and research purposes. It is not 
clear, for example, which level of insight structure might be of more use in 
terms of predictive validity. Awareness of symptoms as pathological, and their 
attribution to a mental illness are only some of the identifiable components (on 
separate levels) in this model, but clearly there are many more. Indeed, the 
perception of experiencing a change and the perception that this change is 
affecting certain functions or views may have more to do with overall insight 
than the attribution of this perceived change to a mental illness. Once more, 
this remains an empirical issue. The relative effect of different components of 
insight is something else that needs further research.
The model of insight structure emphasises two essential points. First, the 
distinctions made between levels carry important implications for empirical 
research. For example, differentiating between levels 2 and 3 theoretically, with 
the consequent differences in their underlying processes/mechanisms, 
suggests that research aiming to correlate insight with clinical variables or with 
brain functions/systems, needs to distinguish between the clinical phenomena
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that are being elicited. Second, the model stresses the interdependency 
between the structure of insight and its relational object. This is important 
because, as was discussed earlier, the various 'objects' of insight assessment 
themselves have different effects on the structure of insight (e.g. the difference 
between subjective mental symptoms and organic deficits as 'objects' of insight 
assessment). In turn, the differential structural effects on insight will likewise 
necessarily affect the phenomenon of insight that is being elicited and 
evaluated. Again, consideration of such interdependency must be important in 
research seeking to explain mechanisms underlying impairment of insight.
Finally, insight has been considered as a composite construct. Thus, insight as 
elicited and assessed in a clinical interview, will be the product of a number of 
constructive processes. Specifically, it will include the following factors: first, the 
patient's own construction of his/her experience; second, the clinician's 
construction of the patient's experience - based on both the speech and 
behaviour of the patient and the clinician's individual conceptualisation of 
insight; lastly, the factors involved in the interaction between patient and 
clinician that help shape these processes.
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CONCLUSION
The study of insight in the context of mental disorders is complicated. There are 
many reasons for this but three main ones have been identified here. First, and 
most importantly perhaps, it is because insight itself is a complex concept, one 
whose content is rich but abstract and whose boundaries are difficult to 
demarcate. Evidence presented here shows that from its development in the 
mid 19th century as a phenomenon to be studied separate from, but in relation 
to, mental illness, insight has been conceptualised in a variety of ways. These 
conceptualisations have been dependent, amongst other things, on prevailing 
philosophies and views concerning the nature and origin of mental disorders. 
Diverse views as to the meaning of insight, methods of assessing it clinically, its 
importance in clinical practice and relationship with other clinical variables, have 
continued to be prevalent. Such diversity is apparent not only between different 
disciplines (psychiatry/psychology/neurology) but also within them.
Second, and reflecting the diverse conceptualisations, approaches taken to the 
study of patients' insight into their symptoms/illness, have correspondingly been 
variable. Studies examining insight in patients have thus yielded mixed and 
inconsistent results. In consequence, it is difficult to compare such work and 
draw conclusions concerning the nature of insight in mental illness.
The third main source of problems in the study of insight lies in the difficulty in 
translating from a theoretical definition of insight into a practical or empirical 
means of insight assessment. Again, this reflects the definitional complexities of 
insight as a concept. Even when a relatively simple definition of insight is taken, 
such as, recognition of illness, difficulties remain in converting this to an insight 
assessment that captures its quantitative and qualitative components. To what 
extent, for example, should the recognition/acknowledgement of illness be 
taken? Do the patients have to be sure that they are ill, or is it enough that they
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have a 'feeling' of illness? Do they need to specify the sort of illness (and if so, 
to what degree) and the severity with which they believe this affects them? Is it 
enough to assess their occurrent verbal contents or do these need to be 
contextualised within the overall consistency of their speech and behaviour? 
Such questions complicate the translation process and are increasingly 
pertinent in relation to broader definitions of insight.
These main issues thus make the study of insight problematic. One of the 
important questions they raise is whether, in the light of the different 
conceptualisations and approaches, the researchers into insight have 
attempted to capture the same or different phenomenon of insight. The results 
of the second empirical study presented here, together with analysis of work on 
insight, suggest that the different approaches to the conceptualisation of insight 
have resulted in the assessment of clinically different phenomena. With the aim 
of making some sort of sense of the different phenomena falling under the term 
'insight', a model of the possible structure of insight has been developed. By 
systematically bringing together the likely factors and processes necessary to 
the construction of insight, a framework is presented against which different 
clinical phenomena can be identified. In addition, their mutual relationship as 
well as with the structure of insight as a whole, can be postulated. 
Consequently, this enables the proposed mechanisms underlying insight, 
including ideas on neurobiology and localisation, to be matched to the 
appropriate clinical phenomenon.
To capture the manifold and varied phenomena falling under the term 'insight', 
it was important to define insight broadly. For this purpose, insight was defined 
as a form of self-knowledge which individuals hold not only about the 
experiences affecting them but also about how such experiences affect their 
interaction with the world. Unpacking this broad definition resulted in the 
identification of awareness of an experience as forming the structural core of
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the concept of insight. This notion of awareness was common to all 
conceptualisations of insight. On the basis of this notion a hierarchical model of 
insight was developed, closely linked to the formation of experiences 
themselves. Judgements (on which knowledge is based) in relation to the core 
experiential awareness were viewed as constructions made by the patient (with 
the contribution of clinicians/others and the interactive situation) and 
underpinned both by general and by individual factors. The hierarchical element 
of this structure depended on successive levels of increasing sophistication of 
judgements, and hence of knowledge, in relation to the patient's experience. 
Apart from identification of different levels capturing different clinical 
phenomena, the model also emphasised the complex and interdependent 
relationship between insight and the 'object' of insight assessment.
The overall purpose of the model of the structure of insight was not so much to 
identify and to capture all possible components of insight, but to recognise the 
specific components/phenomena that were being sought in relation to different 
clinical/research settings.
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1. 1 have come into hospital for a rest yes no 1 don't know
2. 1 have never been so ill in my life yes no 1 don't know
3. Mental illness does not exist yes no 1 don't know
4. 1 am here because 1 was asked to come yes no 1 don't know
5. My condition can be treated with medicines yes no 1 don't know
6. Why have you come to hospital?
(you can ring more than one)
a. My doctor asked me to
b. 1 am ill and need treatment
c. My wife/husband might leave me if 1
d. 1 feel nervous but not ill
e. 1 was forced
 didn't
7. Should anyone be here instead of you? yes no 1 don't know
8. To feel well 1 only need some advice and talking to yes no 1 don't know
9. 1 have been having some silly thoughts yes no 1 don't know
10. Nothing is the matter with me yes no 1 don't know
11. The mind cannot become ill, only the body yes no 1 don't know
12. 1 shall sue the hospital if 1 am not allowed out yes no 1 don't know
13. No one believes 1 am ill yes no 1 don't know
14. Something very strange is happening to me yes no 1 don't know
15. My neighbours are after me yes no 1 don't know
16. 1 feel my mind is going yes no 1 don't know
17.1 know that my thoughts are silly but 1 can't help it yes no 1 don't know
18. ! cannot stop worrying about things yes no 1 don't know
19. The voices 1 hear are not in my mind yes no ! don’t know
20. Someone is controlling my mind yes no 1 don't know
21. All 1 need is to pull myself together yes no 1 don't know
22.1 feel different from my normal self yes no 1 don't know
23.1 am losing contact with my environment yes no 1 don't know
24.1 am losing contact with myself yes no 1 don't know
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2 5 .1 understand why I am in hospital
2 6 .1 understand why other people think I should
yes no don't know
be in hospital yes no 1 don't know
27. 1 feel in control of my thoughts yes no 1 don't know
28. 1 feel in control of my feelings yes no 1 don't know
29. 1 could have prevented this situation yes no 1 don't know
30. 1 find it difficult to explain how 1 feel yes no 1 don't know
31. 1 want to know what is happening to me yes no 1 don't know
32. 1 want to know why 1 am feeling like this yes no 1 don't know
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APPENDIX C
Semi-structured interview - Insight
1. What do you think about coming in to hospital?
Do you think it is appropriate? Elaborate.
Rating:
0   10
not appropriate entirely appropriate
2. What do you see as being the problem?
What is causing this?
Do you think you are ill? To what extent?
Do you feel any different from your normal self? In what way?
Rating:
0  10
totally different normal self
3. Do you think you could have prevented this from happening? How?
4. How do you think other people view you? Strangers/relatives/friends?
5. Anything else you would like to add to this?
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APPENDIX D
TO BE COMPLETED BY THE PATIENT 
(WITHOUT HELP OR PROMPTING BY OTHERS)
MEMORY QUESTIONNAIRE
S e lf -a d m in is te re d  v e rs io n  (Markovâ & Berrios 1996)
N a m e  A g e  D a te
FOR EACH ITEM (19 ALTOGETHER) PLEASE CIRCLE THE LETTER (a o rb  
arc, etc.) CORRESPONDING TO THE ANSWER THAT BEST DEALS WITH
THE QUESTION:
1) Compared with 10 years ago, my memory now Is:
a. better than before
b. the same
c. worse than before
d. much worse
2) Compared with members of my family, my memory is:
a. better
b. much the same
a. worse
d. much worse
3) Concerning my health:
a. there is nothing wrong with me, I feel very well
b. I do not feel any different from my normal self
c. in general, I am feeling different, less sure/confident, uneasy
d. I feel ill, there is something wrong with me
4) When I think back to the past (e.g. my childhood, school, friends etc.):
a. I can remember most events in detail, clearer than ever
b. my recollection of events is much the same as usual
c. I can remember main things, but find that the details are not as clear or vivid
d. things that happened in the past are very unclear, I notice I have gaps/blanks for 
events /people
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5) When thinking back to events in the past:
a. it is easier now to remember all details
b. it feels no different than ever
c. I have noticed that it takes more effort to recall certain things
d. I have to put in much more effort and work to remember anything
6) When I try and recall events happening recently, in the last day or so:
a. I can remember most things much more cleariy
b. my recollection of things is much the same as usual
c. I can remember the main things, but find that the details are not as clear
d. I find that most things happening recently are very unclear, I can forget some things 
completely
7) Remembering things that happened recently e.g. yesterday or in the last
week:
a. is much easier than before
b. feels no different now than it has always been
c. I have noticed that it takes more effort to recall certain things
d. I have to put in much more effort and work to recall anything
8) With respect to various events in my life:
a. things that have happened recently are much clearer in my mind than those that 
happened long ago
b. events which happened long ago are just as clear to me as those happening 
recently
c. events from the distant past are much clearer in my mind than those occurring 
recently
9) In relation to remembering the names of people or places;
a. I have no difficulties at all
b. i have not noticed any change in doing so
c. I have noticed some difficulties and/or am slower in doing so
d. i have considerable difficulties
10) Concerning the reason I am here today:
a. I am unsure why I am here
b. I was asked to come by my doctor/famiiy/friends
c. I need help because I feel there is something wrong with my health
d. I need help because I think that I may have a condition such as dementia
11) When I am talking with other people:
a. I never have difficulty in expressing myself
b. I talk in much the same way as usual
c. I have noticed some difficulties in expressing myself
d. I have difficulties in remembering the words I want to use
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12) When talking with other people or watching T V.:
a. I find it easy to understand everything
b. I understand and follow conversations in much the same way as always
c. I have noticed it takes more effort to follow conversations/plots etc.
d. I have difficulty in understanding much of what is going on
13) With respect to household tasks/gardening/other activities:
a. I can do things better than ever
b. I do things as well as I ever did
c. I have noticed some difficulties in doing these things
d. I have great difficulties in doing things the way I used to
14) With respect to household tasks/gardening/other activities:
a. I feel more confident than ever in carrying out my tasks
b. I feel as confident as always in doing such things
c. I am not as confident as I used to be in doing these things
d. I have lost a lot of confidence in my ability to do these things
15) In terms of some/particular tasks/jobs:
a. I have no difficulties in working out how to do things
b. I am much the same as I ever was in working things out
c. It seems to take more effort in working out how to do certain things
d. I have difficulties in working most things out
16) Compared with my friends, my memory is:
a. better
b. much the same
c. worse
d. much worse
17) When planning/organizing events e.g. people coming for a meal or going
out, etc.:
a. I have no difficulties at all
b. I am much the same in this respect as I always have been
c. It seems to fake more effort/I am not as confident in these things
d. I have great difficulties in doing such things
18) When I see other people, friends/family:
a. I have no difficulties in talking with them
b. I feel no different in talking to them than I ever did
c. I feel a little less confident/uncomfortable with them
d. I find it difficult, and try and avoid them
19) Concerning any current problems:
a. I don't have any problems at present
b. in general, my problems are much the same as usual
c. I have some difficulties, but these are normal as one gets older
d. my problems are related to the difficulties I have with my memory/thinking
(THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE i!)
Appendix D / 249APPENDIX D
TO BE COMPLETED BY RELATIVE OR FRIEND
MEMORY QUESTIONNAIRE (Markové & Bemos, 1996)
N a m e  A g e  D a te
C a re r 's  n a m e
FOR EACH ITEM (19 ALTOGETHER) PLEASE CIRCLE THE LETTER (a orb  
arc, etc.) CORRESPONDING TO THE ANSWER THAT BEST DEALS WITH
THE QUESTION:
1) Compared with 10 years ago, his/her memory now is:
a. better than before
b. the same
c. worse than before
d. much worse
2) Compared with members of the family, his/her memory is:
a. better
b. much the same
c. worse
d. much worse
3) Concerning his/her health:
a. there is nothing wrong with this, he/she seems very well
b. he/she does not seem different from his/her normal self
a in general, he/she seems to be different, less sure/confident, uneasy
d. he/she is ill, there is something wrong with him/her
4) When talking about the past (e.g. childhood, school, friends etc.):
a. he/she can remember most events in detail, clearer than ever
b. his/her recollection of events is much the same as usuai
c. he/she can remember main things, but find that the details are not as clear or vivid
d. he/she has major difficulties in recollecting most things, he/she seems to have 
gaps/blanks for events /people
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5) When thinking back to events in the past:
a. he/she finds it easier now to remember all details
b. he/she is much the same as ever
c. It seems to take him/her more effort to recall certain things
d. he/she has to put in much more effort and work to remember anything
6) When trying and recall events happening recently, in the last day or so:
a. he/she can remember most things much more clearly
b. his/her recollection of things is much the same as usual
c. he/she can remember the main things, but the details are not as clear
d. he/she is very unclear about most recent things, he/she can forget some things 
completely
7) Remembering things that happened recently e.g. yesterday or in the last 
week:
a. he/she finds this much easier than before
b. he/she is much the same as ever
c. it seems to take him/her more effort to recall certain things
d. he/she has to put in much more effort and work to recall anything
8) With respect to various events in his/her life:
a. things that have happened recently are much clearer in his/her mind than those 
that happened long ago
b. events which happened long ago are just as clear to him/her as those happening 
recently
a events from the distant past are much clearer in his/her mind than those occurring 
recently
9) In relation to remembering the names of people or places:
a. he/she has no difficulties at all
b. he/she is much the same as usual
c. he/she has some difficulties and/or is slower in doing so
d. he/she has considerable difficulties
10) Concerning his/her understanding about coming here today:
a. he/she does not know why he/she is here today
b. he/she has agreed to come at the request of the doctor/family/friends
c. he /she is concerned about his/her health
d. he/she is concerned about the possibility of suffering from a condition such as 
dementia
11) When he/she is talking with other people:
a. he/she never has difficulty in expressing his/herself
b. he/she talks in much the same way as usual
c. he/she has some difficulties in expressing his/herself
d. he/she has major difficulties in remembering the right words
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12) When talking with other people or watching T.V.:
a. he/she has no difficulty in understanding everything
b. he/she understands and follows conversations in much the same way as always
c. he/she seems to have more difficulties in following conversations/plots etc.
d. he/she has great difficulty in understanding much of what is going on
13) With respect to household tasks/gardening/other activities:
a. he/she can do things better than ever
b. he/she does such things as well as eve
c. he/she seems to have some difficulties in doing these things
d. he/she has great difficulties in doing things the way he/she used to
14) With respect to household tasks/gardening/other activities:
a. he/she seems more confident than ever in carrying out such tasks
b. he/she seems as confident as always in doing such things
c. he/she has lost some confidence in doing these things
d. he/she has lost a great deal of confidence in these things
15) In terms of some/particular tasks/jobs:
a. he/she has no difficulties in working out how to do things
b. there is no difference in his/her ability to work things out
c. It seems to take him/her more effort in working out how to do certain things
d. he/she has great difficulties in working most things out
16) Compared with friends, his/her memory is:
a. better
b. much the same
c. worse
d. much worse
17) When planning/organizing events e.g. people coming for a meal or going 
out, etc.:
a. he/she has no difficulties at all
b. he/she is much the same in this respect as always
c. It seems to take him/her more effort, he/she is not confident in these things
d. he/she has great difficulties in doing such things
18) When seeing other people, friends/family:
a. he/she has no difficulties in talking with them
b. he/she talks with them in much the same way as usual
c. he/she seems less confident, appears uncomfortable with them
d. he/she seems to find it difficult, and tries to avoid them
19) Concerning any current problems:
a. he/she doesn't have any problems at present
b. in general, his/her problems are much the same as usual
c. he/she has some difficulties, but these are normal as one gets older
d. his/her problems are related to the difficulties with his/her memory/thinking
(THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE I!)
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T a b le  8
Ite m  a n a ly s is  o f  s e lf -a d m in is te r e d  v e rs io n  o f  th e  M IQ  (n = 1 0 0 )
Ite m
N u m b e r
(patient-
answered)
R a n g e M in im u m  
V a lu e  fo r  
Ite m
M a x im u m  
V a lu e  fo r  
Ite m
M e a n  V a lu e
(s.d.)
S k e w n e s s
1 3 1 4 3.13 (0.69) -0.551
2 3 1 4 3.01 (0.75) - 0.464
3 3 1 4 2.67 (0.82) - 0.453
4 3 1 4 2.69 (0.88) - 0.060
5 3 1 4 2 .7 7  (0.78) -0.101
6 3 1 4 3.17(0.82) - 0.665
7 3 1 4 3.03 (0.76) - 0.476
8 2 1 3 2.36 (0.66) - 0.545
9 3 1 4 3.14(0.70) -0.380
10 3 1 4 2.56 (0.84) + 0.475
11 3 1 4 2.98 (1.02) -0.534
12 3 1 4 2.38 (0.84) -0.189
13 3 1 4 2.72 (0.74) + 0.196
14 3 1 4 2.76 (0.77) + 0.304
15 3 1 4 2.59 (0.79) -0.613
16 3 1 4 2.88 (0.76) - 0.226
17 3 1 4 2.60 (0.74) - 0.430
18 3 1 4 2.27 (0.94) + 0.247
19 3 1 4 3.19(0.97) -0.865
T a b le  9
Ite m  a n a ly s is  o f  c a re r 's  v e rs io n  o f  th e  M IQ  (n = 1 0 0 )
Ite m
N u m b e r
(carer-
answered)
R a n g e M in im u m  
V a lu e  fo r  
Ite m
M a x im u m  
V a lu e  fo r  
Ite m
M e a n  V a lu e
(s.d.)
S k e w n e s s
1 2 2 4 3.24 (0.65) -0.288
2 3 1 4 3.08 (0.79) - 0.270
3 3 1 4 2.84 (0.75) -0.319
4 3 1 4 2.61 (0.84) + 0.010
5 3 1 4 2.72 (0.74) + 0.196
6 2 2 4 3.28 (0.77) - 0.528
7 3 1 4 2.96 (0.68) -0.147
8 2 1 3 2.35 (0.64) - 0.471
9 3 1 4 3.00 (0.85) - 0.598
10 3 1 4 2.76 (0.82) + 0.246
11 3 1 4 2.48 (0.88) - 0.209
12 3 1 4 2.24 (0.85) - 0.089
13 2 2 4 2.70 (0.78) + 0.588
14 3 1 4 2.74 (0.75) + 0.169
15 3 1 4 2.47 (0.85) - 0.465
16 3 1 4 2.87 (0.79) -0.145
17 3 1 4 2.56 (0.81) -0.316
18 3 1 4 2.09 (0.82) + 0.397
19 3 1 4 3.27 (0.96) - 0.847
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T a b le  1 0
R e lia b il ity  a n a ly s is  fo r  s e lf -a d m in is te r e d  v e rs io n  o f  th e  M IQ  (n = 1 0 0 )
Ite m  N u m b e r M e a n  V a lu e
(s.d.)
S c a le  M e a n  if  
I te m  D e le te d
S c a le  
V a r ia n c e  if  
I te m  D e le te d
A lp h a  V a lu e  
i f  Ite m  
D e le te d
1 3.13(0.69) 49.77 65.27 0.8650
2 3.01 (0.75) 49.89 64.50 0.8640
3 2.67 (0.82) 50.23 66.70 0.8722
4 2.69 (0.88) 50.21 66.05 0.8722
5 2.77 (0.78) 50.13 64.05 0.8634
6 3.17(0.82) 49.73 64.02 0.8644
7 3.03 (0.76) 49.87 64.13 0.8632
8 2.36 (0.66) 50.54 69.40 0.8759
9 3.14(0.70) 49.76 65.15 0.8648
10 2.56 (0.84) 50.34 67.36 0.8747
11 2.98(1.02) 49.92 64.90 0.8733
12 2.38 (0.84) 50.52 65.30 0.8688
13 2.72 (0.74) 50.18 66.12 0.8686
14 2.76 (0.77) 50.14 66.61 0.8707
15 2.59 (0.79) 50.31 64.56 0.8654
16 2.88 (0.76) 50.02 63.51 0.8612
17 2.60 (0.74) 50.30 64.23 0.8630
18 2.27 (0.94) 50.63 63.27 0.8657
19 3.19 (0.97) 49.71 63.86 0.8685
Reliability Coefficients 19 items:
Alpha Cronbach "  0.8738 
Standardised item alpha = 0.8778
T a b le  11
R e lia b il ity  a n a ly s is  fo r  c a re r 's  v e rs io n  o f  M IQ  (n = 1 0 0 )
Ite m  N u m b e r M e a n  V a lu e
(s.d.)
S c a le  M e a n  if  
Ite m  D e le te d
S c a le  
V a r ia n c e  i f  
Ite m  D e le te d
A lp h a  V a lu e  
if  ite m  
D e le te d
1 3.24 (0.65) 49.02 74.75 0.8951
2 3.08 (0,79) 49.18 73.18 0.8944
3 2.84 (0.75) 49.42 75.82 0.8993
4 2.61 (0.84) 49.65 73.34 0.8960
5 2.72 (0.74) 49.54 73.48 0.8941
6 3.28 (0.77) 48.98 73.66 0.8950
7 2.96 (0.68) 49.30 73.63 0.8932
8 2.35 (0.64) 49.91 77.48 0.9007
9 3.00 (0.85) 49.26 72.17 0.8937
10 2.76 (0.82) 49.50 78.45 0.9061
11 2.48 (0.88) 49.78 73.65 0.8977
12 2.24 (0.85) 50.02 73.35 0.8964
13 2.70 (0.78) 49.56 73.52 0.8951
14 2.74 (0.75) 49.52 72.88 0.8929
15 2.47 (0.85) 49.79 71.78 0.8927
16 2.87 (0.79) 49.39 71.55 0.8907
17 2.56 (0.81) 49.70 71.14 0.8902
18 2.09 (0.82) 50.17 74.75 0.8986
19 3.27 (0.96) 48.99 70.74 0.8933
Reliability coefficients 19 items: 
Alpha Cronbach = 0.9006 
Standardised item alpha = 0.9015
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T a b le  1 2
R e lia b il ity  a n a ly s is  (s p li t -h a lf )  fo r  s e lf -a d m in is te r e d  v e rs io n  o f  th e  WIIQ (n = 1 0 0 )  
(1 0  ite m s  in  p a r t  1; 9 Ite m s  In p a r t  2 )
S c a le
Ite m s
M e a n
V a lu e
(s.d.)
V a r ia n c e ite m  M e a n Ite m
R a n g e
(min. - 
max.)
Ite m
V a r ia n c e
P a r t  1
(10 items)
26.87
(4.87)
23.22 2.69 2.27-3.13 0.07
P a r t  2
(9 items)
26.03
(4.27)
18.27 2.89 2.36-3.19 0.08
T o ta l
S c a le
(19 items)
52.90
(8.49)
72.15 2.78 2.27-3.19 0.08
Alpha for part 1 = 0.7901 Alpha for part 2 = 0.7732
T a b le  13
R e lia b il ity  a n a ly s is  (s p li t -h a lf )  fo r  c a re r 's  v e rs io n  o f  th e  M IQ  (n ” 1 0 0 )  
(1 0  ite m s  in p a r t  1; 9  ite m s  in p a r t  2 )
S c a le
Ite m s
M e a n
V a lu e
(s.d.)
V a r ia n c e Ite m  M e a n Ite m
R a n g e
(min. - 
max.)
I te m
V a r ia n c e
P a r t  1
(10 Items)
26.15
(5.10)
25.99 2.62 2.09-3.24 0.11
P a r t  2
(9 items)
26.11
(4.57)
20.91 2.90 2.35-3.28 0.09
T o ta l
S c a le
(19 items)
52.26
(9.03)
81.61 2.75 2.09-3.28 0.12
Alpha for part 1 = 0.8360 Alpha for part 2 = 0.8265
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(ii) Relationship between the severity of the mental disorder and insight
Correlations were calculated between insight scores at 1st and 2nd interviews 
and severity of mental disorders at both times, as measured by the BPRS and 
the HRSD. The results at first interview showed a negative correlation 
(Pearson's) between the severity of psychotic disorder (BPRS scores) and the 
overall positive insight score (r = -0.9205; P< 0.01); patients with higher BPRS 
scores at initial interview showed lower levels of insight. The results at second 
interview also showed a negative correlation (r = -0.9498; P< 0.01) between 
severity of depressive illness (HRSD scores) and the overall positive insight 
score; i.e. patients showing a greater degree of severity of depression around 
the time of discharge from hospital had lower levels of insight at that time.
Table 6
O rg a n ic  a n d  p s y c h ia tr ic  g ro u p s  c o m p a re d  o n  m a in  p s y c h ia tr ic  m e a s u re m e n ts
P s y c h ia tr ic  M e a s u re ^ O rg a n ic  G ro u p
median value (inter­
quartile range)
P s y c h ia tr ic  G ro u p
median value (inter­
quartile range)
M a n n -W h itn e y
U
S ig n if ic a n c e ^
2-Tailed
Beck Depression 
Inventory
6 (2.25-12) (n=44) 10.5 (6-19) (n=44) 570.0 P< 0.0135
Carers' Checklist 
(TRIMS-BPC)
47 (26-82) 
(n=47)
73
(24.5-122.5) (n=29)
579.5 NS
Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaire
93 (75-98) (n=39) 73.5 (58.25-82.75) 
(n=44)
422.5 P< 0.0015
Dissociation
Questionnaire
7.5 (6-12) (n=24) 10 (8-11) (n=31) 329.0 NS
General Health 
Questionnaire 28
4 (1-8.75) (n=48) 8.5 (2.25-14) (n=44) 766.5 NS
Maudsley Obsess.- 
Compulsive. Inventory
6.5 (3.25-9.25) 
(n=8)
7 (4-14) (n=19) 67.0 NS
Personality Invent. - 
dominance subscale
29 (27-30) (n=31) 29 (2 6 .7 5 -3 1 )  (n=34) 514.0 NS
Personality Invent. -
extrapunitive
subscale
27 (25-29) (n-31) 27.5 (25-30) (n=34) 479.0 NS
Personality Invent. - 
intropunitive subscale
32 (30-33) (n=31) 3 0 .5  (2 9 -3 2 .2 5 )
(n=34)
394.5 NS
Signal Detection 
Memory - R. value
1.31 (0.7-3.08) 
(n=44)
3.66 (1.49-8.38) 
(n~44)
572.5 P< 0.015
Signal Detection 
Memory - d' value
1.27 (0.63-1.67) 
(n=44)
1.9 (1.54-2.28) 
(n=44)
436.5 P< 0.0015
Snaith’s Irritability 
Questionnaire - 
anxiety subscale
3 (2-5) (n=34) 5(3-9) (n=35) 411.5 NS
Snaith's Irritability 
Questionnaire - 
depress. Subscale
3 (2.75-5) (n=34) 5(2-8) (n=35) 478.0 NS
Snaith's Irritability 
Questionnaire - inward 
irritability
3(1 -4) (n=34) 3 (1 -4 ) (n = 3 5 ) 566.0 NS
Snaith's Irritability 
questionnaire - 
outward irritability
3(1-5) (n=34) 4(3-6) (n=35) 457.5 NS
= References for psychiatric measures are in section on Methods 
 ^= Bonferroni corrected
Table 7
O rg a n ic  a n d  p s y c h ia tr ic  g r o u p s  c o m p a re d  o n  m a in  n e u r o p s y c h o lo g ic a l
m e a s u re m e n ts
N e u r o p s y c h o lo g y
M e a s u re ^
O rg a n ic  G ro u p
median value 
(inter-quartile 
range)
P s y c h ia tr ic
G ro u p
median value 
(inter-quartile 
range)
M a n n -
W h itn e y
U
S ig n if ic a n c e ^
2-Tailed
Verbal IQ 96.5 (85.25- 
106.75) (n=44)
103 (90-112) 
(n=31)
518.5 NS
Arithmetic 9(7-12) (n=46) 11 (8-13) (n=31) 565.5 NS
Block Design 9.5 (7-12.25) 
(n=50)
12 (9-14) (n=31) 525.5 NS
Digit Span 9(7-11) (n-51) 10 (7-11) (n=32) 688.0 NS
Fragmented Letters 
(VOSP)
19 (18-19) (n=47) 20 (19-20) 
(n=28)
355.5 P< 0.0075
Similarities 8.5 (6-11) (n=50) 11 (9-13) (n=32) 479.0 P< 0.03
Vocabulary 9(8-12) (n=50) 11 (8-13) (n=32) 612.5 NS
MART IQ 106 (96-116) 
(n=50)
111.5 (97.25- 
117.25) (n=32)
735.5 NS
McKenna Naming Test 
(raw score)
17 (9-21) (n=47) 24 (19.75-26.25) 
(n=30)
260.5 P< 0.0015
Verbal Fluency (using 
'S')
12 (7-18.5) (n=41) 16 (10.5-17) 
(n=29)
431.5 NS
Wechsler Memory 
Scale: Passages - 
immediate recalP
16.5 (4-38.5) 
(n=32)
63 (28-86) 
(n=27)
185.5 P< 0.003
Wechsler Memory 
Scale: Passages - 
delayed recalP
8(2-35) (n=29) 51 (35.5-78.5) 
(n=25)
110.5 P< 0.0015
Wechsler Memory 
Scale: Design - 
immediate recalP
31.5 (11.25-69.25) 
(n=26)
94 (57-99) 
(n=19)
85.5 P< 0.003
Warrington Reoognition 
Memory Test: Words- 
50^
3 (3-9) (n=42) 10 (6-12) (n=30) 334.5 P< 0.0135
Warrington Recognition 
Memory Test: Faces- 
50^
5 (3-8) (n=32) 8(7-9) (n=28) 223.0 P< 0.009
1 = References for the neuropsychological tests are in section on Methods 
 ^= Bonferroni corrected
 ^= raw scores have been age adjusted to give scale scores (Warrington) & 
percentiles (Wechsler)
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The 'organic' sample showed significantly lower mean scores on the Beck 
Depression Inventory (p< 0.0135). They also had significantly worse scores on 
the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (p< 0.0015) and on the Signal Detection 
Memory Test (d' scores - p< 0.0015; scores - p< 0.015).
With respect to neuropsychological performance, the organic patient group 
performed significantly worse on a number of measurements, particularly on the 
memory tests for recognition and recall but also on Mckenna Naming Test, 
fragmented letters and similarities. The organic patients were also significantly 
worse in tests of frontal lobe dysfunction, i.e. the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
and/or the WeigI (Chi-Squared = 9.57, P< 0.001).
Table 14
C o m p a r is o n  o f  to ta l  in s ig h t  s c o re s  (a s  fu n c t io n s  o f  d is c r e p a n c y  v a lu e s  o n  th e  
M IQ ) b e tw e e n  o rg a n ic  p a t ie n ts  a n d  p s y c h ia tr ic  p a t ie n ts
D is c re p a n c ie s  
o n  M IQ
O rg a n ic
G ro u p
(n=56)
median value 
(inter-quartile 
range)
P s y c h ia tr ic
G ro u p
(n=44)
median value 
(inter-quartile 
range)
M a n n -W h itn e y
U
S ig n if ic a n c e ^
2-Tailed
Total
discrepancy
score
10.50
(7.00-15.00)
11.00
(7.25-16.00)
1143.5 NS
Total positive 
discrepancies
5.00
(2.25-11.75)
3.00
(1.25-5.00)
773.0 P< 0.003
Total negative 
discrepancies
3.00
(1.00-5.00)
7.00
(3.00-12.50)
662.5 P< 0.0003
Bonferroni corrected
Table 16
O rg a n ic  a n d  p s y c h ia tr ic  p a t ie n ts  c o m p a r e d  o n  in s ig h t  s c o re s  in  re la t io n  to  th e  4  
s u b d iv is io n s  o f  m e m o ry  fu n c t io n :  g e n e ra l,  m e m o ry , la n g u a g e  a n d  c o g n it iv e .
S u p e r v a r ia b le
(items, whose 
discrepancy 
values, are added 
are in brackets)
O rg a n ic  G ro u p
(n=56)
median value 
(inter-quartile 
range)
P s y c h ia tr ic
G ro u p
(n=44)
median value 
(inter-quartile 
range)
M a n n -W h itn e y
U
S ig n if ic a n c e
2-Tailed
G E N E R A L
(3,10,19)
1.00
(1.00-3.00)
1.00
(1.00-2.00)
1025.5 NS
M E M O R Y
(1,2,4,5.6, 7,8,16)
3.00
(1.00-6.00)
3.00
(1.00-5.00)
1141.0 NS
L A N G U A G E
(9,11,18)
1.00
(0.25-2.00)
2.00
(1.00-3.00)
952.0 NS after Bonferroni 
correction:
P< 0.16
C O G N IT IV E
(12,13,14, 15,17)
2.00
(1.00-2.00)
2.00
(1.00-5.00)
1154.5 NS
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In quantitative terms (table 16) again both groups appear to be showing similar 
degrees of impaired insight (i.e. no significant difference in size of 
discrepancies) in each area. There is a trend, not reaching significance levels 
following Bonferroni correction (p< 0.16), for the ‘psychiatric’ patients to show a 
greater extent of discrepancy in the language area, suggestive of less insight 
into these problems.
C h ap ter 7 / 1 7 1
The only area in which the 2 patient groups showed some difference, albeit not 
at a significant level following Bonferroni corrections, in terms of a quantitative 
measure of insight was language. As is evident from the results in table 16, 
'psychiatric' patients differed from the 'organic' patients not only in the type of 
insight but also in the amount of insight they held as determined by the greater 
discrepancy values on the MIQ. This indicates that 'psychiatric' patients appear 
to show less insight into their language function than do 'organic' patients. 
Although not statistically significant, the trend should be discussed in view of 
the supporting results concerning the language area and insight (tables 15 and
18). A number of reasons could account for this.
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(4) Correlations between insight, psychiatric and neuropsychological variables
The total insight scores and positive and negative subscores were correlated 
with the computerised psychiatric tests and with neuropsychological 
performance. The results showed that total insight scores did not correlate 
significantly with any psychiatric or neuropsychological variable.
With respect to psychiatric measures, the total positive discrepancy scores 
showed negative correlations (Pearson's, Bonferroni corrections) with Beck 
Depression Inventory scores (r = -0.2217; P< 0.05), GHQ28 scores (r = - 
0.2606; P< 0.05) and the Signal Detection Memory score (d') (r= -0.3303; P< 
0.04). There was a positive correlation with the Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaire score (r ~ 0.3308; P< 0.04). This shows that the greater the 
positive discrepancy, indicating greater underestimation of memory problems, 
the less depressed and/or less emotionally disturbed were the patients (as 
determined by the BDI and GHQ) and the worse they performed on the Signal 
Detection Memory test (indicating organic impairment) and on the Cognitive 
Failures Questionnaire (indicating attentional difficulties). In contrast, the total 
negative discrepancy scores showed only a significant negative correlation with 
the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (r = -0.4219; P< 0.01). This shows that the 
higher the negative discrepancy, indicating greater overestimation of memory 
problems, the lower the score on the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire.
With respect to neuropsychological measures, the total positive discrepancy 
scores showed significant negative correlations with Similarities (r = -0.2955;
P< 0.05), the Wechsler Memory Scale for Passages (1) immediate recall (r = - 
0.3554; P< 0.05) and (2) delayed recall (r = -0.3885; P< 0.05), Warrington 
Recognition Memory Test (r = -0.5098; P< 0.05) and Warrington Recognition 
Test for Faces (r = -0.4105; P< 0.05). This shows that the higher the positive 
discrepancies, indicating greater underestimation of memory problems, the
worse the performance on these neuropsychological tests. The total negative 
discrepancy scores showed significant positive correlations with the Warrington 
Recognition Memory Test (r = 0.3240; P< 0.02) and McKenna's naming test (r 
= 0.2791 ; P< 0.05). This shows that the higher the negative discrepancies, 
indicating greater overestimation of memory problems, the better the 
performance on these particular neuropsychological tests.
(5) Relationship between neuropsychological performance, patients' self- 
evaluations and carers' evaluations
In order to get an indication of whether patients' self-evaluations of their 
memory problems and carers' assessment of patients' memory problems bore 
any relationship to actual memory impairment as elicited on neuropsychological 
testing, further analyses were carried out. In this case, discrepancy values were 
not used and instead, the total scores obtained by patients on the MIQ were 
correlated with neuropsychological performance. Similarly, the total scores 
given by carers on the MIQ were correlated with the patients' 
neuropsychological performance. It was predicted that carers' assessments 
were more likely to correlate with degree of memory impairment as determined 
by the neuropsychology results. Results showed this to be the case. There 
were no significant correlations (Pearson's, Bonferroni corrections) found 
between patients' self-assessments and their performance on neuropsychology 
tests. In contrast, there were significant correlations between carers' 
assessments and neuropsychology results. The strongest correlations were 
with Similarities (r = -0.3015; P< 0.03), Warrington Recognition Memory Test (r 
= -0.4086; P< 0.03) and Block design (r = -0.2797; P< 0.03).
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Addendum
The thesis sets out to explore the concept of insight. Analysis of the 
development of the concept in relation to mental illness (chapter 1) together 
with the analyses of studies examining insight in psychology (chapter 2), in 
relation to functional psychiatric disorders (chapter 3), neuropsychological 
deficits (chapter 4), and chronic organic brain syndromes (chapter 5), ail point 
towards the conclusion that insight as evaluated within the mental state 
examination cannot validly be considered a symptom, one that is moreover 
assessed as present, partially present or absent. What has been attempted in 
the thesis is to indicate in different ways the complex nature of the 
phenomenon and to identify some of its possible components and their 
interrelationships within an overall structure. What is shown clearly is that the 
nature of this complex, multifaceted concept has resulted in different aspects of 
the phenomenon being explored in the numerous studies in this area and from 
different perspectives. This has also resulted in the inconsistent and 
inconclusive results pertaining to insight and clinical variables. It is also clear 
from this work that it is the nature of the subject that precludes individual 
empirical studies from contributing more than a fraction towards the 
understanding of the components underlying insight as a whole. In other words, 
individual empirical studies can only explore specific aspects of insight and it 
would take a large number of individual studies to empirically determine all 
possible components of insight.
In formulating a structure for the concept of Insight, chapter 8 therefore had to 
draw on all the preceding work to firstly, identify the perspectives from which 
insight could be assessed, secondly to identify the possible structural 
components of insight and, thirdly, to build these up in a systematic way for the 
conceptualisation of the overall framework. Thus, the whole chapter apart from 
the few pages dealing speculatively with symptom ‘formation’, is intrinsically
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linked with the conceptual and empirical work carried out in the previous 
chapters. Each of the chapters contributes in a different way to the 
understanding of the structure of insight as a whole. Chapter 1, in examining 
the development of the concept as an independent phenomenon in relation to 
mental illness, brings out some of the complexities in the definition of the term 
and possible components (particularly, awareness/consciousness and 
judgement/knowledge) hinted at in the debates held by the psychopathologists 
of the 19''' century. Chapter 2 explores insight from the psychological 
perspective and emphasises the specific narrower definitions in the Gestalt 
sense and highlights emotional and perceptual components. In addition, 
unconscious components within the structure of a ‘deeper’ knowledge or insight 
are raised, all such factors important in the development of the model of insight. 
Chapters 3,4 and 5 analyse the numerous studies on insight in relation to 
functional psychiatric disorders, neuropsychological deficits and chronic organic 
brain syndromes respectively. Most evident here is that different definitions are 
employed, different instruments used, and different components of insight are 
captured. Whilst token acknowledgement of such differences have been made, 
these have not, until now, been empirically explored. The analyses here also 
raise the complex relationship between insight and the ‘object’ of insight 
assessment, be it psychiatric illness, symptoms or neurological deficit. Again 
this interdependency becomes important in the construction of the model of 
insight. Chapters 6 and 7 attempt in different ways to examine empirically 
some of the specific possible components of insight as suggested by the 
preceding conceptual work. The first study was able to identify some of the 
qualitative aspects to judgements made by patients in relation to their mental 
illness. The difference between awareness of experienced change and the 
attribution of such experience to psychopathology was also highlighted and is 
important in the development of the model of insight, particularly in relation to 
levels 2 and 3 of the model. The study in chapter 7 is not designed to follow 
logically from the previous study. Instead, it aims to approach insight from a
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different perspective in order to emphasise the multifaceted nature of the 
phenomenon of insight. It is crucial in the empirical validation of the distinction 
between primary awareness and secondary judgement that had been identified 
from the preceding conceptual analyses. This distinction forms an essential part 
of the model of insight presented in the last chapter and without this empirical 
support, the discussion would be purely speculative. The empirical studies and 
the model of insight itself raise many more questions but also help indicate the 
direction of further empirical work.
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